PAKISTAN
Dictating Democracy
The Taliban collapse next door has put pressure on Pakistan. Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf, wrestling with Islamic extremism and tensions with India, is banking on a balance of military rule and democracy to hold his country together--and hold on to power
By Michael Vatikiotis/ISLAMABAD Issue cover-dated December 20, 2001
LT.-GEN. SYED Tanwir Husain Naqvi is the new face of military rule in Pakistan. The former tank commander is in charge of what the regime led by Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf calls a "road map" for the restoration of democracy. Working to a three-year deadline that expires in 10 months, Musharraf plans to hold elections but stay on as president. He claims to have brought democracy to the grassroots through district-level elections, to have cracked down on corruption and set up an "absolutely autonomous" election commission in readiness for promised provincial and national assembly elections by October 2002.
"It's a silent revolution," says Naqvi, who heads the military government's National Reconstruction Bureau.
Silent perhaps, but not all that democratic. Although plans have yet to be finalized, it seems clear that Musharraf is not preparing to relinquish power. Moreover, the new political system he has in mind will give the military a constitutionally sanctioned role in government and make Pakistan, the world's second-largest Muslim nation, a unique hybrid--an Islamic republic governed by civilians but overseen by the military.
Musharraf plans to convene a National Security Council composed of key military and civilian officials to oversee civilian rule.
"I don't envisage the NSC having any role in the day-to-day functioning of the government," Musharraf says, in an interview with the REVIEW. "But certainly overseeing and making sure that the national interest is held supreme at all times by the government."
The thinking behind the National Security Council is paradoxical: the military needs to have a role to prevent another military intervention. "He wants a kind of military-civilian partnership," says Rifaat Hussain, a political analyst at Islamabad's Quaid-i-Azam University.
"The idea is not to hurt democracy but keep it intact, even if it is a little bit less than what people think it should be," explains Naqvi in his office in the marble edifice built by ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
There may also be special powers vested in the president to dismiss the prime minister--though not to dismiss the assembly. Critics say the military's approach is crude, almost na.ve. "You can't dictate democracy," scoffs retired Gen. Talat Masood.
Pakistan's political prospects are an important part of the regional security calculus. With the collapse of the Taliban movement and the move towards a broad-based moderate government in Kabul, attention is focusing on Islamabad, where there are fears that Islamic extremism may continue to fuel cross-border terrorism, especially in Kashmir. If Musharraf can quell the militants and at the same time put the country back on the road to stable civilian rule and accountability, it would greatly help restore security to the region.
The risks are equally great because of Musharraf's role in holding together the government. When he sidelined officers opposed to his turnabout on support for the Taliban, it raised fears of an internal coup against him.
The United States government's official view is that such fears are unfounded. "What you have here is a very professional military which takes orders from its commander down," U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlin told the REVIEW.
A BREAK WITH THE TALIBAN
This view's biggest doubters sit in neighbouring India, where there is acute suspicion of Pakistan--especially the military. In a recent speech, Indian opposition leader Manmohan Singh cited "uncertainties about the political regime in Pakistan" and the "question mark" about ownership of the country's nuclear assets. Some Indian defence analysts even go so far as to describe Pakistan as a "failing state," with disintegration on the cards.
With India urging the U.S. to spurn Pakistan and act against alleged terrorist activity there, Musharraf is under pressure to prove that his government's support for Islamic militants is over and that he can forge a reasonably democratic and stable government.
The break with the Taliban regime came after intense pressure from Washington in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the U.S., and observers in Islamabad say Musharraf has not looked back. Musharraf says he was confident there would be no adverse reaction to his policy. "I'm not worried about a backlash internally," he says. "I think the vast majority has appreciated the decision. Even those who were against it initially have changed their minds now."
Nevertheless, concerns linger about Islamic extremists. As many as 3 million Afghan refugees are milling around in the country with a grudge to bear against Pakistan for abandoning the cause of the Taliban and the ethnic Pashtuns they represent. These refugees could easily conceal fugitive Taliban and their foreign supporters. More importantly, India accuses the Pakistan military of supporting Islamic militants in the struggle over disputed Kashmir.
The military's response: We're trying our best. "We've asked to register all religious schools; we've said there will be no militant or military training. This is being implemented," says Gen. Rashid Qureshi, chief spokesman for Musharraf. But with some 20,000 religious schools, or madrassas, and over 3 million students, according to Ministry of Interior figures, that's a daunting task.
Then there's the tenuous nature of central government authority in Pakistan's tribal areas and the smouldering sentiment there about Islamabad's support for the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan. "We've spoken to all the tribal leaders and they all support President Musharraf's decision. But of course, there will be anger," Qureshi says.
Western diplomats in Islamabad are reasonably convinced of Musharraf's resolve. They cite the arrest of two leaders of important radical Islamic parties, the strong language Musharraf has used to denounce militants and the fall-off in mass demonstrations against the regime over the past month.
Domestic political stability and a return to democracy may hold the key to resolving the problem of radical Islam, says Talat Masood. "The religious parties were exploiting the political space left empty by the absence of mainstream political parties," says the retired general.
According to M. Ziauddin, editor of the daily Dawn newspaper, the military also used religious extremist parties like Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam to undermine popular support for the mainstream secular parties. With Musharraf now bent on holding elections and bringing back the mainstream parties, the hope is that this makes extremism as a tool of political manipulation redundant.
While international attention focuses on the dying embers of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the quest for stable government in Pakistan is about to begin. Most observers acknowledge that the excesses and corruption of the 10 years of civilian rule leading to Musharraf's military coup bled the country's economy. Naqvi talks about the need for a government that is "people-serving instead of self-serving." In short, he says, "we're not restoring democracy, we're establishing it."
The prospects for the short term look good. No one doubts that elections will be held and that parliament will be restored after its dismissal in June this year. But the army won't give up all its power. Former MPs like Abida Hussein, from the Pakistan Muslim League, are resigned to this. "We were hoping that Musharraf would intervene and allow a new leadership to emerge, but he has decided to be the ruler himself."
Longer-term, the worry is that Musharraf won't have much more success than previous military rulers of Pakistan. The key, say experienced analysts like Najam Sethi of the Friday Times in Lahore, is institution-building. "We've seen this again and again. Nothing endures because nothing is institutionalized."
Indeed, two previous military leaders have bypassed the political parties by holding district elections in the name of grass-roots democracy. The strategy worked for a while, squeezing the parties and ensuring no strong civilian leader emerged. "Each of our military rulers has used local democracy to control parliamentary democracy," says Abida Hussein. But once the military strongman disappears, the civilians take over and the whole cycle begins again.
This time, the military hopes to keep the parties weak by decapitating them. Former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto are in exile, but remain unquestioned leaders of the two main parties, the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan People's Party. The PPP commands the most popular support, fuelling speculation that Musharraf is trying to strike a power-sharing deal with Bhutto. In an interview published in Dawn, Bhutto, who now lives in Dubai, called for "an election process that is acceptable to the political parties," and accused the military of planning to rig the vote.
Meanwhile, many Pakistanis relish the short-term benefits of Musharraf's rule. A decade of civilian government brought the country to its knees, with nearly 60% of government revenues going to service a massive $38 billion debt. Musharraf's rejection of the Taliban and support for the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan has brought immediate relief, with close to $1 billion in immediate grants and loans from the U.S. and multilateral agencies. Japan is expected to lead the way by adjusting the interest and time-frame on the $5 billion Pakistan owes to Tokyo.
Much therefore hangs on the uncertainty of Musharraf's survival. Nor can anyone anticipate what the polls will bring. One possibility is that support for religious parties will mushroom. Popular backing for extremist militants could tempt the military to increase support for them, which in turn would likely find expression in more attacks on Indian forces in the disputed region of Kashmir.
If Pakistan's military believes it a fair trade to sacrifice democracy in pursuit of stability, it's a familiar choice in the region. Even the U.S. government seemed to lower its democratic standards in order to secure much-needed support from Pakistan and Uzbekistan in the military assault next door.
"Idealistically speaking, there is a dilution of democracy, but it's a necessary dilution," asserts Gen. Naqvi. But Musharraf still has to balance the demands of his own military, religious extremists and the pressure of a powder keg next door in Afghanistan. Even if October's elections bring Islamabad the kind of ideal broad-based government the UN has in mind for Kabul, it won't be easy to hold it together.