IWPR'S BALKAN CRISIS REPORT, NO. 217, PRESEVO PEACE PLAN REJE CTED/- Guerrillas Reject Serbian Peace Plan

[Seth Ackerman]

	Michael Pugliese wrote:

> >WELCOME TO IWPR'S BALKAN CRISIS REPORT, NO. 217, February 9, 2001
> >
> >PRESEVO PEACE PLAN REJECTED Albanian guerrillas operating in southern
> Serbia
> >reject Belgrade peace proposals amid renewed fighting. Dragana Nikolic
> >reports from London
> 
But Radio Free Europe *loves* the Presevo guerrillas. Check out this bizarre
commentary from Feb. 6:

WHAT IS BELGRADE'S GOAL IN PRESEVO? Serbian tanks continue to fire shells
into ethnic Albanian villages in the "demilitarized" Ground Safety Zone on
southwestern Serbia's frontier with Kosova, the "Guardian's" Jonathan Steele
reported from the region on 2 February. He added that "it is hard to find
any Albanian who will criticize" the guerrillas, noting that "people are
calling for a 'third force' to protect civilians from the Serbs." 
It is not clear whether the shells are trained on specific, allegedly
guerrilla targets, or whether the firing is more random. Some observers have
suggested that the Belgrade authorities are deliberately keeping up the
tensions in the Presevo region in order to convince the international
community that Serbia is the victim of "Albanian terrorism." 
But for her part, Biserka Matic, who is the "senior Serb information
official in the region," told Steele that the new government is determined
not to alienate the ethnic Albanians the way that its predecessor did. She
noted that it is crucial to integrate the Albanians into state structures
and the police, pointing out that mass sackings of Albanians in Kosova more
than a decade ago led to the formation of two parallel societies in the
province. She stressed that the new "government is trying to turn a page and
finally do something smart." 
The London-based daily noted that the Yugoslav army is "literally a loose
cannon" in the region, and that there are "serious differences" on Presevo
between Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic and General Nebojsa Pavkovic,
who heads the Yugoslav army's General Staff. The "Guardian" suggested that
"the only tactics [the military] seem to know are to order tanks and heavy
artillery to fire on villages." 
But in several recent statements, it seemed that the civilian authorities
have taken a tougher line on Presevo than the military. General Pavkovic
said in Medvedja that diplomacy with the support of the international
community must take the lead in ending the tensions, "Danas" reported on 29
January. 
Ex-General and Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Momcilo Perisic, who deals with
security affairs, warned the Belgrade authorities not to attempt any
military solution in Presevo unless they have carefully thought about the
possible consequences. The former head of the Yugoslav army General Staff
pointed out that the use of force in the frontier zone would bring the
security forces "into direct contact" with a compact ethnic Albanian
civilian population as well as with KFOR troops across the border, "Danas"
reported on 1 February 2001. 
But responding to recent incidents in the region, in which a Serbian soldier
died, Covic said that "everything has its limits and some things cannot and
will not be allowed," Reuters reported on 28 January. He called for a "halt
to the provocations." Yugoslav Interior Minister Zoran Zivkovic said the
previous day that the problem must be solved quickly "either by diplomatic
means or by using the force of the police and the army," RFE/RL's South
Slavic Service reported. He dismissed ethnic Albanian calls for
demilitarization, saying "there's no need for that." 
Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic issued a statement in Belgrade on 28
January, in which he called for an "urgent meeting" of the UN Security
Council to make "an immediate and strong condemnation of terrorist attacks."
He also demanded "punishment for the culprits." Belgrade wants a revision of
the Kumanovo agreements that ended the 1999 Kosova conflict so that its
forces can return to the zone. (The former regime of President Slobodan
Milosevic also appealed frequently to the UN for changes in the Kumanovo
agreements, usually to permit Serbian forces to return to Kosova.) 
Speaking in Davos on 29 January, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica again
called for reducing the size of the five-kilometer-wide demilitarized zone.
He added that Belgrade is stepping up its diplomatic activities in the face
of a worsening security situation in the Presevo region. 
In the end, Svilanovic got his UN statement, but it did not constitute the
clear move toward revising the Kumanovo agreements that Djindjic said it did
(see "RFE/RL Newsline," 1 February 2001). In fact, NATO Secretary General
Lord George Robertson said in Brussels on 30 January that Belgrade must do
more to remove the sources of tensions in the Presevo region. "We will
continue to take robust action to prevent [the guerrillas] from getting the
provocation they seek... I hope that the Yugoslav and the Serbian
authorities will start putting in place some of the confidence-building
measures" that Belgrade recently promised. "A greater degree of
participation of the ethnic Albanian majority population in southern Serbia
in their own administration and indeed in their own local police" would help
to defuse tensions, Reuters quoted Robertson as saying. 
The plan he was referring to was one that Covic presented in Belgrade on 30
January, aimed at ending guerrilla activity in the zone. Covic envisions a
peaceful end to the tensions in the area but did not rule out using the
Yugoslav army or Serbian police to "carry out anti-terrorist action." Covic
ruled out changing borders or introducing autonomy. He nonetheless called
for "European standards" in human rights to be introduced and for the
integration of the local ethnic Albanians into the Serbian "social system,"
as Ms. Matic suggested. The government also plans to affect an "economic,
political, and social revitalization of the area." It is not clear whether
the plan will meet basic Albanian demands for the thinning out of Serbian
security forces and a greater political role for the Albanian parties. 
In any event, developments in Belgrade's policies toward Kosova, Presevo,
and its neighborhood in general should probably be seen in a broader
context. The leadership's goals are to speed its reintegration into the
international community, revise the Kumanovo agreements, and rid Serbia of
the political burden of having been the one chiefly responsible for
destroying former Yugoslavia and starting four wars. To that end, its
leaders are likely to continue to portray Serbia as the victim of "Albanian
terrorism," "Montenegrin separatism," and "NATO bombs and depleted uranium."
(Patrick Moore)