Michael Pugliese wrote:
> >WELCOME TO IWPR'S BALKAN CRISIS REPORT, NO. 217, February 9, 2001
> >
> >PRESEVO PEACE PLAN REJECTED Albanian guerrillas operating in southern
> Serbia
> >reject Belgrade peace proposals amid renewed fighting. Dragana Nikolic
> >reports from London
>
But Radio Free Europe *loves* the Presevo guerrillas. Check out this bizarre
commentary from Feb. 6:
WHAT IS BELGRADE'S GOAL IN PRESEVO? Serbian tanks continue to fire shells into ethnic Albanian villages in the "demilitarized" Ground Safety Zone on southwestern Serbia's frontier with Kosova, the "Guardian's" Jonathan Steele reported from the region on 2 February. He added that "it is hard to find any Albanian who will criticize" the guerrillas, noting that "people are calling for a 'third force' to protect civilians from the Serbs." It is not clear whether the shells are trained on specific, allegedly guerrilla targets, or whether the firing is more random. Some observers have suggested that the Belgrade authorities are deliberately keeping up the tensions in the Presevo region in order to convince the international community that Serbia is the victim of "Albanian terrorism." But for her part, Biserka Matic, who is the "senior Serb information official in the region," told Steele that the new government is determined not to alienate the ethnic Albanians the way that its predecessor did. She noted that it is crucial to integrate the Albanians into state structures and the police, pointing out that mass sackings of Albanians in Kosova more than a decade ago led to the formation of two parallel societies in the province. She stressed that the new "government is trying to turn a page and finally do something smart." The London-based daily noted that the Yugoslav army is "literally a loose cannon" in the region, and that there are "serious differences" on Presevo between Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic and General Nebojsa Pavkovic, who heads the Yugoslav army's General Staff. The "Guardian" suggested that "the only tactics [the military] seem to know are to order tanks and heavy artillery to fire on villages." But in several recent statements, it seemed that the civilian authorities have taken a tougher line on Presevo than the military. General Pavkovic said in Medvedja that diplomacy with the support of the international community must take the lead in ending the tensions, "Danas" reported on 29 January. Ex-General and Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Momcilo Perisic, who deals with security affairs, warned the Belgrade authorities not to attempt any military solution in Presevo unless they have carefully thought about the possible consequences. The former head of the Yugoslav army General Staff pointed out that the use of force in the frontier zone would bring the security forces "into direct contact" with a compact ethnic Albanian civilian population as well as with KFOR troops across the border, "Danas" reported on 1 February 2001. But responding to recent incidents in the region, in which a Serbian soldier died, Covic said that "everything has its limits and some things cannot and will not be allowed," Reuters reported on 28 January. He called for a "halt to the provocations." Yugoslav Interior Minister Zoran Zivkovic said the previous day that the problem must be solved quickly "either by diplomatic means or by using the force of the police and the army," RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported. He dismissed ethnic Albanian calls for demilitarization, saying "there's no need for that." Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic issued a statement in Belgrade on 28 January, in which he called for an "urgent meeting" of the UN Security Council to make "an immediate and strong condemnation of terrorist attacks." He also demanded "punishment for the culprits." Belgrade wants a revision of the Kumanovo agreements that ended the 1999 Kosova conflict so that its forces can return to the zone. (The former regime of President Slobodan Milosevic also appealed frequently to the UN for changes in the Kumanovo agreements, usually to permit Serbian forces to return to Kosova.) Speaking in Davos on 29 January, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica again called for reducing the size of the five-kilometer-wide demilitarized zone. He added that Belgrade is stepping up its diplomatic activities in the face of a worsening security situation in the Presevo region. In the end, Svilanovic got his UN statement, but it did not constitute the clear move toward revising the Kumanovo agreements that Djindjic said it did (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 1 February 2001). In fact, NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson said in Brussels on 30 January that Belgrade must do more to remove the sources of tensions in the Presevo region. "We will continue to take robust action to prevent [the guerrillas] from getting the provocation they seek... I hope that the Yugoslav and the Serbian authorities will start putting in place some of the confidence-building measures" that Belgrade recently promised. "A greater degree of participation of the ethnic Albanian majority population in southern Serbia in their own administration and indeed in their own local police" would help to defuse tensions, Reuters quoted Robertson as saying. The plan he was referring to was one that Covic presented in Belgrade on 30 January, aimed at ending guerrilla activity in the zone. Covic envisions a peaceful end to the tensions in the area but did not rule out using the Yugoslav army or Serbian police to "carry out anti-terrorist action." Covic ruled out changing borders or introducing autonomy. He nonetheless called for "European standards" in human rights to be introduced and for the integration of the local ethnic Albanians into the Serbian "social system," as Ms. Matic suggested. The government also plans to affect an "economic, political, and social revitalization of the area." It is not clear whether the plan will meet basic Albanian demands for the thinning out of Serbian security forces and a greater political role for the Albanian parties. In any event, developments in Belgrade's policies toward Kosova, Presevo, and its neighborhood in general should probably be seen in a broader context. The leadership's goals are to speed its reintegration into the international community, revise the Kumanovo agreements, and rid Serbia of the political burden of having been the one chiefly responsible for destroying former Yugoslavia and starting four wars. To that end, its leaders are likely to continue to portray Serbia as the victim of "Albanian terrorism," "Montenegrin separatism," and "NATO bombs and depleted uranium." (Patrick Moore)