>Today most German papers are presenting their own kind of 'analysis'. It is
>at least some indication that the legitimization of the Kosovo war even
>within mainstream circles is beeing questioned.
>
>In my eyes the most remarkable article appeared today in the Frankfurter
>Allgemeine Zeitung. They are devoting almost half a page in their printed
>edition to the issue. More or less they come to the conclusion 'we will
>never know, what really happened'. It looks as if this is the present line
>of defence of those ones who were talking od a 'massacre' before.
>
Thanks to Johannes & Hinrich for posting articles on the alleged "Racak Massacre." I think that this type of "questioning" of the Kosovo War is going on now because the Empire has already succeeded in replacing the Socialist Party of Serbia/the Yugoslav United Left by Kostunica-led "Democraic Opposition of Serbia" whose constituencies are more amenable to further restructuring of the economy along the neoliberal line, and in this new context, the grievances of Albanians in Kosovo are _no longer useful pretexts for military assaults by NATO that they once were_ but now merely useful (if annoying) "problems" (in that while it is hard to manage Albanians who have their own aspirations, the difficulty of management is in itself still useful because it's an excuse for maintaining the imperial military presence in the area, _perhaps for ever_):
***** BBC Summary of World Broadcasts January 03, 2001, Wednesday SECTION: Part 2 Central Europe, the Balkins; FORMER YUGOSLAVIA; FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA; EE/D4034/C HEADLINE: President notes "huge, but not insurmountable" tasks in 2001 SOURCE: Source: Radio Belgrade in Serbo-Croat 1830 gmt 31 Dec 00
Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica has warned in his New Year's address of the difficulties lying ahead in the year 2001....The following is text of Vojislav Kostunica's New Year's address to the nation, broadcast live by Serbian radio on 31 December:
,,,If I were to say that all the difficulties in the economy will be overcome overnight, that we will manage to bypass all the traps of transition, and immediately start enjoying the benefits of a socially-oriented market economy, you would have every right to wonder why you voted for me, if you did. Following the Socialists' economic chaos, the sanctions and the bombing, we will have to work extremely hard to get the economy up and running again. The task is hard but not insurmountable. In fact none of the tasks facing us are insurmountable, although they are huge: to preserve and define the state constitutionally, to set up democratic institutions, to set up independent judiciary and a reasonable education system, to pass new and better laws, to start implementing a motivating, developmental and social policy, to introduce a reliable but sustainable health service, _to carry through real privatization_, to establish partnership relations with the world, and to start attracting foreign investors, at the same time keeping our national interests in mind....
Happy New Year to us all.
LOAD-DATE: January 2, 2001
(emphasis mine) *****
***** Financial Times (London) December 29, 2000, Friday London Edition 1 SECTION: LEADER; Pg. 12 HEADLINE: LEADER: Tall order for Serbia
The toughest European political job of the New Year goes to Zoran Djindjic, Serbia's prime minister designate.
The job of his new government is to work with President Vojislav Kostunica to clear up the physical mess left by Slobodan Milosevic, launch political and economic reforms, normalise relations with neighbours and with the west and bring the former dictator to trial....
...The new government needs to privatise inefficient public services and industry, starved of capital and management. Privatisation will be uniquely awkward, because Serbia's public sector is not owned solely by the state. It shares ownership rights with trade unions, the socialist parties and individual workers. Persuading them to surrender these rights will be a big challenge.... *****
***** Los Angeles Times November 26, 2000, Sunday, Home Edition SECTION: Part A; Part 1; Page 4; Foreign Desk HEADLINE: MILOSEVIC DONS MANTLE OF FIERY OPPOSITION; BALKANS: EX-YUGOSLAV LEADER IS REELECTED AS HEAD OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY. HE CLAIMS THAT 'PAID WESTERN SPIES' BACKED 'COUP' AGAINST HIM. BYLINE: PAUL WATSON, TIMES STAFF WRITER DATELINE: BELGRADE, Yugoslavia
...[T]he end of Milosevic's 13-year regime has also meant the abrupt lifting of price controls and subsidies that he used to buy voters' support. The price of milk has shot up 75% during the last two months. The cost of prescription drugs almost doubled when the government eased price restrictions Thursday.
Living standards continue to fall because wage increases haven't kept pace with inflation. The average salary in Serbia was only about $ 45 a month in October, a 13.5% rise from September, according to official figures. *****
***** Copyright 2000 Janet Matthews Information Services Quest Economics Database EBRD Transition Report November 14, 2000 SECTION: Comment & Analysis; Statistics; Forecast; Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Yugoslavia in transition
...This annex provides a brief overview of the current state of the Yugoslav economy and the extent to which there has been progress in structural reforms. After a decade of conflict and international isolation, it is clear that the economy is in a deep crisis. However, provided the country's international relations are normalised quickly and the transition towards democratic and accountable government proceeds smoothly, the prospects for recovery are good. Yugoslavia occupies a key strategic position in south-eastern Europe, it has a relatively large market, and foreign investors from EU countries in the region are already showing interest in investing there.
...Progress in market-oriented reform
Liberalisation
Very little progress has been achieved in economic liberalisation. Price controls are widespread, with government control (either direct or indirect) over an estimated 60 per cent of all goods. Prices of utilities are well below cost-recovery levels. The economy is relatively protected, with a complicated system of extensive tariffs on imports. In Serbia as of mid-October a multiple exchange rate regime is in place: the official rate (currently Yu Dinar 6 = DM 1) is used for customs tariffs on the import of raw materials and for selling foreign currency to government enterprises. Higher exchange rates apply for others (for example, importers selling dinar to the Central Bank), although banks sometimes give preferential rates to selected enterprises. The current black market rate (mid-October) is around Yu Dinar 30 = DM 1. Montenegro has had an official dual currency system since November 1999, with many enterprises and state-owned utilities only accepting payment in foreign currency (usually the Deutschmark).
Privatisation
While it is impossible to give a precise estimate of the size of the private sector, a rough estimate puts the private sector share of GDP at about 40 per cent, with most small-scale enterprises in private hands. The true size of the private sector may be significantly higher once the informal or illegal economy is taken into account.
The privatisation process began in former Yugoslavia in 1989 following the enactment of the Federal Law on Privatisation. The two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, have followed somewhat different paths since then. In 1991, Serbia enacted a more restrictive law, but many companies nevertheless continued with privatisation, mostly through management-employee buy-outs and shares for pensioners. Amendments to the law in 1994 annulled many of the sales, and from 1995 onwards privatisation ground to a virtual standstill. Serbia adopted a new privatisation law in late 1997 with the aim of attracting foreign investors, but the large level of indebtedness of large state-owned enterprises has prevented much activity taking place so far. Privatisation revenues in 1998 were about US $ 100 million.
Montenegro initially launched its privatisation process in the early 1990s by transferring state-owned capital to a number of state funds. By the end of 1995 these funds had become majority shareholders in about 350 companies. A new privatisation plan in Montenegro was approved in 1998 and led to the establishment of a Privatisation Council. The plan, which has yet to be implemented, targets about 300 enterprises, most of which will be privatised either by a mass voucher scheme or by international tender.
Enterprise reform
The country's large enterprises are largely unreformed and are characterised by substantial losses, soft budget constraints, widespread inter-enterprise arrears and barter arrangements. There are no effective bankruptcy procedures. While there is a competition law in place, it has not been applied. Property rights are unclear in many cases; the initial days after the election of President Kostunica saw the spontaneous ousting of some owners and the return of social ownership.
In contrast to the large enterprise sector, many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were profitable between 1994-98 despite the absence of financial support from the banking sector. Currently there are more than 200,000 registered SMEs, of which about 60,000 are active. Some SMEs have attempted to overcome the lack of finance by establishing their own shareholding banks or joint guarantee funds but their small size acts as a brake on further expansion of successful enterprises....
Infrastructure
...The only major privatisation in infrastructure so far has been the sale in 1997 of 49 per cent of Telecom Srbija to STET (Italy) and OTE (Greece).
Financial institutions
About 80 per cent of the banking sector in Yugoslavia is owned by enterprises under social ownership....
Prospects for the future
...The introduction of a widespread and comprehensive economic reform programme is urgent. A central element of this programme must be a credible stabilisation programme that controls public expenditure, especially in the areas of military expenditure and pensions, and that reduces inflation. Administrative controls on most prices, trade and access to foreign exchange should be quickly eliminated, and the exchange rate should be unified. Bureaucratic and administrative obstacles to enterprises, particularly SMEs, should be dismantled to allow the private sector to "kick start" the recovery and to attract foreign investment. The international community has a critical role to play in this process, first by approving an emergency short-term assistance programme but also by helping Yugoslavia to design a longer-term growth strategy.
Copyright: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. All rights reserved. EBRD and JMIS assume no liability for the consequence of reliance upon any opinion or statement. *****
The turn toward the free market has already begun, but there is a lot more to privatize, as you can see in the EBRD Transition Report.
In this changed context, Kosovo-Albanians may sometimes be in the way of the Empire, as the following New York Times article suggests:
***** The New York Times January 21, 2001, Sunday, Late Edition - Final SECTION: Section 1; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk HEADLINE: Multiplying Albanian Insurgents in Yugoslavia Threaten Belgrade's New Democracy BYLINE: By STEVEN ERLANGER DATELINE: PRISTINA, Kosovo, Jan. 16
A year ago, just across the boundary line from Kosovo into the rest of Serbia, a ragtag group of about 40 ethnic Albanian guerrillas was just beginning its fight to defend and annex parts of Serbia it would like to attach to an independent Kosovo.
Today, under the eyes of American troops in their sector of Kosovo, the group has swelled to between 500 and 800 fighters, who are fast becoming a serious embarrassment to the NATO-led peacekeeping force here and a source of political instability to the new democratic government in Belgrade.
The new insurgent force, named the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac after the areas inside Serbia that it hopes to capture, has the respect of the majority Albanian population in their area of Serbia, close ties to the former Kosovo Liberation Army, the rebel group, and increasingly widespread if still shallow support inside Kosovo itself.
It is now organized into at least three loosely coordinated groups inside a three-mile-wide zone along the 55-mile boundary from which Serbian troops are excluded.
Commanders of the peacekeeping force insist that the guerrillas have been hurt by interception of their supplies and capture of close to 10 percent of their members by the peacekeepers. But some senior United Nations officials are not so sure that the insurgent force -- known by its Albanian initials U.C.P.M.B. -- is doing anything more than lying low for now.
The growth of the group has been slowed, but it is not shrinking, and its popularity inside a Kosovo frustrated by the Western turn toward Belgrade's new democratic leadership should not be underestimated, they say.
"If anything, all the attention from us has further legitimized the U.C.P.M.B.," said one senior United Nations official who has made several trips across the boundary.
The insurgents have taken advantage of the military agreement negotiated at the end of the 1999 NATO bombing war against Yugoslavia. To separate NATO forces from the Yugoslav Army, Belgrade agreed to a three-mile-wide "ground safety zone," bordering Kosovo but inside Serbia, from which all Serbian forces are banned, except police officers with light weapons.
The new insurgency, feeding off the majority Albanian population in the area, used the freedom of the zone to organize, bring in or dig up weapons and stage attacks against the Serbian police.
While Slobodan Milosevic was in power in Belgrade, the West did not much care about another irritant to him and his forces in southern Serbia, senior diplomats and military officials concede.
But with Mr. Milosevic's ouster and the election of Vojislav Kostunica as Yugoslav president and of his democratic coalition as the new government of Serbia, the insurgent force has become a source of grave concern to both the peacekeepers and to the new Belgrade leadership. The Yugoslav leaders are being criticized for not defending Serbian territory.
The ascent of Mr. Kostunica was a painful surprise to Kosovo Albanians, who saw Mr. Milosevic as their best chance to get Western support for Kosovo's independence. A surge in violence in November by the insurgents, in which four Serbian policemen died, is widely interpreted as an effort to get Mr. Kostunica to overreact militarily and to harm his new relations with the West.
In fact, the insurgency has helped bring Mr. Kostunica's government and the West closer, leading to formal and informal talks between the peacekeepers, the United Nations and Belgrade that would have been unthinkable before Mr. Milosevic fell. That relationship has further upset people in Kosovo and made the insurgent force all the more symbolic as an instrument of Albanian aspirations.
The November violence was also seen as a response to the victory of the Albanian moderate Ibrahim Rugova in local elections in Kosovo in late October, when parties headed by the former guerrilla fighters Hashim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj did relatively poorly. "It was a reminder to Rugova and Kosovars generally of who was willing to fight for independence," a senior international official here said. "It was Thaci and Ramush saying, 'We still have a crucial role to play.'"
Both Mr. Thaci and, more reluctantly, Mr. Haradinaj, have responded to Western appeals to distance themselves publicly from the insurgents.
But Baton Haxhiu, the editor in chief of the most credible local newspaper, Koha Ditore, says that at least a third of the members of the insurgent force are not Albanians from inside the region of Serbia it wishes to control, but Albanians from Kosovo. One of them is his 25-year-old cousin, Mr. Haxhiu said. The cousin was wounded and made sterile when shot by Serbs, who killed his brother, sister and father.
"He was never in Presevo in his life," Mr. Haxhiu said. "He said he just wanted to go and kill Serbs. There are a lot like him. If there's no political solution soon, and there's fighting, and Albanian bodies come back here, peace is finished."
Brig. Robert Fry, the British commander in Kosovo, said that the insurgents are loosely organized and are only slowly adjusting to the new situation. "But they are significantly dependent on money and support from Kosovo and the Fatherland Calling Fund," a tax on people from Kosovo living elsewhere that also funded the Kosovo Liberation Army, he said.
Brigadier Fry said there is evidence of new weapons recently procured in Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe being brought to the insurgents through Serbia or Macedonia, and evidence that the insurgents were buying weapons from the Serbs themselves.
"I don't think it's a force on the decline," Brigadier Fry said, showing a videotape of the insurgents training taken by British soldiers on the edge of the boundary with a 600-millimeter lens. "But they'll never be big enough to have more than a local effect."
Mr. Kostunica has sharply criticized the peacekeepers for not doing more to stop the insurgency and has called for the zone between Kosovo and Serbia proper to be reduced to just over a mile, or less, to allow Serbian forces more leeway. But that decision is up to NATO, and could turn angry Kosovo Albanians against the peacekeepers.
Still, some officials see the new cooperation between the West and Belgrade over Presevo as promising. The new Yugoslav and Serbian governments in Belgrade also need Western financial and diplomatic aid to keep their promises of improving life at home and to keep pressure on Montenegro's restive president, Milo Djukanovic, to stop short of independence, destroying what remains of the Yugoslav federation.
Belgrade also wants to begin the return of Serbs who fled Kosovo after the war, as called for under the United Nations Security Council resolution that ended the conflict.
In return, the West wants Belgrade to send back to Kosovo the remaining 600 or so Kosovo Albanians held on various charges in Serb prisons. And the West would like Belgrade to persuade Serbs who have effectively partitioned Kosovo at the northern city of Mitrovica to cooperate with the United Nations, and to participate in elections this year.
If the fall of Mr. Milosevic has given the West more incentive to consider Serbian grievances and to help Belgrade, to consolidate and preserve democracy there, it has also given Belgrade more incentive to cooperate with the United Nations and the West over interim arrangements in Kosovo.
GRAPHIC: Photo: Baton Haxhiu says Kosovo Albanians are among the guerrillas. (Reuters)
Map of Kosovo: Pristina's separatist movement is spreading in Kosovo border areas.
LOAD-DATE: January 21, 2001 *****
O Tempora! O Mores!
Yoshie