***** World Politics 51.3 (1999) 323-358
Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses, and Problems of Russian Democracy
Judith S. Kullberg and William Zimmerman *
Strong showings and outright victories by antireform and conservative parties in several elections in Russia--most notably the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections--and in other postcommunist East European countries in the early and mid-1990s raised concerns about the long-term prospects for democracy in the region. Western analyses have largely explained these election outcomes as popular reactions to short-term economic costs arising from reform of command-administrative economies 1 or as protests against radical restructuring by voters preferring a more moderate pace of reform. 2 Such interpretations are essentially optimistic in that they do not question the commitment of postcommunist publics to democracy: they suggest that with improvement in economic conditions, support for communists and nationalists will evaporate.
In contrast to the general optimism of Western assessments, much of the commentary in the East has been more pessimistic. East European analysts have been inclined to interpret the victory of antireform parties as the explicit rejection by mass publics of the liberal ideology and leadership of westernizing, reformist elites. 3 Such interpretations suggest that the dissatisfaction of publics with liberalism and the emergent postcommunist political order is indeed deep, too deep to be generated merely by short-term economic decline or opposition to reform policy.
Evidence presented in this paper from parallel Russian elite and mass opinion surveys, conducted at the end of 1992/early 1993 and from late 1995 through the summer of 1996, is consistent with the contention that an elite/mass ideological divide exists in certain postcommunist societies. In the survey data we find evidence of a considerable gap between elite and mass worldviews. Whereas elites overwhelmingly opt for liberal democracy, the Russian mass public is thoroughly divided. Although Boris Yeltsin triumphed in the 1996 presidential election...it is nevertheless clear that a substantial segment of the Russian electorate has not accepted the westernizing liberalism of those who led the democratic revolution and has instead opted for socialism or authoritarian nationalism and the corresponding "red" or "brown" political parties. 4
What accounts for the ideological gap between elites and the mass public? We argue that ideological variation--both between elites and the masses and within the mass public--is largely the result of differences across groups and individuals in the postcommunist structure of economic opportunity. Support for liberalism is causally related to the ability of individuals to participate in the new economic order: those who are "locked out" of the new economy and are constrained by circumstances and context from improving their conditions will be more likely to express antiliberal values and attitudes. Thus, what largely accounts for the elite's embrace of liberalism and, conversely, its nonacceptance by a considerable proportion of the Russian mass public is not simply economic decline, but the differential impact of economic restructuring on opportunities and, therefore, long-term material prospects of groups and individuals.
While a small segment of the Russian population has benefited dramatically from the collapse of the socialist economy, the economic position of a majority of the Russian population has been harmed. Within that majority, many have suffered extensively. The entry of Russia into the global economy resulted in the virtual collapse of entire industrial sectors. Individuals attached to these sectors, either directly through employment or indirectly through residence in regions where the sectors are concentrated, have experienced chronic unemployment or underemployment. Furthermore, millions are unable to acquire new skills or relocate, trapped by extremely low income and dependent upon sporadic distributions of back pay or "payments in kind" by employers or regional governments. Thus, poorly positioned to participate in the new market economy, many Russian citizens are unable to benefit from the emerging economic order. Even though aggregate economic growth may produce a general increase in support for democracy, 5 major subgroups of the population are likely to remain alienated from the democratic order as a result of the asymmetrical structure of economic opportunity. This alienation, in our view, will pose a long-term challenge to the postcommunist order and the legitimacy of Russian democracy....
...In emphasizing the effect of changes in income on support for democracy during the transition period, the "costs of reform" argument obscures the character of the connection between the market economy and democracy. A market economy is not designed to produce an equitable and fair distribution of income; rather, it is a system of competitive exchange that takes place within a framework of rights, foremost among them property rights. 13 Under capitalism, the economic position of groups and individuals is a function of their possession of economic rights, their actual opportunity to participate in the market, and the value of resources and goods they are able to bring with them to market competition. 14 Keenly aware that their economic well-being depends on these conditions, individuals do not evaluate governmental performance purely on the basis of their short- and their long-term gains and losses in income, but rather through assessments of both their short- and their long-term economic opportunity. In sum, it is not simply the aggregate economic performance of a market economy that produces support for democratic institutions, but citizens' possession of economic rights and genuine economic opportunity....
...Although states and societies possess a variety of methods for the inculcation of beliefs, popular acceptance of any ideology ultimately depends on congruence between the ideology and the actual experiences of individuals and groups. 18 If the events of daily life over a period of time validate the ideology's depiction of the social order, the ideology is accepted. If, however, experience continually contradicts the tenets of fairness and justice espoused by the ideology and regime, adherence to the ideology as well as support for the regime are undermined. Given a sufficiently large gap between the image of justice and daily life and the existence of alternative ideologies, individuals and groups may opt for one of those alternatives. 19 Insofar as the concept of justice contained in the alternative ideologies contradicts that espoused by the regime and its allies, widespread adherence to such ideologies may presage significant societal conflict. Indeed, mass defection from the regime's ideology may contribute to the collapse of the entire sociopolitical order. 20...
There is a...tension between the experience of daily life and regime ideology in contemporary Russia. For many citizens, the structure of economic opportunity is highly constrained. Skilled and unskilled workers are still painfully attached to firms that have lost their domestic customers and are as yet unable to compete successfully in global markets. Mid- to lower-level bureaucrats, as well as academics, doctors, teachers, and military personnel, are all employed in state institutions that have experienced dramatic reductions in funding from the central and local governments since 1991. Many also face limited prospects for finding private sector employment in the areas in which they were educated and trained. For such individuals, movement into the private sector involves the abandonment of careers and, often, a significant drop in social status. In an even weaker position are pensioners and older workers, who are unlikely to have time and energy to start businesses or acquire new skills that will enhance their marketability, and women, who have experienced an increase in employment discrimination since the collapse of socialism. 22
Rooted in the political and economic inequality of the Soviet period, the weak position of the mass public has continued into the postcommunist present. In the first stages of economic reform in the late 1980s, most Soviet citizens lacked significant resources or access to resources to invest in new businesses and were therefore poorly positioned to take advantage of emerging markets. What savings they had were wiped out when prices were freed in early 1992 under the Gaidar "shock therapy" program. The resulting near hyperinflation quickly eliminated the "ruble overhang" of forced savings accumulated by the mass public from years of chronic undersupply of consumer goods. The high rates of inflation also resulted in a sharp reduction in real income and the impoverishment of almost half of the population. 23 It is now also clear that the voucher privatization program, which was touted as a massive redistribution of state property, resulted in a relatively small transfer of property to the mass public. 24
In contrast to the poor market situation and constrained opportunities of the mass public in the late Soviet period, managerial and political elites were well positioned in Russia for tremendous economic gain in the movement to the market. Indeed, they benefited substantially, even spectacularly, from the transition to liberal democracy. 25 The advantage has been most pronounced for political elites, who used their positions in a liberalized, but far from successfully reformed institutional arrangement, to accumulate significant economic resources. 26 The problem of elite enrichment appears to have been more severe in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union than in East Central Europe. 27...
...Since private property is not yet institutionalized and markets are undeveloped, postcommunist democratic regimes must create them. To do so, governments operate not as referees or arbiters among a multitude of already existing business and socioeconomic interests, but as distributors of property and resources. Where unconstrained by developed legal institutions, strong political parties, or social organizations, 28 elites are able to construct reform programs that maximize economic gains for themselves and their allies. Largely because of their ability to transform their political positions and resources into capital, 29 they support privatization and marketization.
To the extent that reform policies supported by democratizing elites undermined traditional bases of mass economic security--the state economy and firms through which most material benefits were dispersed to citizens--the interests of mass publics and elites in postcommunist societies were initially discordant....Acutely aware not only of the costs they have paid in the transition but also of their limited prospects in the new economic order and the contrasting benefits and advantages accruing directly to elites, segments of the mass public may fail to accept liberalism or to support liberal institutions. Instead, mass publics may opt for illiberal ideologies, of either the communist or the nationalist variety.
The Nature of the Gap
Studies of public opinion in periods of transition may be used to analyze how the interests of various social groups play themselves out in the construction of democratic orders. When combined with parallel surveys of elites, public opinion studies reveal much about the structure and dynamics of postauthoritarian politics. We turn now to just such survey data to test the contention that vastly different opportunities arising from the market situations of elites and masses in some postcommunist societies may weaken public support for liberal principles and institutions and thus threaten the long-term prospects of democracy.
The data we use here to test our hypotheses come from parallel surveys of the Russian elite and mass public conducted in 1992-93 and 1995-96....
...Among the mass respondents interviewed in the third wave of the election study in July 1996, more than three-quarters (76 percent) of those categorized as liberal democrats indicated that they thought either "the present political system" or "democracy of a Western type" most suitable for Russia, as did more than two-thirds (67 percent) of those categorized as market authoritarians. Almost two-thirds (64 percent) of those identified as socialist authoritarians and 58 percent of the social democrats answered that the "Soviet system before perestroika" was most suitable for Russia. Those we coded as ambivalent were truly ambivalent: exactly half (49.9 percent) favored the old Soviet system and half (50.1 percent) preferred the present system or Western-style democracy.
Table 1 displays the distributions of the elite and mass samples across the categories of the typology. 34 The table demonstrates that support for market democracy, the admixture of economic and political liberalism, was far greater among elites than among mass respondents in both 1993 and 1995. 35 In both years elites were overwhelmingly committed to the market. Likewise in both surveys elite commitment to democracy is high. In contrast, the proportion of mass respondents who could be labeled as market democrats was less than half the proportion found among elites, and in 1995, less than a third. Conversely the proportion of illiberal respondents (market and socialist authoritarians) was approximately twice as great in both years. Overall a majority of the mass respondents were political liberals in 1993, falling into either the market or social democrat category, and in 1995 a majority of those who had committed positions continued to favor political liberalism. Fewer than half overall were economic liberals (market democrats or market authoritarians) either in 1993 or 1995, and fewer than half of those with committed positions were market liberals in 1995. 36 Among those with committed positions in 1995, political liberals (market democrats and social democrats) constituted a majority, and economic liberals (market democrats and market authoritarians) represented less than a majority among both those with identifiable positions and overall. In 1993, as in 1995, liberal democrats outnumbered socialist authoritarians overall, but the ratio of those identified as liberal democrats and socialist authoritarians shifted between 1993 and 1995 in favor of the latter. Thus, support for political liberalism was considerably greater than support for the market in both 1993 and 1995, but levels of support for economic liberalism and probably for political liberalism appear to have diminished somewhat across the two-year period....
...In 1993 more than 80 percent of the elite sample responded in a liberal direction on three of the four items. They did not accept the notion that it was senseless to begin a new business, they endorsed economic competition as functional for society, and they agreed that it was reasonable for persons who ran successful businesses to become rich. Although support for these measures decreased modestly in 1995, more than 80 percent still supported the market overall.
Elite respondents also strongly endorsed liberal political beliefs and practices in both years. They were virtually unanimous in their support for political liberalism (Table 3), with approximately four-fifths...coded as liberal democrats overall in both 1993 and 1995....More than 80 percent of the elite respondents in 1993 rejected the proposition that societal rights should prevail at the expense of individual rights; they also disagreed (usually strongly) with a proposition that epitomized the historical divide between liberalism and socialism, namely, that there was a single "correct" philosophy. In 1995 they continued (1) to be virtually unanimous in their opposition to the notion that there was such a true worldview and (2) to evince consensual support for political competition and the precedence of individual over societal rights.
Comparison of the mass response pattern with the elite response pattern for individual scale items (Tables 2 and 3) reveals noticeably weaker support for market liberalism and somewhat weaker support for political liberalism among the mass public. To be sure, respondents in 1993 and 1995 were overwhelmingly supportive of economic competition in the abstract ("Competition between various enterprises, organizations, and firms benefits our society"), and in 1993 a majority among the mass public revealed that they were favorably disposed to entrepreneurial activities and the introduction of new business. In both years, however, they were strongly opposed, much more than elite respondents, to private ownership of heavy industry. A majority continued in 1995, as it had in 1993, to dispute the proposition that it was senseless to begin a new business. But only a minority in 1995 agreed that it was normal for an owner of a prosperous business to become rich. Whereas in 1993 among those with committed positions a majority had favored the market, in 1995 support had eroded such that only a minority supported an overall market orientation.
...The mass public was as likely as the elite to reject the claim that societal rights should take precedence over individual rights, but on other items it was less likely to take a liberal position. We find consensus in both years that there is "no one right philosophy"--a proposition about which the elite respondents were virtually unanimous. In both years a majority favored political competition, the consensual position among elites. Again, mass respondents in 1995 were less supportive than elites of the statement that individual rights should receive priority. Both in 1993 and 1995 those opposing the prohibition of dangerous ideas were in the minority among the mass public.
In short, as predicted, the ideological orientations and values of Russian elites and masses are sharply divided, with masses exhibiting a greater proclivity to socialist and illiberal ideologies. Whereas a clear preponderance of elites had accepted market liberalism by 1993, a sizable fraction among the mass public had not. Furthermore, comparison of elite and mass response patterns on specific measures offers compelling evidence that the ideological positions of elites and the mass public reflect their respective opportunity structures. Elites, with their greater opportunities to acquire property and engage in profitable business activity, were virtually unanimous in their support for most elements of market liberalism in 1993. Consensus continued to exist in 1995 among elites that economic competition was beneficial, that entrepreneurial enrichment was normal, and that it was worth the risk to open a new business. In contrast, members of the mass public, with their more limited opportunities and greater likelihood of bearing the costs rather than the benefits of reform, were less positive about the various facets of the market economy. However, in their attitudes toward the various elements of democratic reform, particularly individual rights, the masses were more positive.
The Origins of the Gap
...On the basis of the foregoing discussion concerning the market origins of ideologies, we expect that upper-status individuals, to the extent that their market situations are more similar to those of truly elite groups, to exhibit higher levels of support for economic and political liberalism. Individuals possessing those attributes most valued in emergent market conditions, such as youth and education, should also exhibit higher levels of support for market liberalism. Conversely, those people least in demand in the new labor market and/or facing the greatest impediments to finding satisfactory employment should be most resistant to liberalism. Included in this group are the less well educated, the elderly, and women. We should also find differences in ideological disposition across economic sectors and regions. Those groups most connected to the old state economy should evince lower levels of attachment to market liberalism, while those attached to firms and organizations operating within emergent market structures should evince higher levels of attachment. Given the wide disparity in economic conditions across Russia, a disparity connected with the regional concentration of specific industries, we also expect to find considerable regional variation in the level of attachment to market liberalism. Individuals from those regions most negatively affected by the economic downturn of the early 1990s should be less likely to accept the values and practices associated with the market. Finally, given the vast discrepancy in opportunities for economic gain between certain cities and most rural regions, we assume that urban residents will be more likely to support market liberalism than will those in the countryside. 39
Variation in the mean economic liberalism score across various demographic, socioeconomic, and geographic categories presented in Table 4 largely confirms these hypotheses. First, as predicted, there is evidence of a considerable gender gap in both 1993 and 1995, with women scoring significantly lower on the economic liberalism scale. With regard to education and age, increases in level of education predict very well to increased attachment to market liberalism and younger age categories are indeed more economically liberal. Further, we find a strong, linear relationship between socioeconomic status, as measured by occupation, and support for market liberalism in the 1993 data and a similar, though less linear, pattern of variation in the 1995 data. In both years, except for the categories of manager and highly qualified professionals, we find mean scores that indicate adherence to more antimarket or socialist orientations. As would be expected, agricultural workers and unskilled laborers display the lowest levels of economic liberalism.
We also find variation in level of attachment to economic liberalism across sectors, regions, and types of communities. In 1993 the groups with the strongest socialist orientation were those working on collective farms and in state industrial enterprises; in 1995 those working on collective and state farms and in the state administration were the least economically liberal. In both years those employed in co-ops, joint ventures, or private enterprises displayed high levels of economic liberalism. 40 As expected, considerable regional variation in levels of market liberalism is present in both samples, though the pattern is much stronger in 1993 than in 1995. The regions with the most conservative scores in 1993, the Urals and the central black-earth region, are areas in which "traditional" socialist economic structures--large-scale heavy industry and collective agriculture--are concentrated. The weakening of the variation across regions in 1995 may indicate a growing homogenization of regional economic conditions, although the illiberalism of respondents in the Far East reflects that region's continuing depression. Finally, community size also appears to be a factor shaping economic liberalism. In both 1993 and 1995 considerably higher levels of economic liberalism are present among residents of Moscow and cities with populations exceeding one million; considerably lower levels are present in smaller communities. While in 1993 there was much less support for economic liberalism in medium-size (100,000 to 500,000 residents) to fairly large cities (500,000 to 1,000,000 residents) than in either smaller towns or cities with more than 1,000,000 residents, by 1995 the relationship between community size and economic liberalism was nearly linear. This change in the pattern of variation may also be a function of gradual equalization of conditions across Russia and a general improvement in the economic situation in larger cities. At the same time, resistance to economic liberalism appears to have deepened in the countryside, towns, and small cities, probably due to the particularly harsh conditions of life and limited resources in such settings. 41...
...But which dimensions of opportunity structure are the most determinative of liberal orientations? Table 5 indicates that in both 1993 and 1995 age, education, sex, and type of community are the facets of economic opportunity structure with the greatest effects on economic liberalism, controlling for all other factors. The strength of their effects is not surprising, given that they are central determinants of individual economic opportunity in the Russian economy. The analyses also show that occupational category and family monthly income per capita do not exert statistically significant independent effects on economic liberalism. In the case of occupation, this failure is probably related to the high degree of collinearity with education, as well as to the imprecision of occupational category as an indicator of individual economic opportunity. As for income, its weakness as an explanatory factor supports our earlier contention that the structure of economic opportunity is primarily a function not of present income but rather of an individual's relative position within the market economy and her or his awareness of that position....
...Individual material wealth, as roughly measured by reported number of possessions, was a significant, if not powerful, predictor of economic liberalism in 1993, while reported desire to start a business was both significant and robust. Similarly, the composite measure of individual perception of general economic conditions in the country and the region (so), assessments of change in family financial situation, and attitude toward the way in which property was being privatized all explained a considerable amount of the variation of individual economic liberalism in 1995....
...Further analysis of the survey responses indicates that the structure of economic opportunity not only affects individual support for liberal principles but also heavily influences political system preference. In the third wave of the 1995-96 panel study, conducted in July 1996 immediately after the Russian presidential election, respondents were asked their opinion of what type of political order was most suitable for Russia at the present time. They were provided with three options: the Soviet system as it existed before perestroika, the present political order, and a representative democracy of the Western type. Almost half (49 percent) of the respondents regarded the erstwhile Soviet political system as preferable to either the present order (preferred by 34.4 percent of respondents) or representative democracy of the Western type (preferred by 17 percent)....The economic opportunity model correctly predicts more than 71 percent of respondent preferences (Table 7). The results clearly demonstrate that those citizens with the least opportunity to engage in and benefit from the market--those who are less educated, female, and older, and who reside in rural regions and smaller towns or cities--are most likely to prefer a Soviet-type system. Thus, the limited economic opportunity of these groups is directly undermining the legitimacy of the present Russian political system.
Conclusion: Postcommunism and Theories of Democratization
...The observation of the gap between elite and mass ideology and the identification of its sources in differences in economic opportunity corresponds well to a growing scholarly consensus that the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe did not rise from society, from social and political movements, but rather was launched and led from above by elites. 49 What precipitated the elite decision to liberalize, fundamentally restructure, and finally abandon communism was the development among elites (including the subelite intelligentsia) of a consensus that the system they managed was morally bankrupt. 50 Our data provide evidence of the continuity of this elite consensus in Russia and suggest that it has developed into a strong attachment to liberal ideology. Awareness of the depth of liberal sentiment at the elite level allows us to interpret the economic programs of Yeltsin and his prime ministers as the expression of the genuine preferences and ideological orientation of the Russian national elite in the postcommunist era, rather than as the product of IMF and Western influence.
While the foregoing analysis suggests a general warning about the high political cost of radical economic dislocations in periods of transition, it also speaks directly to the nature of the Leninist legacy in Russia. The Soviet social structure, the evolution of which produced reformist elites, also produced mass publics whose economic interests were tightly interconnected with socialist institutions. Millions are still painfully attached to and dependent upon these institutions and the disintegrating state. Our results indicate that poverty and limited opportunities in the new market economy are impeding the successful internalization of democratic norms by large segments of the Russian population. Combined with the poor development of institutionalized channels for the articulation and aggregation of interests and grievances, the limited opportunities and hardships experienced by many Russians may yet produce the social explosion feared since the beginning of the reform period....
[Endnotes omitted; the full article is available at <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v051/51.3kullberg.html>.] *****