"Mizug Aliyot' is the ideology of the 'Israeli melting pot.' It proclaimed to mix Europan and Oriental Jewish Cultural elements into a unique Israeli blend. In fact, historically immigrant Jews have been expected to give up their ethnic cultiures in favor of that of Ashkenazi based Israel. The argument to shed their 'diaspora' identity was couched in terms of the need to build a unified society. The 'Israeli identity' was no neutral concept--the political Zionism of the white Ashkenazis was put forward as the norm. Non-western cultures were de-legitimized and became non-Israeli. 'Absorption' thus meant in fact resocialization. Immigrants from North Africa and Arab countries outside Palestine were dubbed 'primitive' and pressured to discard their old ways. This was argued to be in the interests of the immigrants but in fact the elimination of culture as a vehicle of adaptation left individual immigrants with few resources of their own and left them dependent on outside agencies, alienated from the dominant society and themselves. Oriental immigrants were channeled into the margins of society. In the 1950s the population redistribution which was not succesfulk with the Palestinians was carried out with Oriental immigrants, spreading them out among the Ashkenazi population. Orientals are a majority of the population, but clearly second-class citizens. Ashkenazi majority holds a monopoly on power. Orientals have historically been primarily manual workers in industry and agriculture. Small numer moved up the ladder to a lower middle class income strata since 1967, as a direct result of their replacement in manual work by Palestinian guest laborers. Some became skilled workers or sub-contractors, and many found a career in the police or military, where they comprise the bulk of the front lines. Still, they comprise a large proportion of the Israeli proletariat, especially in industries felt to be 'security risks' (which is almost everything in Israel). Various discriminatory practices have been documented and the 'social gap' as it is called in Israel is recognized by all (although the reasons vary).
Housing discrimination: contant 'ingathering of exiles' to fulfill zionist objectives is accompanied by various incentive schemes to draw skilled and educated Jews to Israel, including subsidized housing. Thus Oriental Jews are left in crowded high rent apartments, while new immigrants get favoritism. Similar story in education. Little representation in government. Relations between Ashkenazis and Orientals has been characterized by suspicion, resentment, disdain, and open hostility. Ashknazis have been known to refuse to sit at the same table as Orientals. Orientals have openly expressed their resentment for institutional favoritism shown Ashkenazis and new immigrants from other countries, especially former Soviet Union/Russia. Studies show Ashkenazis overwhelmingly opposed to intermarriage with Orientals. Right-wing Ashkenazis have expressed open antipathy toward Orientals, who are often darker skinned (although also political alliances). Liberal Ashkenazis have supported government intervantion to improve condition of Oriental Jewish population. This is often argued in pragmatic terms, even in terms of national security.
Arie Bober has argued that the Israeli government through the law of return draws on the world Jewish community as a reserve army--in particular skilled labor, maintaining barriers to Oriental Jewish advancement and reproducing a reserve army of unskilled and semi-skilled as well as military workers. Upward mobility of Oriental Jewish population has bveen feared due to threat of their replacement by Arabs, considered threat to security and socio-economic stability. Bober explicitly states that the ethnic divisions correspond to class divisions, but that the Orientals tend to see themselves in ethnic rather than class terms. Comparing them to poor whites in the U.S., he notes that they identify with some of the most racist, fanatical, and chauvinist elements in Israeli society--blaming Arabs for their employment troubles etc.
Ethiopian Jews provide a special case which reveals the racism and eurocentrism, and opportunism of Zionism. They were not included in the Law of Return until 1975. They were only admitted in Israel after years of 'cultural brokerage' (Abbink's term) by missionaries of mainstream Judiasm. They are commonly referred to as 'Falashas' even they they have made it clear they consider this an epithet. They are also referred to in the media, scholarly work, and everyday conversation as 'primitive', lacking in 'education' and 'personal hygeine'. Upon arrival Ethiopian Jews are given Hebrew names, often unconnected to their original name, and given new birth dates, since the bureaucratic labyrinth in Israel cannot work if you have no precise age and birth date, and Ethiopians traditionally did not keep these. Traditional clothes are exchanged for jogging suits and tennis shoes, and prayer caps are put on the heads of children (adults must consent to this). The Ethiopians must undergo what is essentially a conversion ceremony, although it is either called a 'symbolic' conversion or a 're-linking' with their lost past ceremony. There is considerable and understandable opposition to this ceremony by the Ethiopians: they understandably vierw it as casting doubt on their Judiasm. Initially this ceremony entailed 'symbolic circumcision' but the rabbis later gave in and reduced it to 'ritual immersion.' As Ethiopians were settled in various areas, communities complained that they would compete for jobs and housing. Hostilities were unleashed on them and false rumours were spread that they 'carried diseases', were not 'really Jewish', were 'primitive', 'smelled bad', etc.
There are also important distinctions among the Palestinians: those inside pre-1967 Israel and those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The point has often been made that Zionist colonialism differed from 'classical' colonialism in its expulsion of the population rather than its exploitation. And the 'transfer' of Palestinians and de-nationalization of some 2 million plus and confioscation of their land is crucial to understanding the story. But what of the 156,000 remaining after 1948, who grew to over 600,000 by the mid-1980s? Their land was confiscated also, but they became an integral part of the Israeli political economy (which despite the propaganda about the Israeli kibbutz and the rhetoric of the Israeli Labor Party, is capitalist). It might be argued that was felt necessary was that the non-Jewish population be made a minority (in 1948 there were 1.4 million Palestinians and 600,000 Jews. By 1949 there were just 156,000 Palestinians inside the Green Line).
Pre-1967: Following land confiscation, the population was redistributed into poverty belts around the large cities to provide cheal labor. Redistribution was not completely successful, but there was a legal and military channeling of Palestinians into the worst (least desirable, worst paying) jobs. Palestinians were under military rule, which included declaring certain areas 'closed'-- no entry or exit without permission. This enabled the control of the flow of Palestinian workers of whom 70% must leave their village before dawn to reach their place of employment. According to Juryis, during periods of unemployment, Palestinian areas were closed to secure Jewish employment.
>From 1967: From the mid-1960s, some efforts were made to placate
Palestinians inside the Green line. 1966 marked the end of formal
military rule of this group, but in fact it simply meant that the
Emergency Defense Regulations were taken from the military governers and
military courts and put in the hands of the police. Formation of the
PLO and Palestinian resistance led zionists to try to create conditions
that would prevent support of these organizations from Palestinians
inside the Green Line. June, 1967, Israel invades West Bank, Gaza
Strip, Sinai, East Jerusalem, and Golan Heights, annexing the latter
two, occupying the former two, returning Sinai to Egypt as a result of
the Camp David Accord in 1979. With the takeover of the West Bank and
Gaza, there was the second great expulsion of Palestinians. The
remainder were incoporated into the Israeli economy. In 1967 5,000
Palestinians from the West Bank were employed in the Israeli economy.
By 1982, the number had hit 63,500. There were three types of guest
workers. The officially employed were usually landless Palestinians
from the refugee camps. A second group of workers usually had some land
which they worked seasonally to tend their crops. This group was
employed through local contractors, usually Arab, who handle their
negotiations and send them out as a group. The third category was the
'informal' market for day laborers. Palestinians gather at
pre-determined sites early in the morning and await Israeli van or
pick-up truck drivers to come by and shout their labor needs for the
day, choosing from among the many Palestinians.
Palestinians from the Occupied territories are not permitred to join the Histadrut. 40% employed in Israel prior to the first Intifadah. The offocially employed received some benefits, but the full range of benefit deductions from employee paychecks of Palestinian guest workers exceeded the amount paid out in pensions, with the surplus going to Israeli workers. The other two categories of workers recieved no benefits, and their wages were less than the registered Palestianians, whose wages in turn were less than the Israelis in the same occupations. West Bank workers held menial jobs that Israelis were reluctant to take. Paslestianians not permitted to stay overnight in Israel, but many did due to employer preference or the long distance and expense of the commute. Reports of their living arrangements were of horrendous conditions: crowded, filthy, dangerous. Some died in fires from being locked in by employers trying to avert detection.
Land appropriation of 52% of West Bank and Gaza by Israel through appropriation of government land, closing off of areas, forged sales deals, etc. From 1967 to the first Intifadah there was a loss of 22% of the cultivable land of the Palestinians. Israeli monopoly on water, with one-third of the water supply removed. Closing of Arab Banks and Palestinian financial institutions with any banking functions. Opening of Israeli banks in territories. In 1981 the Bank of Palestine was permitted to reopen, but no foreign exchange transactions, all business in shekels. Jordon based bank was allowed to repoen in 1984 under restrictive conditions. At the beginning of the first Intifadah, Israel was exporting $800 million worth of goods per year to the Occupied Territories, importing $275 million from there. Severe restrictions on exports to Israel: no crops were allowed to compete with any grown in Israel. Water policies favoring Jewish 'settlements' gave them an advantage of early crops and so enabled them to establish a hold on the market before Palestinians. Israel penetrated all facets of the Palestinian economy, without the traditional colonial expense of long distance transport and communications. Palestinian production was geared to Israeli demand at the expense of Palestinian needs, while Palestinian consumption was dependent on Israeli supply. Israel had more advanced technology, government protective measures, credit facilities. Ups and own of the Israeli economy shifted directly on the Occupied Territories.
With the Intifadah, many of the contradictions of the Zionist project were revealed. Zionism was intended on establishing a Jewish State, yet Palestine was populated with non-Jews. 'Transfer' has historically been the major policy, yet many Palestinians remained within the Green Line. This Palestinian population as incorporated into Israeli capitalism. The Jewish State needs the support of its Jewish citizens. Thus Plestianians were channeled into the worst and least paying occupations, allowing relative advantages for the predominantly Oriental Jewish working class. However, Palestinian presence in too large numbers or in certain security sensitive areas meant that Israel left itself vulnerable to political action with economic consequences on the part of the Palestinian population. In addition, the need to attract the 'ingathering of exiles' meant that incentives had to be offered to these newer immigrant groups, at the expense of the Oriental population. With the addition of the Occupied Territories, Israel once again found it profitable to incorporate the Palestinian economy into its own, with the result that it relied on its wage labor from the Occupied Territories in its own industry and Palestinian markets to buy up its goods. Palestinians cannot serve in the military, however, and this means that the Oriental population has been a high proportion of the front lines. The Palestinians having secured a role of importance in the Israeli economy through mass strikes and boycotts showed they were able to have a signifianct effect on the Israeli economy. Israel thus needed to devise a strategy to protect itself from this vulnerability, to respond to international pressures, and its own internal political contradictions (settlers, far right religious fanatics, 'Israeli Arab' population, etc.). The collapse on restrictions on immigration from former Soviet bloc provided additional 'ingathering' but must be understood in the context of Ashkenazi privilege and incentives to immigrants (so not really a major replacement for unskilled, worst jobs--prefer illegal activity and were able to make themsleves a political force, as have the right wing 'Sephardic' bloc.