Positivism [was Re: Ethical foundations of the left]

[Michael McIntyre]

I've heard that analytic philosophers are all post-positivists now, but I'm not sure the word has reached the social sciences.  Lots of folks I studied with were still willing to call themselves positivists.  John Mearsheimer calls himself a "logical positivist".  David Laitin calls himself a "neo-positivist".  On the other hand, Henry Brady, whom most would tar with the brush refuses to call himself a positivist.  So maybe we need a quick survey of the territory.  My third-hand [and quite likely wrong] understanding is that analytic philosophers of all stripes now reject a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and between statements of fact and statements of value.  Those distinctions, however, are still at the heart of state-of-the-art books on social science research design.  (I have King, Keohane and Verba's _Designing Social Inquiry_ in mind).  So perhaps positivism isn't entirely dead . . . or it is dead but those in the lower reaches of the academy have!
n't gotten the word yet.

Clarifications Justin?

Michael McIntyre


>>> jkschw at hotmail.com 07/18/01 09:45AM >>>
Positivist leanings? That's a new one. I'm a pragmatist and a scientific 
realist in the manner of Sellars, Quine, Richard Boyd, the old Hilary Putnam 

  (circa 1967-75)(at least two stages back), that lot. Of course, all of us 
trained in analytical philosophy "come out" of positivism, but that doesn't 
make us us positivists, any more than the fact the Solidarity "comes out" of 
groups with Trotskyist politics makes it Trot.

I have developed more respect and appreciation for positivism than I (we) 
had in the 1970s, when it was still hip to beat up on it, and when there 
were positivists of a sort still around. There aren't, really, anymore 
today, except for maybe Larry Sklar at Michigan.

No, I don't accept verificationism of any sort, and I'm a sort of moral 
realist in that I think that ethical claims like "Exploitation is unjust" or 
"Freedom is better than slavery" are properly appraised as true or false. My 
metaethical position is probably close to that stakes out by Eliz. Anderson 
in Value in Ethics and Economics. I have written a number of papers in 
political ethics, and at least one defending the objectivity of justice.

Btw, the positivists did not "deny the existence of ethics"; they just 
interpreted ethical statements as presciptive. The classical statement is 
C.L. Stevenson's still-wonderful Ethics and Language. My dissertation 
advisor Allen Gibbard--no positivist! (he has written important papers in 
grand metaphysics)--has a brilliant restatement of prescriptivism in his 
book Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.

I think it is odd to describe Rawls as a "dissenting utilitarian." He's not 
a utilitarian of any sort.

I have not read Singer's "Darwinian left," although I have read other of his 
books, such as Practical Ethics. I find his flat headed utilitarianism 
rather unpersuasive, although his applied discussions are generally 
interesting and sensitive.

--jks