-----Original Message----- From: Justin Schwartz [mailto:jkschw at hotmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2001 1:24 PM To: lbo-talk at lists.panix.com Subject: Re: Positivism [was Re: Ethical foundations of the left]
Yeah, that's right. I should add that my Michigan PhD is in philosophy and political science, so I'm trained as a U-M number cruncher in polisci, worked with David Singer, etc. When I was doing my polisci coursework, the classes would start with a "methods" section restating as "scientific method" the tenets of high logical empiricism circa 1956. I would make merciless fun of this stuff, and suggest that my profs and fellow grad students disregard it. I guess things have not improved since I left Michigan.
As to whether postpositivist analytic philosophers "all" reject the analytical-synthetic distinction and the fact-value distinction, "all" is a strong word. I'd say that most of us trained at the high-powered analytical schools are more less Quinean, which doesn't mean necessarily, that you don't think there are any necessary truths or truths in virtue of meaning (sorry about the double negative), but that you think that necessity and
analyticity are relative. Some statements have more of it than others.
As to the fact-value distinction, although _I_ think that Quinean principles totally undermine it in the same way as the A/S distinction, a lot of philosophers put a lot of weight on it, including,e.g., Donald Davidson, a pragmatist philosopher (so he says) who is generally named in the same breath as Quine as a major figure of postpositivist neopragmatism. I think D is overrated, but he's clearly a major figure. So rejection of the latter is more controversial.
--jks
>From: "Michael McIntyre" <mmcintyr at wppost.depaul.edu>
>Reply-To: lbo-talk at lists.panix.com
>To: <lbo-talk at lists.panix.com>
>Subject: Positivism [was Re: Ethical foundations of the left]
>Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2001 11:03:39 -0500
>
>I've heard that analytic philosophers are all post-positivists now, but
I'm
>not sure the word has reached the social sciences. Lots of folks I
studied
>with were still willing to call themselves positivists. John
Mearsheimer
>calls himself a "logical positivist". David Laitin calls himself a
>"neo-positivist". On the other hand, Henry Brady, whom most would tar
with
>the brush refuses to call himself a positivist. So maybe we need a
quick
>survey of the territory. My third-hand [and quite likely wrong]
>understanding is that analytic philosophers of all stripes now reject a
>distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and between
>statements of fact and statements of value. Those distinctions,
however,
>are still at the heart of state-of-the-art books on social science
research
>design. (I have King, Keohane and Verba's _Designing Social Inquiry_
in
>mind). So perhaps positivism isn't entirely dead . . . or it is dead
but
>those in the lower reaches of the academy have!
>n't gotten the word yet.
>
>Clarifications Justin?
>
>Michael McIntyre
>
> >>> jkschw at hotmail.com 07/18/01 09:45AM >>>
>Positivist leanings? That's a new one. I'm a pragmatist and a
scientific
>realist in the manner of Sellars, Quine, Richard Boyd, the old Hilary
>Putnam
> (circa 1967-75)(at least two stages back), that lot. Of course, all
of
>us
>trained in analytical philosophy "come out" of positivism, but that
doesn't
>make us us positivists, any more than the fact the Solidarity "comes
out"
>of
>groups with Trotskyist politics makes it Trot.
>
>I have developed more respect and appreciation for positivism than I
(we)
>had in the 1970s, when it was still hip to beat up on it, and when
there
>were positivists of a sort still around. There aren't, really, anymore
>today, except for maybe Larry Sklar at Michigan.
>
>No, I don't accept verificationism of any sort, and I'm a sort of moral
>realist in that I think that ethical claims like "Exploitation is
unjust"
>or
>"Freedom is better than slavery" are properly appraised as true or
false.
>My
>metaethical position is probably close to that stakes out by Eliz.
Anderson
>in Value in Ethics and Economics. I have written a number of papers in
>political ethics, and at least one defending the objectivity of
justice.
>
>Btw, the positivists did not "deny the existence of ethics"; they just
>interpreted ethical statements as presciptive. The classical statement
is
>C.L. Stevenson's still-wonderful Ethics and Language. My dissertation
>advisor Allen Gibbard--no positivist! (he has written important papers
in
>grand metaphysics)--has a brilliant restatement of prescriptivism in
his
>book Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.
>
>I think it is odd to describe Rawls as a "dissenting utilitarian." He's
not
>a utilitarian of any sort.
>
>I have not read Singer's "Darwinian left," although I have read other
of
>his
>books, such as Practical Ethics. I find his flat headed utilitarianism
>rather unpersuasive, although his applied discussions are generally
>interesting and sensitive.
>
>--jks
>
>
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