Long-term Goals of the Palestinian Authority

Brad DeLong delong at econ.Berkeley.EDU
Thu Jul 19 13:05:13 PDT 2001



> The August talks were over, but the negotations were still in
>process. Both leaders had given up more than they had ever done in the
>past -- in itself a complete shock, since both were at an records lows in
>political support, and Clinton was lame duck as well -- but it was also
>clear that both would have to give up even more before the deal was
>possible. It was, for the first time, conceivable that a real deal could
>be closed -- not probable, of course, but conceivable, which was a first.
>But besides the other sticking details, Arafat could never have closed a
>deal on Jerusalem by himself, alone in a room with his adversary. It's
>not his to give. He's not the leader of the Arab world. He had to shop
>it by the major heads of state first. And he was in the process of doing
>just that, and getting positive feedback, when Ariel Sharon marched onto
>the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif with between 1000 and 2000 armed
>retainers. *That's* what ended negotiations. Which most people agree
>could never have taken place without Barak's tacit approval. And the
>effects of which were completely foreseeable. So it's not Arafat who
>blinked here. It was the Israelis who took it back, frightened at what
>they'd done.
>
>Michael

Effects... Foreseeable...

If there is ever to be peace, lots of unpleasant people will go to all kinds of places. Ariel Sharon's feet are bloody, yes. But how is it that a visit of one man to one historical/religious site can destroy negotiations "in process"--if those negotiations are real?

Brad DeLong



More information about the lbo-talk mailing list