Right, that would be non-reflective learning. Reflection is dialectical when it 'frees up' into language something that had formerly been blocked. Evidence of the integration of critique into the learning process manifests itself on three levels: speech (the person is able to formulate something which could previously not be formulated, i.e. like an intuition now formulated as an argument), action (the critique is integrated into the way we live our lives - which is a 'test' of the sincerity of the participants who have reached an agreement), and in terms of communicative experience (the capacity to problem solve at a more reflective level than previously possible, i.e. instead of defaulting to church, family, or employer as an authority, one turns to ones own reasoning with others).
> If a definition of dialectics was possible, it would be something like a
>critique of the historical forces which condemn us all to being critics,
>a.k.a. shoppers in the global mall, hunting for use-values and ending up
>with exchange-values. I'm also very skeptical about calls for abstract
>"learning" which are tied to no less abstract notions of rationality and
>problem-solving.
This isn't a call - at all - for abstract learning. The learning process takes place through participation, this is what we're doing now, we're talking about stuff. But this process itself can be formulated *in theory* - which basically means, through the use of methodological standpoints, we can translated experience into data. If we can't do this, if one simply says that this is abstract, then the entire idea of enlightenment is forfeit - in order to have a concept of enlightenment that is not self-defeating, we have to be able to spell out what this means for ourselves with others. In other words, the call for enlightenment without any idea whatsoever about what this might mean is abstract (and probably dangerous). It is possible to develop, I think, valid standards for human rights. Valid not in the sense of being Universal, but in the sense of minimal conditions required, that we can agree to, that make a conversation possible. With a general guideline for what counts and what doesn't count as rational, then it should be apparent that the idea of enlightenment here is not abstract (and I agree, to some extend, that we can only do this negatively - we negate, through communicative action, conditions that we know to stifle discourse). Equally, this notion of rationality is not abstract because it is first contained in our experience with other, our communicative experience: which is basically a consciousness shift out of narcissism. into a community of participants. This invokes both the idea of relative autonomy (a word subject to much abuse, it really means contextually embedded reflection) and solidarity (one can't hit someone and have a conversation in any coherent sense of the term, conversation).
The thing is, our conversation here is primarily hermeneutic and pre-scientific (bear with my use of the term science, I have a rather broad understanding). If we actually set ourselves to the task of putting this conversation into through the grind, in a theoretical analysis (I don't want to say scientific because this leads to unfortunate methodological entanglements), then we could, in principle, figure out whether or not there was an actual 'learning' process. For instance, if from this day forward you pay more attention to Habermas than before... then we can say that reasoning and become reflective, and reflection has translated into action. Reading Habermas might now be very wise, it might even be bad for you, but transformation of communicative experience into reflection into action is readily apparent. This isn't a deep observation, what is remarkable about it is the way in which Habermas links up theoretical inquiry with practice.
> This isn't how aesthetics happens, this isn't how
>friendships or community happens. Even the most moral morality just isn't
>moral enough to orient ourselves in this insane total system.
Since I disagree with your point, I don't think this follows. And, as regards to this 'insane total system' - if the system is total, than any dialectical experience is moot, since we would be living in a post-dialectical world. Perhaps it is more accurate to say, totalizing...?
People are always asking me, "Do I know Jurgen Habermas?"
Somehow, all of this. The theories, the pragmatics, the idealizations of speech... it all has something to do with a theory of communicative action.
bonds of love, ken