>I'm talking about Kenneth's version of the story, not Habermas'.
I'm defending an orthodox version of Habermas. I have references for every remark, and most of the metaphors, the I've used.
> I know that H has personally engaged, for example, in the
> Historismusstreit and so forth. I actually haven't given thought to
> whether his account of communicative action can accomodate the points I
> have been making. Thinking about Habermas is not something I do a lot.
> But Kenneth hasn't explained how _his_ version can accomodate it. He
> just keeps repeating (as far as I can tell) that philosophical analysis
> is an a priori presupposition of human communication.
I don't see how you've refuted any of the points that I've made. You're saying that people don't give a shit, and I'm pointing out that it doesn't matter what peoples intentions are, the structure of communication is built into the reproduction of a social environment. No, it isn't invariable, because we can move between modern and mythological forms of thought, domination destroys capacity and so on. And, as I mentioned previously, philosophical analysis isn't an a priori assumption, it is a *reconstruction* of the presuppositions of intersubjective communication; an action theoretic that outlines the normative dimensions of reaching an agreement. Take it or leave it.
>This isn't my target. I have doubts about making agreement particularly
>central in political theory because I'm a liberal and a historical
>materialist--two theories that emphasize conflict from different angles.
>But I have not been hammering on that. Rather I have been hammering on
>what I take to be Kennenth;s excessive rationalsim and his narrowness
>about the range of considerations and kinds of discourse that matter to
>them in the social production of their lives, in which the kind of
>abstract philosophical justification of policy options and basic values
>that Kenneth seems to insist on (I am talk talkking about Habermas) is not
>very important.
I haven't at all limited the range of considerations. I've pointed out that the range can be thematized into different intentional structures: teleological, communicative, dramaturgical and so on. I'm arguing that a philosophical justification can be given for the normative dimensions of reaching an agreement.
>>i sense an odd reduction, not in your post per se, but in bernstein too,
>>of habermas's work on communicative action to the linguistic, ideational
>>arm of CA. we shouldn't think of CA as language only or rationality. reason
>>is meant to involve action, social action, the practical lived aspect of
>>communication and interpretation.
>
>Tell Kenneth about this, then. He seems to think it's not communicative
>action to try to change someone's mind by relling a different story or
>exemplifying a different kind of life.
It is, but if you are retelling a story there are different parts: the truth claim, the normative claim, and the expressive claim (third person, second person, first person). All three are open to discursive analysis: regarding the validity of the truth claim, the validity of the normative claim, and the authenticity of the expressive claim. Habermas argues that meaning and validity are two sides of a speech act.
>Habermas is some sort of historical materialist.
He was. In 1976 he "reconstructed' historical materialism along the lines of cognitive development and social evolution. Since then he hasn't touched hismat and has focused on evolutionary processes.
scotch on the rocks, ken