>you can look in the lbo archives for the same
>http://nuance.dhs.org/lbo-talk/9910/0418.html
Thanks for the past-blast. As for the emphatic conception of reason, I've kind of gone back to it. The idea of emphatic reason holds out for the unity of rationality in all three Kantian spheres (theory, practice, aesthetic judgement). I'm more inclined to agree to this now than I was last year, so that means that my wandering away from it met with a return. However, I'm not going to defend this in my thesis, because it is, after all, just a utopian intuition.
><...>
>>If this isn't persuasive, and one still wants to remain Habermasian,
>>consider that the idea of communication free from domination is
>>*conceptually* incoherent.
>
>why?
I would argue that communication itself is meaning-full *as* distorted. In which case, communication takes place through the medium of its distortions *and* its clarifications. The latter is what Habermas is interested in, the former is unthinkable for him. That's my reason for disagreeing with Habermas on that point. As for why I think the idea is conceptually incoherent is because in order to be conceptualized, we must have a grasp of the meaning of the idealization (along the lines of truth and rightness and etc). This cannot be the case, as Habermas's argument goes, it is neither a Kantian regulative or a Hegelian concept. The realization of an ideal communicative community is not one that can be realized. If we take this seriously, then the fact that we presuppose the impossible whenever we speak doesn't actually help us much, much less serve as the *grounds* of social criticism. However, Habermas inadvertently solves this problem in BFN. When talking about sovereignty, Habermas argues that it must remain empty, it is a zero point, no 'thing' (collective or individual) can hold a place of absolute (legitimate) sovereignty. I read this as meaning, by implication, that no community can occupy the ideal communicative space/place. This shifts the idea of enlightenment from a teleological goal to a tarrying with the negative, it is our mode of interaction, but not our telos. I think this corrects the consequentialist problem that Benhabib highlights in her book Situating the Self and complements Wellmer's critique that Habermas's framework has metaphysical leanings. It is the impossibility of this point that makes enlightenment possible, in an inverted sense. I think Lacan provides an explanation for this, one that Habermas hasn't adequately dealt with, although I am in an awkward position to expand on this much further. At the moment it is a hunch, perhaps later I'll be able to clarify it. Aside from Benhabib and Wellmer's critique, and Habermas's commentary, this idea is also put forth by Mouffe in her book The Democratic Paradox. I should also mention, this Maeve Cooke's excellent reading of Habermas's pragmatics, which has similar implications as well (that Habermas can only grant conceptual priority to communicative action, not moral priority).
>>This should put an end to it. If you can't conceptualize it, one can
>>hardly defend that it is a necessary moment / structure of speech (I
>>agree, the presupposition can be made, in a practical discourse, but not
>>invariantly so)
>
>this from someone who digs lacan's notion of lack.
>
>okeydoke!
Yeah well, I can't figure everything out all at once. One problem at a time.
>>[although Habermas doesn't argue this is invariant, he notes that the
>>lifeworld must meet the world of institutions half-way... but then that's
>>just a problem for my argument *and* his isn't it?
>
>i'm not quite sure i understand what the part in brackets means, but if it
>means what i think it means, then no, i don't think that's his argument.
>the lifeworld has its own rationalizing logic that is different from that
>of the institutions of the market and the state.
Right, but systems colonize the lifeworld and, in effect, destroy the potential for agreement systematically. In other words the mechanisms of the market, for instance, can destroy or distort communication. Habermas is sensitive to Adorno's concern about an administered world, and his theory of system / lifeworld reflects this. If the systems colonize the lifeworld, then certain socialization process necessary for cognitive development and social integration are wiped out, ie. the lifeworld can be overburden with contrary demands which brings about a turn toward tradition or a fragmentation of perspective, manifest it socio-pathological symptoms (he actually puts it like that, vol 2). Maybe I've misunderstood your point? I mean, he clearly states that the lifeworld must meet discourse half way, one can't expect too much given the institutional structure at any given time: our 'fantasy' of a better world must be exact, it must conform to what is objectively possible at any given time.
suture, ken