On Fri, 27 Jul 2001, Kenneth MacKendrick wrote:
> Maybe you can summarize the key points in a paragraph or so? As I mentioned
> in another post, Wittgenstein's approach, according to
> Habermas,Wittgenstein implicitly equates semantic conventions with social
> conventions. He doesn't distinguish between the language and the grammar of
> language games. Habermas's action theory exceeds the capacity of the
> concept of rule-following - the semanticist approach fails to see that the
> concept of a rule applies to operations that are performed along with
> concrete actions.
>
> ken
>
I haven't read H on Wittgenstein, but I don't see why H distinguishes himself from late W. on this. If we want to understand language, look at how it is used to do things in everyday life. It is not a question of following rules or any consistent, underlying cognitive principles; rather, W argues, any pattern or "meaning" in language is simply and completely recognizable in how it is used. --Thus the need for systematic empirical studies of how people use language to do things: convince, persuade, cajole, plead, argue, justify, ridicule. If we ignore the ways in which people actually use language in everyday life, we might be able to come up with criteria for the "perfect" or "ideal" communicative situation. But what's the point? What does it have to do with the world in which we live and use language?
Miles