Well, I think you got Justin on that one.
My head is spinning with this whole Habermas (barely remembered), Quine (never read), Davidson (never read), Wittgenstein (read some) debate about whether or not there is an ethics of communicative action that can be grounded in the presupposition of rational debate (did I put it right?). "Grounded" is probably the wrong word, however, since it doesn't seem to me that "reaching" an understanding or concensus necessarily "grounds" anything in existing circumstances (except that that is what you have to start with). So we are not talking about actual discourse so much as some future state that requires certain conditions of argument to achieve -- what Habermas and Kenneth would probably call "rational concensus" based on "rational" argument.
It seems to me that Kenneth has done a good job of laying out Habermas. But I am still not sure what the objections are, since they tend to be couched in technical philosophical discussion. On the other hand, I had to toss two weeks of mail in a corrupt inbox due to a bad second disk drive, and actually I wrote most of this post in a restaurant without access to the specific posts.
But maybe I can provide people with something to chew on.
Does the objection to Habermas involve a suspicion of the old temptation to disembody "reason"--to treat is as some abstraction in itself that is never related to concrete evidence or the the concrete circumstances of people's lives? Is it, for example, the spectre of "Reason" magazine, which insists that capitalism is the most "rational" and beneficial economic system because (in their abstract theory) it is "efficient"? But at what, optimizing M-C-M for the owners of the economy? That, no doubt seems eminently "reasonable" to those who own and decide the economy. Is it "rationalism" in the sense of "deduction from principles" (according to my Reason-magazine "theory" of capitalism, everyone ought to win, hence capitalism is good -- evidence be damned).
The objection to Habermas seems to me to be mitigated by his insistence that an "Ideal Speech Situation" (not necessarily the current situation) involves the democratic participation of "everyone" (forget for the moment the complexities of that) in the debate and decision-making process. If "everyone" is involved in the decisions that are determined by the debate, it becomes difficult for some to institute their own advantage over others except by force, or ideological deceit, I suppose (both frequent enough in the real world). Of course, such a utopian ideal speech situation has to be created, by social-economic-institutional change and education and will no doubt never exist perfectly. But that is why it is called an "ideal." The philosophical debate seems to be about whether or not it is "presupposed" in speech acts (a utopian social moment in speaking, perhaps based on the idea that we sometimes speak in order to figure out how we are going to cooperate to solve a problem).
But what do we mean in a social, political and economic context by a "rational concensus"? And what is the "rational" outcome of a social argument? It seems to me that we have issues of values on our hands as well as questions about standards of argument, as when we talk about "reasonable" in the sense of "fair" and "humane" social outcomes.
There is probably much to say about what constitutes adequate arguments outside of social outcomes, but in the social realm one has to argue social/ethical outcomes -- values. So, if I say about the arguments of "Reason" magazine that their claims about the benefits of capitalism are contradicted by weighty evidence that they (conveniently) suppress, it isn't that I can just make up my own evidence. But what motivates me to argue against them is my sense that they cleverly support a system that I consider "unfair" -- on the evidence, plus my values.
But consider this. On the basis of that broader evidence, the defender of capitalism could also decide that, well, maybe capitalism ISN'T "fair" in many ways, but what the hell, he and his CEO and stockbroker buddies are just better and smarter human beings (after all, they got college degrees) and DESERVE what they can get out of the system, which suits them just fine, and which hence must be maintained.
If you look carefully at Robert Bork's "Slouching Toward Gomorrah" (I tortured myself with that one last year), that is precisely the meritocratic argument that he makes (and based mostly on annecdotal evidence rather than on hardcore social research). Ordinary people are lazy, greedy, ignorant moral cretins who do not deserve to have a democratic say-so; the successful and wealthy are smarter, more "rational," and work harder and hence deserve their privileges, especially the privileges of making decisions that their property gives them (just like Bork worked hard, went to the U. of Chicago, and hence deserved an appointment to the Supreme Court). By the way, is it something about LAWYERS and JUDGES? From what people have said, Posner seems to follow in a similar vein, although (I don't really know -- haven't read him either) possibly less egregiously.
In any case, I eagerly await my shredding by the philosophers, or my bludgeoning for being an "idealist" by the hardcore Marxists (I'm not trying to make fun of Marxism; I read the Monthly Review and find it much more convincing than my local newspaper business page).
Actually, I just wonder what the participants would have have to say about these larger hypothetical examples that aren't taken up with the minutiae of speech act theory.
I probably won't have much time to respond, but you guys seem to be able to have more time and to be able to go at it with each other.
Peter Kosenko
============================================================= Peter Kosenko Email: mailto:kosenko at netwood.net URL: http://www.netwood.net/~kosenko ============================================================= "Man is a rational animal. He can think up a reason for anything he wants to believe."--Benjamin Franklin