>
>>First, my problem is that justification by reference to an ideal state of
>>affairs will fail to motivate people in the here and now, where conditions
>>are not ideal.
>
>The rejoinder would be, we always already presuppose this ideal, or some
>such approximation of this idea, whenever we speak. The ideal does not
>motivate, it is the equivalent, I think, of a Kantian postulate.
OK, if the ideal does not motivate, then what force does it have? Sounds like you have to reject "ought implies can," and argue that people somehow ought to have motivations that they would have under ideal circumstances, but don;t have because circumstances are not ideal. WOrse, what makes it an idea;?
You say, we presuppose it--actuallly, here and how. How? Because our communication is distorted by power if we don't? But, as Carol noted, "distorted" presupposes a norm, and the question here is whether the fact that communication occurs under certain conditions described in the ideal speech situation has any normative force.
>What
>motivates people are their interests: self-preservation, desire, emotions,
>feelings, affections, reasons and so on. Habermas argues we can distinguish
>between two kinds of interests: an interest in understanding and an
>interest in mastery. One is practical, the other is technical. It is our
>interest in these two things that motivate us to learn, not the
>idealizations that we make. The idealizations, in effect, are the simple
>'assumption' that when we try to understand or mastery something, we assume
>that it is possible.
OK, but it's obviously possible for masters to communicate with slaves and vice versa, without any ideal conditions obtaining. ("Build me a pyramid!" "Yes, boss.") If we wish to explain communication of this sort, how is the ISS the least bit illuminating?
--jks
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