Remember that I (and a lot of other fiscally-orthodox Dems) are capital fetishists: believers in large positive externalities from investment through learning-by-doing, learning-by-using, and worker-employer quasi-rent sharing. Thus a low national savings rate terrifies us.
Thus we favor the policy mix proposed by Robert Solow back in the early 1960s: tight fiscal policy (to boost national savings); a redistributive tax system (to level out the distribution of income and create large fiscal automatic stabilizers); loose monetary policy on average (to counteract the tight fiscal policy); and delegation of the bulk of stabilization policy to the Federal Reserve.
Of course, this requires that (a) the Federal Reserve be competent, (b) the Federal Reserve have a sound and accurate view of what "maximum employment and purchasing power without accelerating inflation" means, and (c) the economy not have gotten itself so wedged that monetary policy is ineffective.
Neither (a), (b), nor (c) can be taken for granted. (Indeed, back in the spring of 1992, IIRC, Laura Tyson, Larry Summers, and Alan Blinder were all sufficiently alarmed by the then-ongoing "credit crunch" to say that it was time to restore fiscal policy to a more prominent stabilization policy role.) But *here* and *now* I think all three of them hold--but (c) does not hold in Japan, and (b) does not hold in Europe.