And that presumptively (that is, unless special circumstances can be shown) includes all cases where there are splits in the circuits (that is, where 3 judge panels in different appellate circuits have reached such conflicting decisions on substantially similar facts and issues), or where rehearing en banc is granted (that is, where the body of appellate judges in a circuit require that the opinion reached by a single panel be reconsidered by all the circuit judges), or where the Supremes reverse a decision of an appellate panel. I put aside Justin's dismissal of the 9th Circuit medical marijuana panel's opinion as just obviously wrong (or whatever) as the symptom of a disorder common among judge's clerks and assistant prosecutors which he will either recover from or learn to disguise.
But putting suchlike aside, if among those cases that *we agree* are in this sense indeterminate one should appear where one decision will cause massive suffering and the other not, is it not obvious that the decision that does not cause suffering must be correct?
The other position I find (and have always found, since Justin's view is common) shocking and horrific; not as a lay moralist but as a Martindale AV practictioner (albeit now only working, praise the Lord and the award of counsel fees in Rule 23 cases, pro bono).
john mage