< http://www.outlookindia.com > Ruling By Proxy Two independent reports document in detail Pakistan's role in nurturing the Taliban V. Sudarshan
In Operation Enduring Freedom, the US has sought Pakistan's help, glossing over the latter's role in creating and nurturing the Taliban. Proof of Islamabad's hand in Afghanistan has now come through a document Russia submitted to the UN before the September 11 attacks. This document details the various ways-listed under eight categories-Pakistan extended support to the Taliban.
Russia submitted the document following Islamabad's persistent violation of sanctions the UN Security Council (UNSC) had imposed on Afghanistan. The first of these sanctions (Resolution No. 1267) came on October 15, 1999, asking the Taliban to turn over Osama bin Laden "without further delay". Later, fresh sanctions were imposed through UN Resolution 1333 last December, and came into effect in January this year. The sanctions imposed included:
The closure of all terrorist training camps under Taliban control;
A ban on the supply, sale or transfer of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts;
A withdrawal of all foreign military and security advisors to the Taliban.
The Russian report to the UN spelt out explicitly the Pakistani role in bolstering the otherwise isolated Taliban. These included, among other things, names of centres controlled by Pakistani groups;
Pakistanis in senior posts in the army of the Taliban movement;
sub-units of the Pakistani regular army in Afghanistan;
Pakistani advisors in Afghanistan;
a listing of production, control and circulation of narcotic drugs in Afghanistan.
The report makes it clear the Pakistanis have had a free run of Afghanistan. For instance, item 20 of the category "Terrorist infrastructure of Osama bin Laden" says, "The barracks of the former Rishkor division (Kabul province) are serving as a base for a Pakistani regiment and more than 7,000 fighters under Maulana Wahezi, Mullah Adel, Mullah Jabbar, Mullah Esrail, Mahfez Mohammed, Khaifuz Atar, Sheikh Abul Hassan from the regular Pakistani army and from various organisations including Ansar, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jamiyat Ulama-e-Islam and Sepah-e-Sahab. The base is under the general command of Osama bin Laden's deputy, Saifullah Ahtar, and has 120 instructors." The document, incidentally, lists 55 such centres.
Russia isn't the only one to accuse Pakistan of aiding the Taliban. The New York-based Human Rights Watch in its July 2001 report, titled 'Crisis Of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in Fueling the Civil War', stated: "Of all the foreign powers involved in efforts to sustain and manipulate the ongoing fighting, Pakistan is distinguished both by the sweep of its objectives and the scale of its efforts, which include soliciting funding for the Taliban, bankrolling Taliban operations, providing diplomatic support as the Taliban's virtual emissaries abroad, arranging training for Taliban fighters, recruiting skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies, planning and directing offensives, providing and facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel and on several occasions, apparently directly providing combat support."
In April and May 2001, Human Rights Watch sources reported as many as 30 trucks a day crossing the Pakistan border. The Watch's sources inside Afghanistan reported that some of these convoys carried artillery shells, tank rounds and rocket-propelled grenades. The report then says, "Such deliveries are in violation of UN sanctions.Pakistan's army and intelligence services, principally the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), contribute to making the Taliban a highly effective military force."
The Watch report also speaks of the Rishkor centre and quotes interviews with several Pakistani volunteer fighters, captured by the Northern Alliance, as saying that, as late as 1999, a special compound existed at Rishkor for the training of Pakistani volunteers and for th e Taliban and that "a guarded area within the camp held the living quarters for Pakistani military and intelligence personnel". The Taliban weren't allowed access to this area. The Watch report also contains a reproduction of the site map as sketched by former Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Masood.
The Watch report quotes volunteers as describing "the Pakistani trainers as being in their forties, military in appearance and speech and frequently multilingual, speaking English in addition to Pashto and in many cases Arabic and/or Urdu. Leaders of the fighting groups were younger, usually in their thirties, who identified themselves as former Pakistani military".
The Rishkor garrison apart, the Russian document lists 16 instances when regular Pakistani forces were deployed inside. For instance, it states that the "21st regiment of the 10th Peshawar division, Kabul, is stationed behind the Ministry of Internal Affairs building by the petrol station". The Pakistani military headquarters in Afghanistan is in the Mohammed Rakhim Building in the Kart-e-Parwan district (Kabul).
The Russian report also cites a para-commando regiment from Rawalpindi (up to 700 men) as being stationed in Manzelbag district (Kandahar province), including a company of special forces from the Charat division. It also mentions a Pakistani reconnaissance plane as being stationed in Mazar-e-Sharif. Going by the listing, most of the so-called Pakistani diplomatic staff stationed in Afghanistan were either isi operatives or uniformed personnel, the highest ranking being Gen Ehsanulla, who was then stationed in Kabul. The document lists 30 other names of Pakistani officers.
The US didn't comment on Pakistan's role in Afghanistan, preferring as it did to maintain a discreet silence. This Islamabad (or even others) could have confused for Washington's benign political acceptance of Pakistan's 'natural' geographical destiny in Afghanistan. Perhaps the US didn't respond to the Russian document because of the behind-the-scenes negotiations that it was having with the Taliban for nabbing Osama bin Laden.
But the Watch report, quoting diplomatic sources, says that after the fall of Taloqan in September last year, "the US government was sufficiently concerned about the possibility of Pakistani involvement in the capture of Taloqan...that it issued a demarche to the Pakistani government in late 2000, asking for assurances that Pakistan had not been involved. The demarche listed features of the assault on Taloqan that suggested Taliban had received outside assistance in planning and carrying out the attack".
Post September 11, it isn't clear whether or not Pakistan can continue to follow its Afghanistan policy with impunity. The quality of cooperation between Islamabad and Washington on Afghanistan has not yet yielded spectacular dividends that were initially imagined would follow automatically. Nor can a mere reshuffle of isi personnel at the top automatically recast Islamabad's Afghanistan policy.
Indian government officials claim the Pakistani insistence on hunting for a mythical but moderate Taliban has put severe operational constraints on Enduring Freedom. Washington's ability to deal effectively with the Afghan crisis has been further complicated by, according to sources, the "re-emergence from the woodworks of former Cold Warriors who are working for another political honeymoon between Washington and Islamabad".
Impatience and frustration over Afghanistan are already evident in the American media. For instance, the editorial from the San Francisco Chronicle of October 23 says that the US strategy, "which seemed to do little but bounce the rubble at previously abandoned bases, was the result of Pakistan's insistence on buying time while it hosted talks to create a broad post-Taliban coalition. But the Pakistanis seem to be playing a double game-helping the US offensive while trying to ensure that their old Taliban allies have a prominent role in the post-war government. Such Machiavellian deception has gone on long enough".
But the unbeatable suggestion came from Slate.com: "Let's worry about post-Taliban Afghanistan post-Taliban."