>
Perhaps not unanimous but allowing only three days to decide how to respond
to a new, unknown, unknowable and incredibly devastating weapon says more about
a willingness to use the weapon again and not consider negotiation than it does
about relative cohesion of the Japanese command.
Did the U.S. say at any point in those three days 'surrender unconditionally
or we will use this weapon again?' After the second bomb the probability for
the Japanese of a third, likely dropped on Tokyo, was incredibly high. Surrender
or self genocide were the only apparent options.
Did the U.S. have a fully formulated and articulated response to 911 by 914?
>Another option, I guess, was a blockade and the effect of that on the
>civilian population would have been terrible (e.g. Iraq between 1991 and
>2001).
>
Mebbe, I've never seen a model of what a blockades effects would look like in
the morbid calculus this issue engenders.
If the point of departure is that weapons of mass destruction targeted at civilians
(or at least with willful ignorance of their presence) are immoral, then the
calculation of death differentials in different models is dancing on the graves
of the victims. http://netwinsite.com/dbabble/