>Let's take the best case of U.S. power-elite largess toward foreign
>nations: the Marshall Plan & development of Japan. They didn't
>change policy and decide to rebuild Germany, Japan, & Europe in
>general because of pressures from Americans. They did so because
>(1) the USSR existed as an alternative to capitalism; (2) the CPs
>came out of WW2 in Europe with bases of popular support and an aura
>of having been the best resistance fighters against fascists (and
>the CP in Japan, too, quickly reconstructed and massively expanded
>itself shortly after the end of the war); and (3) (often socialist)
>anti-colonial movements were on the forward march. Currently, we
>don't have popular pressure that is equivalent of (1), (2), & (3)
>combined & probably won't have it in the next decade either.
>Moreover, the history of the Marshall Plan & the like shows you that
>you won't get a reform by arguing for a reform; you'll get a reform
>when you credibly threaten the ruling class with a revolution, or
>better yet, revolutions spreading all over the world.
>
>As far as reconstruction and development of Afghanistan by the U.S.
>and/or the U.N. are concerned, a more likely prospect is that they
>will resemble what has happened to the Marshall Islands, as
>described in excruciating detail by JoAnn Wypijewski, "This Is Only
>a Test: Missile Defense Makes Its Mark in the Marshall Islands,"
>_Harper's_ (December 2001): 41-51.
Afg is serving as an ordnance testing range now, but I really doubt that it will be used like the Marshalls or Vieques when the bombing stops.
You've told us why the Marshall Plan happened. All that is correct. But I'm talking about making it a political demand that the US and its imperial partners pay up. You don't have to tell me that's a long shot, but I don't get the fatalism about making the demand in the first place.
Doug