"After all if it is needed to stop the financing of terrorism it could be needed to stop bribery."
"What objections would capital raise to this?"
I suppose it all devolves back to the state. The state as it is niether has the will nor means to enforce much other than the amount of transparency which the bourgeoisie require in order not to have their investments robbed too often. In order to enforce even this small amount the state supports fairly ineffectual supervisors. When they do act, because of some brewing financial scandal it is not because of their supervision (which amounts to little more than rubber stamping reports) but because they have been told there is a problem from somebody that counts (a member of the bourgeoisie with some cloat).
A purely procedual solution is in this sense no solution at all. Likewise relying on the the state as it is, is to rely on the wrong people, yet the state is the cornerstone. Easy answers are therefore not possible, however, this is where I would underscore having simple demands around which complex struggle can accumulate. A few minor changes in law offer an excuse to act, the act however must come from below.
Presuming a struggle to change the definition of directors responsiblities has been successful (or is in progress). The real transparency can only come from "whistle-blowers" individuals or small groups within corporations that notice that something is wrong. As is the case today, such powerless individuals following procedures of reporting would get no-where fast. The nature of the state (any state including a proletarian one) is in the first instance bureacratic and the rule is bury trouble before it becomes a problem.
Just as the bourgeoisie use extra-legal powers (networking and socializing) to get their way (forcing the state into action or inaction), the proletariat needs recourse to extra-legal force (obviously not of the same kind) to motivate the state into action.
Law, criminal law, works on the basis of an act having been committed, the punishment of the offender defines what is acceptable and most people (including the bourgeois directors) have to make then a conscious decision which acts they will do and which they will not. In taming corporations I believe the same logic holds.
Capital will raise the strongest objections to procedual supervision, legal restrictions etc (packaged solutions) for these directly hamper their freedom to take advantage of other bourgeoisie (the more law abidding being severely disadvantaged by the the less - the result being that there is always a set of rules in operation which the state in the last instance will be brought in to enforce). The trick is to change the class basis of the rules and "take-out" the worst offenders so that the rest adopt a higher overall standard (much of this leaves them doing business as they have always done) the objective is to give direction, not solve all the problems by a stroke of the pen.
Chris, I apologise for this lengthy reply and will try to be more concise in the future, it is that the questions touch deeply on the relationship between the legal and extra-legal which I believe is an essential concept.
Greg Schofield Perth Australia
--- Message Received --- From: Chris Burford <cburford at gn.apc.org> To: lbo-talk at lists.panix.com Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 08:03:56 +0000 Subject: Re: Business bribery [Democracy and the nation state]
At 19/11/01 16:28 +0800, you wrote:
>*The laws of fraud and criminal negligence are applicable to companies in
>the form of their directors having criminal liabilty - we should not allow
>them to employ their "get-out-of-jail" card which in effect by the
>non-prosecution they enjoy.
How easily could we enforce transparency of business interconnections - holding and daughter companies etc?
After all if it is needed to stop the financing of terrorism it could be needed to stop bribery.
What objections would capital raise to this?
Chris Burford
London