Stand-off between Opec and Russia?
Mark Jones
mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk
Sat Nov 24 02:45:24 PST 2001
Events of world-historical importance are unfolding in the Middle East and
Central and South Asia, but this is only the epicentre of a crisis shaping
up with dramatic speed and power. At stake is the global architecture of
world capitalism in this century and the fate of US hegemony.
The Afghan war, which many rightly identify as a battle fought in a larger
war for resources and power in Central Asia, has triggered a cascade of
change elsewhere including the restructuring of the terms of US hegemony
and its relations with Russia in particular. As this global reordering
evolves, huge changes will be triggered in US relations with Europe, Japan
and China. If the emerging US-Russian strategy succeeds, then the
balkanisation of the Middle East can only accelerate. The West will
reassert its control over the social and political destiny of the Islamic
world. Other potential rivals may fare no better; China, in particular,
will face a grim future. A geopolitical realignment which leaves China
effectively encircled by Russo-American power, means that the 21st century
will not, after all, be one of Asian renewal, as many had speculated.
Right now the Russians are making their play but how serious is current
Russian talk about replacing Opec as the west's principal energy supplier?
You have to have spent time with Russian oilmen, the so-called 'generali',
in order to understand how seemingly normal people can be blinded by
avarice. These 'oil generals' sold out the Soviet Union in the name of
greed and personal ambition. Men like Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former Prime
Minister and currently Ambassador to Ukraine, and Rem Vyakhirev, his
successor as Chairman of the Gazprom Board, or Vagit Alekperov the Chairman
of the giant LUKoil petroleum company, helped wreck the great Siberian oil
reservoirs and ruined the Siberian and Arctic ecology to boot. After the
Soviet collapse they continued for example to sponsor crazed plans for
pumping so much gas from the Yamal peninsula that even by Gazprom's own
calculations the entire peninsula will sink beneath the Barents Sea.
Latterly, they have even begun to celebrate the 'positive benefits' of
global warming, which by melting off the ice cap has opened a new polar
route for tankering out the oil extracted from beneath the Arctic ice shelf.
The 'oil generals' are now plotting how to excavate methane hydrates from
the seabed, a procedure known to involve the risk of runaway global warming
which will turn the earth's atmosphere into that of Venus. For the Russian
'oil generals', the idea that Russia can replace Opec as the main western
oil supplier, unlikely though it may seem to the rest of us, is just small
potatoes. For their backers, oligarchs like Mikhail Khordokovsky (Putin's
favourite 'oilman', who rose to prominence by plundering state assets in
the Yeltsin years), this scenario offers new ways to win acceptance.
As Gunder Frank has been pointing out, Russian oil has risen again to
around 7m/bbls and is second only to Saudi oil. BUT this does not alter the
fact that Russian oil is well past its peak; in Hubbert Curve terms it is
in irreversible decline, and this is notwithstanding the alleged Caspian
oil bonanza.
At its 1987 peak the USSR produced ~13m/bbls a day. As with North Sea oil,
the Hubbert Curve contains within it a succession of minor peaks and
troughs; N Sea oil also 'peaked' twice before entering its present and
seemingly terminal decline. The same with Russian and ex-Soviet oil; even
with the most optimistic expectations of Caspian output that are publicly
available, total ex-SU production will never again exceed the 1987 level.
Therefore this is a declining reserve, and we should bear in mind the
implication: because the Russians are trying to elbow Opec aside even
though Opec production is still a decade or more away from peaking.
A huge power-politics is in play and this is the real score of the
Putin-Bush love-fest. The bottom line is this: world oil production is
peaking, and the relative significance of Opec is therefore on the up once
more. The US and its allies are determined to break Opec power. To give
Opec a stranglehold on world oil is to breathe new life into the corpse of
pan-Arab nationalism, and ultimately to empower the disfranchised Arab
masses. This has to be avoided at all costs; it strikes at the keystone in
the arch of US imperialism. Revolution in the Middle East would release the
genie from the bottle in many other places. This danger must be avoided at
any price. But it is indicative of the profound impasse now faced by US
hegemony, and the terrible dangers now faced by the whole imperialist
system, that the necessary political reconstruction now ongoing in the
mid-East must *in any case* be accompanied by a huge transfer of net
resources from the West to the oil-producing states. Even if the price is
to prolong the recession in the West, oil prices cannot be allowed to slip
below $25-28/bbl because a price collapse immediately endangers the
political security of client states like Saudi Arabia.
Social stability in many Gulf states is already jeopardized. Political
unrest is inevitable if oil revenues cannot be sustained. Therefore, US
imperialism is caught between a rock and a hard place. It cannot escape its
gross over-dependence on imported oil; imperialism has not been able to
outgrow the petroleum economy. Imperialism therefore cannot escape the long
term consequences of the *decline of world oil*, and it is this
accelerating decline which makes the mid-East so important. The decline of
oil production in the North Sea, Alaska, Texas, Mexico, Nigeria and also in
Russia, makes Saudi and Iraqi oil uniquely significant.
After the 1973 oil shock which first brought Opec to prominence, new oil
from Mexico, the N Sea and elsewhere later pushed Opec back into the
background. But all those reserves are now in sharp decline and this has
produced the need for new non-Opec sources. Putin has made his choice, and
has pushed Russia into the camp of the West and against what might seem to
be Russia's natural allies, the other oil giants which are mostly in Opec.
This cynical ploy is covered by a heap of fig-leaves: 'civilisation v.
barbarism', the 'war on terrorism' and the mystical values of Russian
Orthodoxy.
Why has Russia jumped this way? Russia, like any Opec producer, depends on
a high oil price. Bulk Urals and Siberian crude (like Caspian crude!)
cannot be profitably sold on the world for less than $15/bbl; and the
Russian economy faces a repeat of earlier collapses (the most recent in
1998) if the oil price is below $22-25/bbl. Russia and Saudi Arabia are
therefore *not* competing on price, even though that is how the press is
mostly reporting the issue, ie as a price war between Russia and Opec. In
fact, there is a competition, but it is for investment capital, not about
price.
What Russia wants above all is *investment*. For that to happen, prices
must be high. Putin is not selling cheap energy to the hungry markets of
21st century capitalism. What he's selling is energy security.
Houston oil banker Matt Simmons has talked of the need for a 'Marshall
Plan' for world energy, if what Simmons calls a 'perfect energy storm' is
to be avoided. Simmons speaks of the need to invest upwards of a trillion
dollars in securing energy supplies, above all, oil and gas but also
nuclear (Simmons does not have much faith in renewables, like most who make
a study of energy economics). Simmons has noted the need to spend upwards
of $500bn on uprating Saudi oilfields and infrastructure alone. You could
spend the same in Iraq and not have much change left. But you could also
spend this money in Russia, and in Russian-dominated Central Asia, and the
pool of available capital is limited.
Putin's emerging vision of the 21st century world order is of a Russian-US
condominium. This prospect is especially sweet for those in the Russian
ruling elite, including Putin himself, who hanker for past glories and who
have grown to resent constant disparagement by the West. Russian political
and business leaders do not like to be reminded of their own past or of
their state's economic weakness and abysmal human rights record. Russians
have been made to feel like second-class citizens and they resent it. This
is a powerful motivational factor behind the current drive by the Kremlin
for respectability, a place at the high table, and above all for
recognition of Russia's rebirth as a superpower and a pillar of the safety
and stability of the world capitalist system. This hunger for membership of
the club is what drove Yeltsin in his day to seek membership of the G-7 and
for the oligarchs to parade at Davos arm in arm with western counterparts.
This continuing sense of Russian exceptionalism, of a special destiny,
makes it easy for Putin to make extravagant gestures such as abandoning
Russian espionage facilities in Cuba or the fabled Cam Ranh base in
Vietnam, whose special significance in Russian eyes was that this facility
was earlier abandoned by the US army which built it. This was the highwater
mark in the Soviet struggle against the West. But it is not a sense of
Russian weakness or of dependence on American goodwill which makes Russia
give up these assets today. On the contrary, it is because Putin senses
growing American weakness that he can afford these gestures.
Putin is prepared to let US forces base themselves in once-sacrosanct
Central Asia, because he has convinced himself that underlying American
weakness now makes Russia indispensable to the West: 21st century
capitalism cannot survive without full-hearted Russian support and
involvement. Who, in the circumstances, is to say this calculation is
mistaken? Putin's vision is both simple and clear: future western
prosperity is anchored on Russia. There must be a strong Russian state, a
vibrant Russian capitalist economy, and a flourishing and well-capitalised
Russian resource and energy sector. This new Russia must take its place at
the top table along with the other great capitalist powers in Europe,
America and Japan. Russia must be a fully-authenticated member of the club,
and the Russian people must not fare less well, on average, than those of
other developed capitalist states. Russia is not and can never be merely a
'raw materials appendage' of the west. It cannot be a Mexico or a Brasil.
It cannot be a third-ranking power.
Putin's vision, informed by hisKGB training in Marxism-Leninism, is not
much different from the traditional Soviet interpretation of history. The
trappings of obsolete ideology have been stripped away, and everything else
in this primitive intellectual universe has been 'normalised', above all
the social position of the nomenclatura and its legal right to own
property. But the great power chauvinism of the true 'Sovok' remains intact.
Unlike many western commentators Putin does not see the Russian state as
just another branch of Russian robber-capitalism (the branch that takes
care of protection). For him, as for any apparatchik trained in Brezhnev's
Soviet Union, the state is a special domain unrelated to and above all
others. The state is the determining last instance of Russian society, the
guarantor of social and property rights and the inheritor of the special
mission of the Russian people in history. What Putin now offers is a new
social compact between the state, the elites and the masses, one they will
all find hard to resist. It includes restoration of great power status and
Russia's place as dominant Eurasian power, a social amnesty to the
criminal/comprador class of gangster-capitalists who gained power and
wealth under Yeltsin; dignity, social peace and improved living standards
to the masses, and above all the chance to draw a line under the past. The
Soviet era now takes its place as a distinctive, but nonetheless
intelligible and even pointful, episode within a broader Russian history:
the Soviet state was the rational continuer of a long tradition of
reformist strong states which succeeded both in defending the country
against aggression and in modernising its institutions and productive
assets. The new Russia is the legitimate and rational inheritor of this
Soviet legacy and there is no logical or emotional contradiction between
Soviet socialism (appropriate in its day) and modern Russian capitalism,
which can now be seen as a higher and more progressive historical stage (a
notion intuitively appealing to any Sovok).
Russia can now join Nato. As the guarantor of stability not only in Central
Asia but also in the Arabian Peninsula, Russia will obviously be a dominant
member of Nato, second only to the US. Russian industry, especially the
extractive and above all the oil and gas industries, can now expect a
biblical torrent of investment capital from Europe and America. The rebirth
of Russian industry and the vertical ascent of the Russian state to renewed
global power and reach ought to set in concrete the 21st century capitalist
order.
What combination of other powers could possibly resist this
American-European-Russian monolith? What possible chance do the broken
states of the Middle East have of competing? This grand plan for global
reaction will surely snuff out any possibility of social progress,
democratic renewal or mass liberation, throughout North Africa and the
Middle East. It will guarantee forever the availability of Iraqi and Gulf
crude, on Americo-Russian terms.
Above all, this grand plan, if it happens, will also ensure that Europe
never again challenges US global hegemony, which in a compliant Russia has
perhaps found its ultimate guarantor.
However, this grand plan for global capitalist renewal is born of
adversity, not of opportunity. It is the product of a great and growing
world energy crisis. It has arrived together with synchronised recession
and the possibility of economic slump. This energy crisis already destroyed
the Soviet economy, which collapsed in the early 1990s when Soviet oil
production peaked and fell by nearly half in the space of five years, at
the end of the 1980s.
Since the crisis of 1998, which was followed the devaluation of the rouble,
and by higher oil prices in the world market, there has been a partial
revival of the Russian economy, with billions of dollars of investment in
the oil sector. Nevertheless, oil production in the ex-USSR remains far
below its peak. In fact Russian oil is available on the world market today
only because of the collapse of industry throughout the Soviet bloc in the
1990s. Russian oil is in longterm decline, and it is not cheap to produce.
In short, Russia cannot replace Opec. Gulf oil in huge and reliable volumes
remains essential to any future global economic recovery. Moreover Putin's
policy contains the seeds of its own downfall. Stabilising the world
economy may not make more capital flow into the Russian oil patch. Capital
follows profit, not sentiment. If Putin's grand plan succeeds, then the
majority of future investment will still flow into the Middle East, above
all to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and not into Russia's decayed and declining
oil sector. Central Asia and the Caspian are also too uneconomic and too
small in reserves to ever replace Gulf crude. Therefore, the underlying
logic of decline and crisis remains in place. Putin's plan is not destined
to save capitalism. All it can do is to buy time: in other words, it is an
attempt to *manage decline* during the next decade, while hoping that
something else turns up meantime. It is not a basis for relaunching world
capitalism into a new great upwave of accumulation.
Inevitably, therefore, the most pronounced aspects of any new
Russo-American realignment will not be any inherent capacity for renewed
growth and progress, but on the contrary will be intensified repression,
obscurantism and black reaction. It is a recipe for the further
militarisation of imperialism, for the shrinking of civil society, for
creating societies of total surveillance and lockdown, for intensified
racism and social intolerance. This is the era of Exterminism, the highest
stage of imperialism. It is also the age of Panopticon. Here too,
Afghanistan is a foretaste of the future.
Mark Jones
More information about the lbo-talk
mailing list