See two articles below.
I think I mentioned a while back I thought it was highly unlikely Afghanistan was going to become a US client state. Russia's ability to exert pressure in Central Asia is unparalleled. This whole thing is like a gift from the gods just dropped in Putin's lap -- get the US help wipe out the people who have been bankrolling the Chechen extremists and running heroin in Russia, get a Moscow-friendly government in Kabul, isolate Pakistan, re-establish power over the non-Baltic former Soviet Republics, massive concessions from the US. This is Russia's dream come true.
Putin is not a US client and has no desire to become one.
(P.S. Doug I'll get that Taibbi translation to you soon, been real busy this weekend.)
Chris Doss The Russia Journal
The Sunday Telegraph (UK) 25 November 2001 Putin is succeeding where Brezhnev failed By Robert Fox
AS British and American commanders wrangle over troop deployments, the Russians are emerging as clear winners in the opening rounds of the complex military and diplomatic contest to influence the outcome of the war in Afghanistan.
In what most diplomats see as a rerun of "The Great Game" that dominated the
chancelleries of Europe in the last century, Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, has seized the initiative from his Western rivals by providing Northern Alliance fighters with the practical support necessary to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Nowhere is the evidence of Russian support for the alliance more apparent than on the streets of Kabul. There is hardly a soldier to be found who is not armed with Kalashnikovs and Soviet-style shoulder rocket launchers, while their commanders travel in shiny, light green Russian Gaz military vehicles.
Russian influence has been even more apparent on the battlefield where the rapid success of Gen Dostum's Uzbek forces in overwhelming the Taliban during the past two weeks has been greatly aided by tanks and arms provided by Moscow.
Western diplomats believe that the Russians were also responsible for the decision by alliance commanders to occupy Kabul, contrary to the numerous commitments they had given to the West and Pakistan not to do so.
Certainly Western suspicions of Russian duplicity seemed to be confirmed when the troops of Mohammad Qassim Fahim Khan, the successor to the murdered Ahmad Shah Masood, drove in triumph into the capital aboard Russian tanks and vehicles.
This was particularly galling for allied commanders who, after all, had greatly facilitated the alliance's chances of success by using America's B-52 bombers to destroy the Taliban's defensive positions around Kabul.
On the day that the capital was liberated, however, it was Russian-made T-55
tanks that paraded through the streets of the devastated city.
While the British and Americans have concentrated on providing aerial support for the alliance, Mr Putin has gone out of his way to ensure that Russian military hardware has been available on the ground in Afghanistan.
At least 50 T-55 series tanks and 30 armoured personnel carriers were supplied by the Russians to the alliance a few weeks ago. With them came tons of tank and heavy machine-gun ammunition, spares for tanks and trucks, and fuel and lubricants for tanks and helicopters.
The equipment was accompanied by teams of Russian military advisers and trainers, who are believed to have drawn up the alliance's rudimentary assault plans for its successful assaults on the towns of Mazar-i-Sharif and
Pul-i-Khumri.
There are even reports that some of the leading tanks and attack helicopters
may have been crewed by Russian mercenaries.
The Russian advisers were matched by a few dozen United States and British special forces acting as forward aircraft controllers for the American air attacks.
By backing the alliance covertly and overtly, Mr Putin appears to have succeeded where his five predecessors, from Leonid Brezhnev to Boris Yeltsin, failed in establishing Moscow's influence across Afghanistan - and all this without a Russian life lost.
According to one diplomat who has observed the Russian manoeuvres, Mr Putin's tactics have paid off brilliantly. "The Americans provided the vital firepower from the air to help the Northern Alliance to drive back the Taliban, but the Russians have played the main role on the ground - and they
have received all the credit".
Apart from extending their influence over Afghanistan, the Russians have other reasons for wanting to extend their influence in the former Great Game
territory of Central Asia.
Despite the cosy tone of the recent Bush-Putin meetings, such as Mr Putin's visit to a hoedown in Crawford, Texas, the Russians are obsessed with getting the huge oil and gas riches from the Caspian basin and central Asia to the warm water ports.
The current proposal is to build a pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan in Turkey, but this would skirt Iran, Iraq and Syria. If, however, the Russians were able to establish warm relations with the new regime in Kabul, they would be
tempted to explore the possibility of building a pipeline through Afghanistan.
Certainly the fate of much of the world's future oil supplies could soon be under Russian control. With an estimated reserve of 110 billion barrels of oil, the Caspian can fill America's energy gap.
This might suggest why Mr Bush has suddenly softened his stance on scrapping
the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, and Mr Putin can play hardball about Russia's partnership with Nato, as he spelt out to Lord Robertson, the secretary-general of Nato , in Moscow last week.
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Subject: PUBLICATION- Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 November Issue on Web Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 From: "Cornell, Svante" <svante.cornell at pcr.uu.se>
The 21 November 2001 Issue of the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, a subscription free Web journal with over 80,000 visitors to the site since November 1999 is now on-line at http://www.cacianalyst.org/
The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies is proud to announce the publication of the 21 November 2001 issue of its biweekly Web-Journal, The Central Asia- Caucasus Analyst.
BRIEFING Wednesday/November 21, 2001
MOSCOW’S BID FOR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN: THE KISS OF DEATH OF A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT? Glen E. Howard AUTHOR BIO: Glen E. Howard is an Analyst at the Strategic Assessment Center for Science Applications International Corporation. He specializes in Caspian defense and security issues and has traveled widely throughout the region.
The seizure of Kabul by the Northern Alliance has altered the strategic dynamics of Afghanistan leaving the US-backed coalition in control of 60 percent of the country. However, there has been little discussion of Russian involvement in Afghanistan and its support for the Northern Alliance. Russian President Vladimir Putin has attached high strategic priority to the war, assigning the Chief of the General Staff Victor Kvashnin to oversee Russian military strategy in Afghanistan. These developments underscore a growing determination by Moscow to play a major role in the struggle for power in Afghanistan’s post-war politics by backing the Northern Alliance’s bid for power.
BACKGROUND: Besides appointing Kvashnin, Russian President Vladimir Putin assigned his close friend and confidant, Sergei Shoigu, to oversee Russia’s $500 million humanitarian assistance program to northern Afghanistan. Shoigu’s appointment to this position is highly symbolic because it reflects the strategic importance of Afghanistan for Putin. Although Putin made an important choice by acquiescing to U.S. strategic access to military bases in Central Asia, he did so when no other alternative was left, and his government’s support for the Northern Alliance as the legitimate heir to power in Kabul has undermined US efforts to create a broad-based coalition in Afghanistan since the demise of Taliban resistance. Referring to the unexpected seizure of Kabul by the Northern Alliance, President Putin told an audience at Rice University that ‘the current developments in Afghanistan are not a surprise to us. It is a goal we set ourselves at the first stage – the liberation of Northern Afghanistan – and then of Kabul.’ Moscow has maintained close military ties to the Northern Alliance since the late 1990s, and significantly expanded its military assistance after the U.S. launched its attacks on the Taliban. Shortly after General Kvashnin took charge of the Russian military assistance to the NA, he together with deputy Federal Security Service (FSK) head Viktor Komogorov organized a high-level meeting with military representatives of the NA in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan.. By October, Russian military assistance began to flow as approximately forty tanks and twelve military helicopters were delivered to NA forces as part of a $70 million arms package. The arms deal also involved an agreement to provide the Northern Alliance with old Soviet T-55 tanks, military helicopters, submachine guns, as well as anti-aircraft missiles. These arms deliveries appear to have played a key role in the series of military setbacks experienced by the Taliban at the hands of the Northern Alliance. Although Kvashnin is one of the few senior Russian military officers never to have served in Afghanistan, the General plays an indispensable role in plotting NA military strategy. His experience in directing Russian troops in Kosovo in 1999 provided Kvashnin with valuable experience in working with US-backed coalitions – but also in undermining them. The Russian commander achieved widespread recognition in Russia for his decision to ignore NATO military planning by leading Russian troops in their dash to seize Prishtina airport in Kosovo towards the end of the 1999 Balkan war. Two years later, Kvashnin is participating in yet another U.S.-backed coalition by advising the NA in its military strategy. Nowhere was his influence more visible than in the NA’s recent decision to seize Kabul in spite of its assurances to the United States that it would refrain from capturing the Afghan capital. An important asset of Russian military cooperation with the Northern Alliance is its new military commander, General Muhammad Fahim. The Soviet-trained former intelligence officer was once a member of KHAD (the Soviet-trained secret police) who tarnished his reputation among many Afghans by serving as Communist-backed leader Najibullah’s deputy prior to the 1979 Soviet invasion, but abandoned the Communist government after the fall of Najibullah in 1992. Fahim later joined the insurgent forces led by Ahmed Shah Masoud. Fahim has special appeal to Moscow because of his ties to the Russian Intelligence services and because of his deep hatred of Pakistan. Officials in the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) believe that Fahim organized the 1996 attack on the Pakistani embassy in Kabul when he served as the chief of security for the Northern Alliance when it ruled the Afghan capital from 1992-1996.
IMPLICATIONS: Russian leverage over the Northern Alliance has increased significantly since Fahim became the new military commander of the Northern Alliance. His promotion has enabled Moscow to expand its leverage over the Northern Alliance, enabling Russia to assert its role in the great power dynamics of post-Taliban Afghanistan. This also could explain why the Northern Alliance has been resisting US efforts to participate in a broad-based coalition and has prevented British troops from using the former Soviet air base at Bagram. In fact, the Putin government reacted swiftly to fill the political vacuum created by the demise of the Taliban. A Russian support team, including defense ministry personnel, departed for Kabul on November 19 that will reopen the Russian embassy in Kabul. Another team of Russian diplomats was dispatched to Mazar-i-Sharif to reopen the Russian consulate there as well. These initiatives are designed to bolster Russian support for the Northern Alliance as the legitimate government running Afghanistan. After announcing that Moscow was dispatching a high-level military delegation to Afghanistan, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, referred to the Northern Alliance as the ‘lawful government of Afghanistan’, indicating that Moscow has no intention of backing a broad-based coalition. These statements reflect a growing willingness by Russia to become the Northern Alliance’s regional patron as Moscow seeks to solidify its position in Afghanistan following the military defeat of the Taliban. Increasingly, it is becoming evident to western analysts that Moscow is eager to use the Northern Alliance as the cornerstone for a new India-Iran-Russia strategic axis aimed at encircling Pakistan.
CONCLUSIONS: The reluctance of the Northern Alliance to participate in a UN-sponsored meeting on the future of Afghanistan is a reflection of Moscow’s wider geopolitical aspirations in Eurasia, that seek to prevent Pakistan from reviving its role as a power broker in Afghanistan. The slowness of American officials to realize this strategy has undermined Afghanistan’s post-Taliban transition to a broader-based government that involves the Pushtun majority population. Russian efforts to bestow international legitimacy on the Northern Alliance promises to alter the strategic dynamics of South Asia in an effort to deny Pakistan strategic depth. In the event that Pakistan and the United States are unable to pry the Northern Alliance from power, the entire spectrum of regional politics will tilt in favor of the Moscow-engineered strategic axis comprising India, Iran, and Russia. The reemergence of the Northern Alliance as a dominant power in Afghanistan’s internal politics also turns back the clock to the early 1990s. Strategically, this creates the conditions for the continued isolation of Central Asia, and prevents the states bordering Afghanistan from gaining access to the Indian Ocean. The demise of the Taliban also risk to alter the energy dynamics of Central Asia by preventing Pakistan from fulfilling its goal of gaining access to Caspian oil and gas supplies - something that Islamabad obviously hoped would be one of the rewards for its cooperation with the United States. It is becoming increasingly evident that if matters continue to develop in the current direction, the real winner in Afghanistan will not only be the Northern Alliance, but also Russia.
AUTHOR BIO: Glen E. Howard is an Analyst at the Strategic Assessment Center for Science Applications International Corporation. He specializes in Caspian defense and security issues and has traveled widely throughout the region.