> Without the assumption of the critical importance of the US policy in
> foreign developments, this whole "blowback" argument is a nonsequitur -
> nothing more than an ex-post facto rationalization, the "poetic justice"
> trope that might provide some emotional consolation to the assorted
> First-World haters, but otherwise explains nothing.
I don't think that US policy such as it was pursued (ie half-assedly, unself-consciously, cynically) was decisive in fostering fundamentalism itself. But it has been decisive in the sense that the State Depts cynicism about anything but military operations left a critical vacuum in which fundamentalism--might become going discourse and reality of the Pakistani/ Afghan refugee "civic realm" (such as it is). That was also true, at least as the WSJ tells it, b/c there was no civic, economic, or political contexts in which "better" (ie more liberal, but private) education paid off, even narrowly (in crude economistic terms) speaking. My point was not that the US "caused" islamic fundamentalism, but that at some level, the State Dept. recognized that it _could_ do something that at least might have made some difference to retard its growing influence, but didn't. That was bound to be a bad calculation (especially for an imperial hegemon), 11 Sept. or not.
I agree that "blowback" doesn't explain anything, if what you're looking for are efficient causes. But that's what it's supposed to be--a name for unintended consequences. It has much more to do with structural causality, which is never predictive, but descriptive and analytical. It wouldn't explain fundamentalism, but could explain the environment in which fundamentalism could have its current importance in South East Asia.
Christian