Fish weighs in

[Ken Hanly]

What does it matter what he is as compared to what he says? I look at what
people say. I may interpret them incorrectly but in this case what Fish said
seemed clear enough. Do you really think that a person who believes that
there are certain universal values could not put themselves in other
people's shoes? Why not? Winslow's post shows some of the contradictions in
Fish. There are also contradictions in the Bernstein stuff. I comment after
some of the points.

Cheers, Ken Hanly
----- Original Message -----
From: "kelley" <kwalker2 at gte.net>
To: <lbo-talk at lists.panix.com>; <lbo-talk at lists.panix.com>
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2001 8:54 AM
Subject: Re: Fish weighs in


> At 08:47 PM 10/15/01 -0500, Ken Hanly wrote:
> >Except that it has nothing to do with relativism. A non-relativist could
do
> >the same thing. Relativism simply does not mean putting oneself in
someone
> >elses shoes. Period. Unless Fish is Alice.
> >I agree with Winslow that Fish's piece is a bundle of contradictions. I
will
> >never understand why anyone ever takes such writing seriously. The marvel
in
> >this Fish piece is that it is at least clear as well as contradictory.
>
> could you explain further? he's not a philosopher, but a litcritter,
right?
> i'd say it's best to read fish out of the pragmatist tradition anyway.
what
> he says reminds me of what Richard Bernstein, in _The New Constellation_,
> calls engaged fallibilistic pluralism.  bernstein also wrote a pretty good
> book on the topic, _Beyond Objectivism and Relativism_. He 'smuch better
> than Rorty, that's for sure
>
> Engaged Fallibilistic Pluralism:
>
> 1. requires responsibility for taking our fallibility seriously. we must
> be committed to our reasoned argument, but willing to listen to others.
> and we must be willing to listen without denying the otherness of those
> others.
>
COMMENT. Our fallibility means the fact that we can make errors. But we can
make errors only if there is such a thing as getting it right. But if there
is getting it right then it would seem there is truth. But if there is truth
then relativism is not correct. So the advice seems reasonable but only on
condition that relativism-at least of some sorts- is not true.

   If relativism entails that what values are "valid" are contextually
determined by culture, socety or whatever then people in a culture that does
not value reasoned argument surely would reject this proposal. What possible
justification could there be for condemning them or even being critical of
them except by privileging the values of another society that accepts the
value of reasoned argument?

     What on earth would be denying the otherness of the others? Is this is
a fancy way of saying that  we should recognise that others may be different
than us in culture,  understanding, and so forth. And why should we do that?
Is there some universal ground for doing this? This seems like a universal
value. Isnt that an abomination for relativists.


>
> 4. embracing the fact that there is no firm foundational ground to stand
> on. there are no safe, rationalized procedures to fall back on in order to
> adjudicate disagreements.

Comment: Of course I presume the above is true. Why isnt it relative,being
true in socieities that believe this and not in one that believe there are
such procedures?
>


>
> 7. the assumption, then, is that we all have something to contribute and,
> as such, our duty is to try to understand the other's position in the
> strongest possible way, rather than searching out their weaknesses, the
> gaps and fissures in their reasoned positions.
> >
Comment: We have a duty. What is the scope of "we". Everyone in any
community of scholars? But this implies that there are some universal values
of some sort requirin us
to try to understand otherspositions. etc. But then this seems to imply
non-relativism re values