> Ken Hanly wrote:
>
> > What does it matter what he is as compared to what he says? I look at
what
> > people say.
>
> >
>
>
> pointing out who he is might be a little relevant, since he is an
> english and law professor (or was. or at least so i believe), not a
> philosopher. philosophical relativism might be a larger and different
> beast than the relativism encountered in literary criticism or even
> postmodernism. but moving along...
This could very well be. However I was remarking on various things Fish
said, for example that relativism was the ability to put yourself in someone
elses shoes. I fail to see how this could be anything but a very misleading
concept of relativism. Anyway it has nothing to do with relativism as
claiming that normative or even factual propositions truth is relative to
culture, beliefs, or whatever. It is one thing to claim that one can put
oneself in anothers persons shoes and claiming that the truth is relative to
whose shoes you are wearing. This may be what FIsh meant but who knows. My
reference to Alice by the way is to Alice from Alice in Wonderland who
thought she could make words mean whatever she wished. (Of course there may
be senses in which normative propositions' truth may be conditional or
relative. Obviously what is morally right, if consequentialist theories are
correct, is relative to consquences.)
>
> >>
> >>1. requires responsibility for taking our fallibility seriously. we must
> >>be committed to our reasoned argument, but willing to listen to others.
> >>and we must be willing to listen without denying the otherness of those
> >>others.
> >>
> > COMMENT. Our fallibility means the fact that we can make errors. But we
can
> > make errors only if there is such a thing as getting it right. But if
there
> > is getting it right then it would seem there is truth.
>
> >
>
>
> why does getting it right imply there is "truth"? because what is
> right is what is truthful? forgive me if i am wrong, but this seems
> a bit circular.
What is right is not necessarily related at all to being truthful. Consider
opening your door. You take out the right key. You made no mistake.. You put
the right key in the lock. There is no question of being truthful but surely
putting the right key in the lock implies that "You put the right key in the
lock" is true. Even the mistake implies truth but has nothing to do with
being untruthful. Being fallible I may put the wrong key in the lock. If
that is so then it is true that I put the wrong key in the lock. The
situation is no different with normative propositions. Being fallible I may
mistake another hunter for a deer and immediately shoot at her. Doesnt this
imply that it is true that I was not as careful as I ought to have been or
alternatively false that I was as careful as I ought to have been. Of course
one can imagine circumstances in which this would not be the case but I
think my point should be clear enough.
>
>
> > If relativism entails that what values are "valid" are contextually
> > determined by culture, socety or whatever then people in a culture that
does
> > not value reasoned argument surely would reject this proposal. What
possible
> > justification could there be for condemning them or even being critical
of
> > them except by privileging the values of another society that accepts
the
> > value of reasoned argument?
>
>
>
> i would agree that you would use the values of your culture to
> examine and critique another culture. only if one holds that one's
> values are universal (at least until proven "wrong"), or that
> cultures are static entities that have fixed capabilities (leading
> to the problem of incommensurability), do problems arise. perhaps
> you use imaginative poetry to convey a point and clinch an
> argument whereas i value socratic dialogue. but you will have a
> problem convincing me of your point only if (1) you have no means
> to absorb socratic dialogue into your culture or (2) i have no
> means to absorb poetic expression in my culture or (3) i remain
> rigid, perhaps due to my belief in the universality of my method
> or culture, and consciously curtail all means to develop an
> appreciation of poetry.
>
> of course the use of the term 'reason' itself is ambiguous, just
> as the term 'truth' is.
"true" no doubt has different meanings as when an edge is true, or people are true to each other, but relativism has to do with "true" as in meta-linguistic (statements about language) statements (or propositions) of the form "'x' is true", where "x" takes as values statements or propositions. For example: "Stealing is wrong" is true or "The earth is flat" is true. One cluster of relativisms holds that these statements' truth is relative-in some sense- to individual beliefs, societal values or beliefs,and is a function of upbringing, culture, etc. and so the statements could be true in one society but false in another or true for one individual but false for another. In the case of normative propositions this variation must not simply be a function of application of a general norm to different circumstances that generate quite different consequences. It may be prima facie wrong for example in a society with scarce water resources for an individual to use 50 litres a day but not in a society with a surplus of water.
These normative relativisms are distinguished from descriptive relativism, the view that what is regarded as or belived to be true varies from one society or individual to another. Some formsof descriptive relativism are no doubt true-for example that what people value or regard as moral etc. varies from one society to the next, although there may be some broad cross-cultural agreement on some basic values. But the truth of this is irrelevant to whether normative statements and factual statements may be true relative to one society but false in another since it does not follow from X is believed or regarded as true that X is true-- in most contexts. There are complications of course but I hope this is reasonably clear.
Perhaps my point can be made by an example. Let us assume that in a certain culture it is believed that the overrriding obligation is to carry out the will of God, and that the will of God is that which the supreme leader determines it to be. Now the supreme leader decrees that it is the will of God to kill as many Americans as possible. It is thought a mortal sin to argue against the interpretation of God's will of the supreme leader. Of course we can imagine that people in this society may be taught this moral doctrine from childhood. It is taught in the schools. It is held by the vast majority of the people. We can even imagine that the supreme leader looks after the welfare of his people and herself believes in the doctrine. Sociologists duly study this culture and conclude that in this culture obedience to the supreme leader's interpretation of the will of God is the one overriding obligation. Now some would rely on facts such as this to argue that in this society it is true that one is obligated to follow the will of God as interpreted by the supreme leader. If this is so then there is a conceptual absurdity in claiming that we nevertheless are justified in asserting that killing innocent Americans is immoral, wicked etc. We could justify our critique only by referring to obligations not to kill the innocent etc. but this would be to privilege an obligation not to kill the innocent over carrying out the will of God etc. But on what grounds could we privilege these values without abandoning our relativist conceptual framework or being just as ethnocentric about our values as the other society is about theirs?
Cheers, Ken Hanly
>
> --ravi
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
------
> man is said to be a rational animal. i do not know why he has not been
defined
> as an affective or feeling animal. more often i have seen a cat reason
than
> laugh or weep. perhaps it weeps or laughs inwardly - but then perhaps,
also
> inwardly, the crab resolves equations of the 2nd degree. -- alasdair
macintyre.
>
>