Summary
The United States has never used solely an air campaign to fight its wars. But the situation in Afghanistan, especially with winter approaching, is forcing Washington to turn to air power to crack the Taliban quickly. If this can be accomplished, then the credibility of air power in future campaigns will be greatly increased.
Analysis
There appears to be little connection between the concept of an advanced air war and the self-conception of the Taliban. One of the things occurring amid the U.S. strikes in Afghanistan is a serious test of the theory of classical air power, in a context where its creators and supporters hardly expected it to be implemented.
Since the development of the armed aircraft, air-power advocates have argued that it would be possible to wage a war almost completely from the sky. During World War II, for example, supporters of precision daylight bombings sincerely felt that given enough time, the Allies would be able to undermine German warfighting capabilities and their will to resist, without the need for a ground war.
During Vietnam these advocates argued in the same vein that a sufficient application of air power could compel the North Vietnamese government to abandon its strategy in the south.
Supporters of using large-scale air power were never given a chance to implement their strategy. They were always overruled, and air campaigns were made part of a combined arms strategy. Such a strategy was probably for the best as the technology of "precision" bombardment was hardly precise, even in Vietnam.
The quantity of munitions that had to be dropped to disable a given facility was so large that it strained not only the U.S. Air Force but also logistical support. Recently, though, it has been argued that advances in precision-guided munitions and other capabilities now make a strictly air-based campaign conceivable.
The air-power advocates are getting their chance to prove this assertion since the circumstances of the new war in Afghanistan are compelling war planners to rely almost exclusively on air power. This is in a sense an unfair test -- asymmetric warfare of the worst sort. The use of air power assumes the target set is at least near high-technology infrastructure and that an industrial society would be disrupted by such attacks. It was not argued that a pre-industrial force could be destroyed from the air.
Nevertheless, you take what you can get. The only way to really reach the Taliban right now -- the opposition Northern Alliance notwithstanding -- is with air power. Apart from small-unit support from special operations teams on the ground, the U.S. Air Force and Navy bear the burden and have the opportunity to demonstrate that they can be decisive on the battlefield by forcing the Taliban to capitulate or at the very least fragment.
This indeed is a critical political mission. The United States has about a month left before Ramadan and the onset of winter in Afghanistan forces a halt to military operations. Washington clearly anticipates this and will use the period to construct alliances on the ground with various factions and, to the extent possible, arm, train and coordinate those forces for a spring offensive.
It will be a hard winter, as the struggle to hold the international coalition together will be as difficult as the struggle to build an internal Afghan coalition. Not only does this give al Qaeda ample time to mount additional operations against the United States, but it simply isn't clear that the broad coalition the United States wants behind it can survive that long.
The United States will undoubtedly resume operations in the spring regardless of the circumstances. Nevertheless, the Bush administration would be delighted if the Taliban can be broken before Ramadan begins. The only available option for that is air power -- that which is limited to the Air Force's long-range air capability and the Navy's carrier-based strike aircraft.
Having clearly dealt with Afghanistan's limited air defenses and having complete control of the sky, the U.S. military is now free to use air power to deal with the Taliban's ground forces. Washington is not convinced air power alone can do the trick but would be absolutely delighted if it did.
But there are severe constraints on this operation. First, it has only about a month left. Second, it does not have the full weight of tactical air power behind it. Third, there clearly are requirements that collateral damage be minimized. Fourth, and of greatest concern, is the fact that air power is being used against a light-infantry force rather than against concentrated armored and mechanized forces. The ideal strategy for the Taliban might be to abandon the cities, disperse in the vast and varied terrain of Afghanistan and thereby blunt the impact of the air campaign.
But this may not be politically possible, and at this point, it does not appear the Taliban is doing that. Its own credibility is on the line, and it may fear that if it disperses its forces, the general perception in Afghanistan would be that the Taliban is suffering a massive defeat. If enough people in the country were to believe that, it could eventually become a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is why so far the Taliban is remaining in the cities and is apparently keeping its forces concentrated there.
This gives the United States the opportunity that it needs for an effective use of air power, and Washington seems to be taking advantage. Using a variety of anti-personnel devices, U.S. aircraft appear to be systematically conducting a concentrated attack against the Taliban's ground forces. The focus is on causing such damage to the Taliban's military capability that it will cease to be effective, or alternatively that a political upheaval will be caused inside the Taliban among elements who will see power slipping from their hands after years of bloody sacrifice and struggle.
It is not clear that air power can succeed in this mission. But in the past, air-power advocates argued that they were not given the opportunity to show what they can do -- that ground operations always began before the air campaign could bear fruit.
In this case, as in all warfare, there are limits and constraints. Time, resources and target types are less than optimal. But for the first time, the political realities absolutely call for a victory by air power, and quickly at that. In a political sense, this is the test air-power advocates have been waiting for.
If the United States can in one month crack the Taliban, the inevitable political crises of the winter can be diverted, and plans can proceed to construct a new Afghan government and mop up al Qaeda in more friendly circumstances. Instead of planning the spring and summer offensive, the United States can concentrate on the end game.
But this outcome hinges on whether air power can do the trick. Obviously one question on the table is the future of Afghanistan, the Taliban, al Qaeda and the terror campaign in the United States. But another question that, in a theoretical sense at least, transcends this particular war is also on the table.
The United States is turning to air power to solve a critical political problem in a finite amount of time, with substantial but not unlimited resources. If this can be done, then air power will have taken a step forward in gaining credibility.