recently a book has been published on the famous wittgenstein- -popper poker incident. this is probably of no relevance to this list, but i thought justin and a few others might find this amusing, so i forward below a review of the book. sorry for bw waste (and if inappropriate material for this list, please let me know),
--ravi
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Printed in an Israeli journal Ha'aretz.
It was an autumn night in October 1946. In a room at King's College, Cambridge, a philosophical seminar was in progress. Bertrand Russell was present, the chairman of the gathering was Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the evening's guest lecturer was Karl Popper, who had come especially from London.
The scholarly get-together soon became an ugly confrontation. Wittgenstein and Popper, two zealous, ambitious, self-important philosophers, fought like angry roosters. One mounted a show of force, the other produced a barrage of mockery. The confrontation, it should be noted, was not a match between equals. At 57, the charismatic Wittgenstein was already the uncontested king of British academia, surrounded by students, emulators and fans. Popper, 44, boldly faced him alone. Though a reputable scholar in his own right, he was also a relative newcomer to the English philosophical arena, having spent the war years in New Zealand.
The seminar progressed as follows: Popper began his lecture, an explicit critique of Wittgenstein - and was immediately interrupted. At some point, Wittgenstein seized the fireplace poker and began flourishing it. The elderly Russell, then 74, made an uncharacteristic effort to intervene, asking Wittgenstein to calm down.
This incident, commonly known in British philosophical folklore as "Popper's Poker," serves as a point of departure for the book "Wittgenstein's Poker," written by BBC reporters David Edmonds and John Eidinow and published by Faber and Faber. How did the incident end? According to Popper, Wittgenstein then tauntingly challenged him to provide one example of a valid moral rule. Popper, in a brilliant retort, quickly replied, "Here's a moral rule: not to threaten visiting lecturers with pokers." Wittgenstein, insulted and angry, immediately walked out.
But Wittgenstein's followers do not credit Popper with this total victory. They concede that the revered teacher indeed left in a rage, but claim that his students continued his line of argumentation, repeating the demand that Popper give an example of a moral rule. Popper's spontaneous response ("Not to threaten visiting lecturers with a poker") is also part of this version, though he is said to have spoken only after his target - Ludwig Wittgenstein - had left the premises.
The heated confrontation in Cambridge is indeed the core of the book, and the two authors have put it to brilliant use. The argument in the Cambridge seminar room (known to this day as "The Moral Science Club") is their pretext for reconstructing the respective paths traveled by Popper and Wittgenstein up until that moment. The two philosophers, according to the book, lived their lives on a collision course.
Wittgenstein and Popper had similar backgrounds, yet with some important differences. Both were born and raised in Vienna in the twilight of the Habsburg Empire. Both were well-versed in the great treasures of German culture, both were the sons of families at least partially comprised of converted Jews, and both possessed musical skills and talent.
Karl Popper was born to a well-off bourgeois family that eventually lost most of its assets. By the time he began his academic career, he could no longer rely on his family's financial help. The Wittgenstein clan was more intriguing, and the book describes it at some length. The Wittgensteins were multi-millionaires who ran cultural salons; guests to their palaces in Vienna included Johannes Brahms and Clara Schumann. Two of Ludwig's brothers committed suicide, and a third brother, Paul, an esteemed pianist, lost an arm during World War I, and had musical pieces for one hand composed for him by Ravel and Prokofiev.
The book includes a reasoned and well-grounded discussion of Popper and Wittgenstein's Jewish side. Among other things, it provides a fascinating account of how, after the Anschluss [the union of Austria with Germany in 1938], Wittgenstein negotiated with the leaders of Nazi Germany, trying to buy his sisters Arian pedigrees for an enormous sum of money.
The two men's paths never crossed in Vienna. In fact, the Cambridge confrontation was the only time they ever met face to face. Wittgenstein reigned at Cambridge for another five years, until his death of cancer at age 61. Popper continued teaching at the London School of Economics, made a name for himself, and was eventually knighted. He is now known as the 20th century's greatest philosopher of science.
Popper, who died at an advanced age seven years ago, sometimes spoke of the incident and even mentioned it in his autobiography. Wittgenstein apparently referred to it only once, in a note scribbled to a friend two days after the fact. The note, which has survived to this day, reads: "Lousy meeting - at which an ass, Dr. Popper, from London, talked more mushy rubbish than I've heard for a long time."
What was this "rubbish"? Briefly put, Karl Popper claimed that philosophy had a right to exist. Philosophers, he argued, should continue to concern themselves with the same all-encompassing problems they had always been interested in: What guarantee do we have that the sun will come up tomorrow (the induction problem)? Do human beings have a soul, that is, a non-material element? Do they have free will and choice? What accounts for scientific progress? What is the fundamental difference between physics and psychology? What allows a democratic society to endure? What is justice, and what moral rules are valid? What is the role of metaphysics?
Wittgenstein, on the other hand, believed that all of these subjects should be abandoned. He, a man whose spiritual existence was described (by his own fans) as verging on madness, depicted the traditional pursuits of philosophy as a pointless emotional entanglement. "People say again and again that philosophy doesn't really progress," he wrote, "that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say that don't understand why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions." Wittgenstein suggested that the accepted forms of philosophical quibbling be replaced by thorough linguistic investigations of spoken language. Such analyses, he promised, would force the quibblers to break their bad habits.
Popper was blatantly dismissive of this approach, known as linguistic philosophy. If this approach were correct, he claimed, then he had no desire to be a philosopher, as Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy basically declared his own work to be without value. "If you force me at gunpoint to say what it is I disagree with in Wittgenstein's `Philosophical Investigations,' he said in a 1970 radio interview with the BBC, "I should have to say, `Oh - nothing ...' Indeed I only disagree with the enterprise. I mean, I do not disagree with anything which he says, because there is nothing with which one can disagree. But I confess I am bored by it - bored to tears."
Prof. Joseph Agassi, who was Popper's student and assistant between 1953 and 1960 (after the Cambridge incident), is one of Edmonds and Eidinow's most important sources. Agassi stresses that the 10-minute encounter was not a real philosophical debate. "These two schools of thought accused each other of being worthless. The two opponents, Popper and Wittgenstein, basically said, `If I am even a little right, then what you say is nonsense.'"
Agassi says of "Wittgenstein's Poker" that it "not only tells the story in a fluent and riveting way, but also offers very simple, yet bold philosophical judgment, which runs counter to all the accepted practices today." The book's boldness, he adds, lies in its "new and clear presentation of the question who was right, Popper or Wittgenstein. In other words, the book assumes that the question has one correct answer, with no possibility of compromise."
And this goes against the current relativist atmosphere?
"Yes. Relativists have nothing to read in this book."
Toward the end of "Wittgenstein's Poker," the authors indeed allude to the state of contemporary philosophy. Popper may have prevailed in that Cambridge quarrel, but the professional philosophers of our own time find Wittgenstein far more interesting, and the phrases he coined have become a part of academic discourse. "In this context, I'd like to quote a very important survey conducted by the journal `The Philosophical Forum'," says Prof. Agassi. "The journal found that the most popular philosopher in the United States today is Martin Heidegger, the Nazi. Wittgenstein came second."
Why is Wittgenstein more appealing to contemporary philosophers than Popper? Does his way of thinking make it easier to produce articles?
"I don't accept that. You can write articles about anything, and most academic essays are nitpicking, sometimes about the most bizarre and trivial aspects."
So why isn't Popper as popular?
"Because he committed the grave sin of assuming his readers to be independent people, capable of thinking and deciding for themselves. Popper addresses the readers rather than what's fashionable."
Agassi provides a counter-example: "Look, when Saul Kripke, one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century, begins a lecture, he always notes that his subject matter is important and fashionable, and supports this claim with external proof. He always does this, and I'm not saying it behind his back, he admits it himself. Popper never took what was fashionable into account. He ignored fashion, or scorned it."
Trends, says Agassi, have a way of avenging themselves on those who disregard them. "Popper demanded that his reader ignore fashion - and now fashion is ignoring him.
"Take a person who has an academic position, for whatever reason. He or she has ordinary training in philosophy and knows his Wittgenstein. That person can produce academic articles out of his sleeve, and if he polishes them a little, he has a good chance of getting them published. When you write about some obscure aspect of Kant, you can have it published in a special journal for Kant's fans. If it's about Heidegger or Wittgenstein, there are many journals you can send it to. But when you write about Popper, almost no journal will accept it, unless what you've written is brilliant and important enough to be irresistible."
But you're still describing the situation, not explaining it. Popper was a philosopher of science. Why aren't people in his own field writing about his work?
"The philosophy of science has a small number of professionals, like me, and a large number of scientists who don't understand anything, but always feel they have something to say. Most of them, when they do become philosophers of science, see science as being in a state of constant struggle with the forces of evil. That is a social fact of great importance."
So, are they Popper's antithesis? Are they positivists who believe that metaphysics - that is, beliefs that cannot be proven - are the enemy of science?
"Yes. Albert Einstein and Karl Popper were both extremely hostile towards positivism. Popper spoke of `science as religion' in the first class of every course he taught, dismissed the notion and moved on. The positivists believe to this day that it is their job to defend science. Popper, who viewed science as Western civilization's greatest accomplishment, not only did not defend science, but stated that its greatness lay in the way it improves when brought under attack."
In your own autobiographical book, largely devoted to your years under Popper's tutelage, you also claim to have always hated positivism.
"The reason is that I've always identified the positivists with the hatred of religion. I also found Popper to be hostile to religion, and I am hostile to that hostility. Also, Popper was especially scornful of superstition. I personally am not particularly drawn to either religion or superstition, but I've written many times that being hostile to superstition is in itself a very bad superstition."
Like the hostility to astrology?
"Exactly. I find myself defending astrology over and over. It has no value, but there's no reason to regard it with hostility."
Going back to "Wittgenstein's Poker," the book shows that although Popper advocated being open to critique as part of his philosophy, he actually feared being criticized. You yourself wrote articles criticizing his thinking - and were punished for it.
"Indeed, but what you're saying would have made Popper very angry. He claimed he never tried to avoid being criticized or delay the publication of his students' work. But one of my most unpleasant moments with him occurred when he said, `I know you think I'm hostile to criticism,' and I said, `Yes.' He then said if that was the case, he no longer wanted to be my friend. I said, `Karl, I love you, and goodbye.'"
That was how you parted, 40 years ago?
"No. He wouldn't let me go, kept saying goodbye to me his whole life. We still met occasionally. It showed how strongly ambivalent he was about me."
When did you first notice that he disliked being criticized?
"Not right away. When I was his student and we spoke, he welcomed criticism. He did as long as the comments remained between us. It was only when I started going out and publishing that he became amazingly aggressive towards me."
What explanation did he give?
"He claimed I had nothing to say against him and was only looking for a way to stand out, and that I attacked him personally out of a personal hostility. Popper fought with all his students, each and every one of them, whenever they had reservations about his views. He said, `I like criticism, you can always come to me and I'll accept what you have to say. But there's no need to publish.' For example, when I attacked his views on religion and Judaism, in his own seminar, he said, `Please don't publish that, and I'll make a correction in my next edition.' He never made the correction, and 25 years later I published my critique. His view of Judaism was hostile, typical of Viennese converts to Christianity in the early 20th century."
Did you speak with him about Zionism?
"I did. He was hostile to it, saw it as a return to tribalism."
He wrote you a letter late in his life [see box], asking you not to bother him again. He never sent it. Did it shock you to read the letter now, in the book?
"The letter was discovered only after Popper's death, but I was told of its existence even before it appeared in the book. In my autobiography I already described what it said. I guessed there was such a letter."
Did you also known about the incident with Wittgenstein in Cambridge?
"Of course, it was no secret. I wrote about it in my autobiography. I think the authors' attitude towards Popper's version of the events is mistaken, and it's an unfortunate flaw in their work. They concluded that Popper's version was false, and claim his account aggrandized his victory and that he persuaded himself of its truth. The authors rely on two witnesses, Peter Geach and Casimir Lewy, who claimed back in 1974, when Popper's version was publicized, that `Popper lied.' They accused him, just like that, without specifying what he had lied about and what had actually happened. That speaks volumes."
Does anything need to be added to the book's account of the evening in Cambridge?
"Yes. The authors don't emphasize the social-symbolic significance of the poker. They miss how especially aggressive Wittgenstein's behavior was. He was holding the poker, signifying that this Cambridge club was his territory - after all, according to British etiquette, only a member of the household may handle the poker. More importantly, the authors depict the confrontation as symmetrical, and that verges on the scandalous. They seemingly forget that Wittgenstein was the chairman, the host, and Popper a guest. Wittgenstein's conduct was so rude that even Russell, a very gentle person, intervened and said, `Ludwig, sit down.' To me that says everything.
"You also have to remember that in the 1940s Wittgenstein was the king of British philosophy. Bertrand Russell said that in those days people treated him, Russell, as though he were already dead, not a very pleasant feeling. Almost no philosopher in England in those days dared to challenge Wittgenstein's authority, and even people who agreed wholeheartedly with Popper acted as though they were Wittgenstein's followers. It was a time of opinion-terror without parallel.
"I came to England in 1952 and was told what my views should be if I wanted to succeed. I had a good friend there, a dear man, who wrote a book about Wittgenstein immediately after finishing his doctorate and found himself under severe attack. He killed himself. His name was David Pole, and he dared to claim in his book that Wittgenstein was a conservative."
What do you now think of Wittgenstein's philosophy?
"There is no such thing."
Meaning?
"I don't know what to tell you. I really don't understand. He has no philosophy, he said so himself. Undoubtedly he would have been very happy to be seen as a doctor, a therapist, and he said so, only he was a very bad doctor."
What do you think of his current popularity?
"It makes me sick to my stomach. But Wittgenstein is not as fashionable as Martin Heidegger, who makes him look pure and white like the driven snow."
What about Wittgenstein the man?
"He evokes sympathy. After all, this was a man who spent his entire life on the verge of suicide, screwed-up, in anguish. According to his loyal student Norman Malcolm, he was close to insanity his whole life. But as a teacher and leader he was apparently mesmerizing. Isaiah Berlin told me so. After all, Wittgenstein, with his charisma, managed to win over even someone like economist John Maynard Keynes, who was the epitome of sanity."
How did Popper feel about Wittgenstein the man?
"Popper hated only one man in his life: Ludwig Wittgenstein."
Do you accept the book's claim that Popper envied Wittgenstein for belonging to a Viennese elite that he, as the son of an ordinary middle-class family, could not enter?
"I don't accept that. Popper and Wittgenstein were rivals. They fought for the inheritance of Bertrand Russell."
And Popper was also a brilliant man.
"And then some. People said you could not talk to him, because he would look into your face and respond to your expected response before you even got to it. I found a way to communicate with him. We'd simply talk together, almost simultaneously, and that was our form of dialogue. We did that for many hours each day. Besides, he was simply an exceptionally brilliant man. One tiny example: I remember Popper always saying that the claim `I can't imagine' is not an argument; after all, some people really cannot imagine that there are people who dislike chocolate. Then, one time, the young son of Ernst Gombrich, a philosopher of art and Popper's friend, asked him, `But who can't imagine people not liking chocolate?' And Popper immediately replied, `Me, I can't.'"
Let's talk about Popper's famous claim about how scientists always account for all the facts. If a scientist believes that "All ravens are black" and then finds a white raven, he will look for an alternative theory to explain when ravens are black and when they are not. But Popper surely knew that many scientists do not actually act this way, making his own theory unsound.
"That's a problem to which Popper unfortunately gave two conflicting answers. When he was relaxed, he would say that his theory described scientific reality as it was. When he was under stress, he'd say that his theory was only a recommendation, that it only suggested how scientists should behave. I see that as a great flaw, evident only in his writing, not in his verbal philosophizing."
And how do you, Popper's fan, solve this problem?
"I see his writing as descriptive."
How? Aren't there scientists who choose to ignore inconvenient facts?
"There are, and the answer is that most scientists are not scientists. Only a tiny minority are real scientists. Just as you can claim, like Kierkegaard, that most priests aren't really Christians ..."
Karl Popper was a curious and knowledgeable man. Was he also well read in French and German philosophy? The works of Heidegger, or Sartre?
"Absolutely not. He would not have thought of it. He would only sample them, to see what kind they were. Popper checked if Heidegger and company were Hegelians, and since he despised Hegel, he had no interest in his offspring."
Did he ever read the books written by Martin Buber, the grandfather of your wife, Judith Buber-Agassi?
"No. He knew only one of Buber's books, "Gog and Magog," and told me what he thought about it. He said that Buber's kind of philosophizing is not of interest to him. Incidentally, Buber said the same thing about Popper."
Popper loathed psychology.
"He was very screwed-up about Freud. Idolized him, but was also hostile to him. He wrote, among other things, that Freud was a poet, like Homer. But he saw his theories as a pseudo-science, and was definitely hostile to them."
Popper's stand on certain philosophers was just as extreme as Wittgenstein's.
"True. His attack on Hegel was not all that extraordinary in its arguments, but his contempt for Hegel, whom he viewed as less than nothing, was what outraged the Hegelians. He said the same about Wittgenstein, that he was just about nothing. And about Heidegger."
Would he have considered postmodernism another one of Hegel's offspring?
"Yes. And if you take Derrida, for example, the answer is undisputed. That is distinctly Hegelian verbiage."
`I do not wish to continue this correspondence'
Karl Popper's unsent letter to his former student, Prof. Joseph Agassi:
"... After the scandalous (because personally aggressive) review you wrote of `Objective Knowledge' (written, according to your introduction of it, unwillingly, and solely because you felt a scholarly obligation to write it); and after a long series of other unprovoked private and public attacks on me (to which I have never responded), I am surprised that you had the courage to write to me those two letters ... in which you declared that you were well aware that you owed everything to me and denied that you had ever attacked me, not even in that review.
"I am an old man, indeed, and still anxious to say some things which I think are important (although I am aware that you do not agree). As my time is obviously limited, I do not wish to continue this correspondence."