Hydrocarbons and a New Strategic Region: The Caspian Sea and Central Asia (and Al Saud)

Brad Mayer bradley.mayer at ebay.sun.com
Mon Oct 29 15:16:45 PST 2001


Indeed, the destabilizing effects of Uncle Sams' stupid 7th Cavalry charge into Afghanistan works precisely against the realization of this pipeline scenario.

The most annoying thing about most post-9/11 "Great Oil Game" commentary is not that they have been "conspiratorial" or "structural determinist" (such things do exist on occasion), but that, at best, they merely argue, by coincidental inference, a causal relation between the Great Oil Game - which really does exist and is in play - and Uncle Sams' pathological post-9/11 behavior.

In fact, the relation is purely conjunctural - the game structure encounters the singular event - and resultant is a negative causality in this case. But then conjuncture is easily mistook as being in complete conformance with the structure.

Now, has anyone thought of this: How Washingtons' present behavior coincides (in the precise sense outlined above) with the strategic interests of...Saudi Arabia? Think about it: Why would the House of Saud want to see gazillions of barrels of oil pumped out of the S. Central Asian basin? Why would the #1 producer of petroleum in the world today want to see its traditional relative leverage over world oil prices weakened by more competition, especially with prices at relative lows and especially with a pipeline directed at the E. Asian market, competing directly with the Persian Gulfs' own geo-economic advantage vis-a-vis that region? (For this same reason, they would be less concerned with the oil going to Europe via the Caucasus, but might - I don't claim to "know" -prefer it not go through Russian hands).

And, considering another aspect of the situation, what incentive does Al Saud have to seriously crack down on its own Islamist opposition when ideological overlap creates such a wide field for attempts at cooptation? If the fire of the terrorist fringe is directed elsewhere - ironically enough, a redirection that began with the Saudi role in the Persian Gulf War - why should the Saudis draw it back upon themselves?

Speaking of the PGW, a bit of hindsight: while Riyadh had to clean out its treasury hiring its mercenary army, it did gain the (temporary, but still substantial) exclusion of Iraq, a major oil producer, from the world market. So, if there's a sustained rise in petroleum prices in the future, and Saudi coffers are refilled, prepare for a possible wider war in the Middle East. Maybe.

Although certainly unbeknownst to all involved, including Riyadh, from the vantage point of Al Sauds' strategic position, Al Qaeda, Taliban, Washington and its supporters (such as MBS) are playing quite the "useful idiots" in the mix.

-Brad Mayer

At 12:25 PM 10/28/01 -0500, you wrote:
>Courtesy of Mark Douglas Whitaker on the World Systems Network list.
>"Hydrocarbons and a New Strategic Region: The Caspian Sea and Central Asia,"
>by Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retire (In Military Review,
>"The Professional Journal of the United States Army", May/June, 2001)
>http://www.cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/MayJun01/grau.htm
> Richard Hutchinson comments, "I read this piece by Grau in "Military
>Review" (thanks, Mark), and it
>corroborates Rashid and others -- the Afghanistan pipeline plan is not
>considered a high priority. In fact, Grau writes it off entirely. Not
>that he is THE authority on the subject, but his analysis certainly
>lends no support to the Ted Rall/Guardian Unocal Conspiracy Theory.
>
>RH



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