> Ahmed Rashid argues in his book on the Taliban - which, by the way,
> is subtitled Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia -
> argues that the US supported the Taliban takeover in the mid-1990s
> because it was thought that the Taliban would be good for the Unocal
> pipeline. Clearly there's something to the oil angle after all.
The oil angle certainly adds something, just like the ethnic angle, the religious angle, the geo-strategic angle, historical angle, the drug-running angle, the truck-smuggling angle, etc. It adds another level of complexity and rivalry. But what it doesn't do is make anything simpler or clearer, IMHO.
Three minor points about the Unocol, the US and the Taliban: (a) the US supported the Taliban during its ascendant phase only in a rooting it on sense, which was essentially a continuation of its policy from 1992 on: of letting its allies Saudia Arabia and Pakistan do as they please and accepting their appraisals. Unless I missed something, Rashid found no evidence to support everyone's suspicions or assertions of US covert aid. What he found instead was a semi-covert non-policy. (b) the US supported the Unocal pipeline for geostrategic reasons -- to counter the interests of Iran and Russia -- rather than cutting policy to fit oil interests (although granted, once involved, it did support a US company over an Argentine one just for the money); and (c) Unocal couldn't have gotten more screwed in the end. For all its lobbying and heavy hitters, nothing went its way. Oh, and (d) once the US decided it would let Turkmenistan run its pipelines through Iran after all in July 1997, the Unocal pipeline lost its raison d'etre. And this seems to me even more true now.
One last footnote: despite the subtitle, most of the fuss in the Great Game Rashid describes is actually about gas, fwiw. But it's a really good book.
Michael
__________________________________________________________________________ Michael Pollak................New York City..............mpollak at panix.com