> Date: Sat, 1 Sep 2001 12:58:56 -0400
> From: Doug Henwood
> Subject: an economist's view of marriage
>
> [it's so hard to tell if these are intended as parodies...]
>
> "Marriage and Consumption Insurance: What's Love Got to Do With
> It?"
>
> BY: GREGORY D. HESS
> Oberlin College
> CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo
> Institute for Economic Research)
>
> Document: Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=277284
>
> Other Electronic Document Delivery:
> http://www.CESifo.de
> SSRN only offers technical support for papers
> downloaded from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection
> location. When URLs wrap, you must copy and paste
> them into your browser eliminating all spaces.
>
> Paper ID: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 507
> Date: June 2001
>
> Contact: GREGORY D. HESS
> Email: Mailto:gregory.hess at oberlin.edu
> Postal: Oberlin College
> Oberlin, OH 44074 USA
>
> Paper Requests:
> Hardcopies For Libraries: contact Gertraud Porak, Postal: CESifo
> Inc., Poschinger Str. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany.
> Mailto:porak at CESifo.de http://www.CESifo.de
>
> ABSTRACT:
> This paper explores the role of marriage when markets are
> incomplete so that individuals cannot diversify their
> idiosyncratic labor income risk. Ceteris paribus, an individual
> would prefer to marry a "hedge" (i.e., a spouse whose income is
> negatively correlated with her own) as it raises her expected
> utility. However, the existence of love complicates the picture:
> while marrying a hedge is important, an individual may not do so
> if she finds someone with whom she shares a great deal of love.
> Is love more important to a lasting marriage than economic
> compatibility? To answer this question, I develop a simple model
> where rational individuals meet, enjoy the economic and
> non-pecuniary benefits of marriage (i.e., love), and then must
> decide whether to remain married or divorce.
>
> The model predicts that if love is persistent and the
> resolution of uncertainty to agents' income is early, then those
> who in fact married hedges (and for good reason) are the ones
> most likely to be caught short with too little love in order to
> save a marriage in the event of an adverse shock. Consequently,
> under these conditions individuals who are good hedges for one
> another are more likely to marry one another, although once
> married, they will be more likely to divorce. In contrast, if
> love is temporary (in the sense of reverting to a common mean)
> and the resolution of uncertainty to agents' income is
> predominantly later, then those who in fact marry hedges will in
> fact be less likely to subsequently divorce. Evidence is
> provided to distinguish which of these alternative scenarios is
> in support of these aspects of the decision to stay married.
> Additional hypotheses regarding the effect of differences in the
> expected means and volatilities of partners' incomes are also
> derived from the theory and tested.
Also, I wonder how such thinkers handle the issue of unconscious experience. It's hard to imagine that even economists would see "love" as a wholly conscious process. Do they think they can get by only by measuring the results? I am copying this to the original author, in the hope that he can elucidate some of these points.
Christopher Rhoades Dÿkema