Ah, Wojtek, the sole reliance on resource mobilization theory is yesteday's sociology (but at least not the totally outdated 1960's classical theory). So that while you are right about how people are recruited into specific social movement organizations (cohort groups--face-to-face recruiting by friends, family, or co-workers), there is a revisiting of the role of culture, framing, and ideology in social movements.
This is from a paper I wrote on social movement theory:
Prior to the 1950s, social movements were widely seen as episodes of hysteria generated by manipulative subversive elements, usually communists or anarchists. This view is sometimes called "countersubversion theory," and was popular during the Red Scare of the 1950's. Reactionary right groups such as the John Birch Society still use this model. Donner (1980), Preston (1963), Goldstein (1978), Levin (1971), and others are critical of the countersubversion model, noting its use in justifying repressive and authoritarian measures by government agencies and private groups.
Following the Nazi genocide and the McCarthy period, social science largely turned to what are sometimes called the "classical theories" of social movements. This school of analysis assumed that the US was a pluralist society where power was shared among many groups which all had access to electoral mechanisms for changing power relationships and policies. Persons who resorted to protest were depicted as having snapped into a pathological mode under the strain they experienced resulting from unresolved grievances. A number of books applied these theories to the US political Right, with the most influential authors being Lipset and Raab (1970), Bell (1964), Hofstadter (1955, 1963, 1965), and Forster and Epstein (1964).
A reaction against the classical formulation (sometimes called the pluralist school or centrist/extremist theory) soon emerged in the form of resource mobilization theory, and a large body of literature quickly emerged
Smith (1996) observes that:
"The 1970s saw a major break in the social-movement literature with earlier theories-e.g., mass society, collective behavior, status discontent, and relative-deprivation theories-that emphasized the irrational and emotional nature of social movements....There was at the time a decisive pendulum-swing away from these "classical" theories toward the view of social movements as rational, strategically calculating, politically instrumental phenomena. "
The political process model pioneered by McAdam (1982) further argued that various opportunities in the political system opened and closed over time, responding to shifting influences and pressures, and that this changed the potential for success by dissident organizing campaigns. Political opportunities depend in part on the actions of government agencies including police and their enforcement decisions--which may respond to pressure from movement groups.
Here is an excerpt from a peer review article I wrote.
[Berlet, Chip. (2001). "Hate Groups, Racial Tension and Ethnoviolence in an integrating Chicago Neighborhood 1976-1988." In Betty A. Dobratz, Lisa K. Walder, and Timothy Buzzell, eds., The Politics of Social Inequality, Vol. 9, pp. 117-163.]
There have been a number of shifts and innovations in social movement theory over the past thirty years (Buechler, 2000, pp. 3-57; Garner & Tenuto, 1997, pp. 1-48). This has been especially true in the study of the US political right (Hixson, 1992, pp. 10-48, 77-123, 273-292).
A number of academics who have studied right wing social and political movements in the US have been critical of the classical theories of the pluralist school that often portray right wing dissidents as "extremists" who are psychologically-dysfunctional, and exist on the fringes of society outside the ideal democratic center (Rogin, 1969, pp. 261-282; Curry & Brown, 1972, pp. vii-xi; Canovan, 1981, pp. 46-51 179-190; Ribuffo, 1983, pp. 237-257; Himmelstein, 1990, pp. 1-5, 72-76, 152-164; Diamond, 1995, pp. 5-6, 40-41; Kazin, 1995, pp. 190-193).
An increasing number of scholars are using post-classical theories to analyze even the most militant and authoritarian social movements on the far right (Aho, 1990; Blee, 1991; Barkun, 1994; Corcoran, 1995; Ezekiel, 1995; Ferber, 1998; Lamy, 1996; Hamm, 1994, 1997; Dobratz & Shanks-Miehle, 1997).
Central to my work is the belief that the centrist/extremist analytical model actually impedes anti-racist efforts and other struggles against oppression because it individualizes what are essentially institutional and systemic problems. The use of the centrist/extremist paradigm to analyze hate groups by major human relations organizations has not "abolished the movement, nor diminished racism in general, and may, in fact, unwittingly support racist beliefs," suggests Ferber (1996, p. 121). "While the focus is on the fringe, mainstream, everyday racism remains unexamined." Ferber argues that a discussion is needed on the "points of similarity between white supremacist discourse and mainstream discourse," especially since "White supremacist discourse gains power precisely because it rearticulates mainstream racial narratives" (1996, p. 121; see also Ferber 1998, pp. 9-12, 156).
Ezekiel (1995) agrees, noting that organized White racism exploits feelings of "lonely resentment." It does this by weaving together ideologies already present in mainstream culture: "white specialness, the biological significance of 'race, ' the primacy of power in human relations" along with "the feeling of being cheated" (p. 321).
Aho (1989) points out how easy it is "to dismiss racism and religious bigotry as products of craziness or stupidity," but argues that such a view is not accurate. According to Aho, "Evidence from field research on Pacific Northwest racists and bigots shows that in the main they are indistinguishable from their more conventional peers, intellectually and educationally." Aho also observes that with the exception of those who engaged in politically-motivated murders, the racists and bigots he studied "appear well within the bounds of normal, psychologically" (p. 86; see also Aho, 1990, pp. 68-82, 185-226).
At the same time, the terms "hate group" and "hate crime" have themselves been challenged as problematic political constructs (Jenness & Broad, 1997; Jacobs & Potter, 1998). In this paper the term hate group will be reserved for organizations that consciously promote an ideological theory of supremacy, and explicitly dehumanize or demonize a target group which becomes an object of hate (Allport, 1954, pp. 363-366). Rather than using the term hate crime, however, this paper will refer to illegal acts of intimidation and violence based on prejudice and hate as acts of ethnoviolence.
Throughout, I try to avoid the term "extremist." As Himmelstein notes: "At best this characterization tells us nothing substantive about the people it labels; at worst it paints a false picture" (1998, p. 7).
Klandermans (1997), who has studied groups on both the left and the right, suggests that despite the "confrontations between competing paradigms" (p. 199), it is useful to pull together elements from several strands of sociological theory (pp. 199-211). Dobratz & Shanks-Meile (1997), for instance, used multiple theoretical models in their study of racist White separatism, arguing that to understand right wing movements (or any movement) it is necessary to consider, "socioeconomic conditions, changing political opportunities, resources, consciousness, labeling, framing, interpretations of reality, boundaries, and negotiation of the meaning of symbols" (p. 32).
-Chip Berlet
----- Original Message ----- From: "Wojtek Sokolowski" <sokol at jhu.edu> To: <lbo-talk at lists.panix.com> Sent: Thursday, September 27, 2001 12:12 PM Subject: Re: Sociology and Explanations (Re: Hitchens responds to critics
<<SNIP>>
> However, since the romantic vision of popular movements in the 1960s, there
> has been substantial research on social movements showing that it is the
> availability of material resources and not what the potential participants
> think or feel that determines a movement's shape and participation.
> Ideological convictions of the participants usually develop and take shape
> as a result of movement participation. Thus, someone may join a terrorist
> organization solely because he has been recruited, and then develop an
> ideology justifying his participation (the oppression-schmopression spiel).
>
> So there is time for kvetching and flag waving, and there is time for a
> serious rational discourse grounded in empirical facts. I am ready for the
> latter.
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> wojtek
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