> In message <5.0.0.25.2.20010929114255.042c8b70 at mail.gte.net>, kelley
> <kwalker2 at gte.net> writes
>
>>Objectivists:
>>
>>Ontology: "naive" realism
>>
>>--empirical facts exist independently of our consciousness of them
>>--scientific concepts are said to be capable of copying or corresponding to
>>those factual realities.
>>
>>Naive realism provides a basis for a theory of scientific representation
>>and is often associated with British Empiricism.
>>
>
> 'Naive'! How very naive to think that the world is more than one's own
> perceptions of it.
>
> Wouldn't the view that I make the world by seeing it better qualify for
> the description, naive, like the 'magical thinking' in which Shaman's
> imagine that their rituals determine the rising and setting of the sun.
>
to some extent, the accusation of naive points to the fact that realism is often justified by appealing to common sense. if i remember right, hilary putnam dismissed solipsism with the reasoning that "no sane person could believe such a thing". as we walk about and do our daily chores i guess we are all realists, but to say "all things fall down" is not as much a theory in physics as newton's theory of gravitation. of course i may just be missing out on the meat of the philosophical explication of realism and i would appreciate pointers.
> In message <3BB5E7F7.82AF3D51 at ilstu.edu>, Carrol Cox <cbcox at ilstu.edu>
> writes
>
>>For me, the fundamental sense of "realism" is that the Forms exist
>>independently of and prior to the particulars which manifest, imitate,
>>etc etc them.
>>
>>I.E., all realists are ultimately Platonists.
>>
>
> Talk about a straw man. Realism is the opposite of Platonism, which is
> why it is called realism, not idealism.
>
> Or, in the sentence above, 'reality' (not 'forms') exists independently
> of and prior to our perception of it (as opposed to 'those particulars
> which manifest them')
>
i would tend to agree with carrol (i notice a general tendency to agree with carrol and justin in matters philosophical on this list - much to their discredit i am sure ;-)) in a particular sense that positivism and empiricism stand in sharp contrast to realism and idealism/platonism, the difference between realism and platonism itself being smaller - i would boldly speculate that realism is platonism without plato's fluff. i say this also because realism (at least modern versions i have read) does not just stop with asserting the common sense notion that the world exists. it then goes on to say things about what the world is etc (kelley's bit above about scientific theories, etc), and those statements and theories often have platonist underpinnings (i am here reminded, among other things, of godel's defense of what he considers his platonist position).
i do agree that carrol cox's first statement seems to be the textbook definition of platonism, not realism.
my uneducated 2c, fwiw!
--ravi