Killing someone while driving drunk isn't punished with anywhere near the severity meted out to to a first-degree murderer.
> Even as a
> >consequentialist, I have a problem with Chomsky assigning moral
> >responsibility on the basis of all the often unforeseeable consequences
of
> >an act as opposed to the original calculation of expected utility.
> >
>
> Anyway, as a consequentialist, you should care about the actual
> consequences, not aboiut the intent. The road to hell and all . . . .
If intent wasn't an instrument towards maximizing utility, this would be true. It would also be true there would often be no point in trying to modify behavior of any sort (moral or otherwise) because the agent's intentions would matter for naught. There's a reason I argued against the absurd bit of folk wisdom that, "the road to hell is paved with good intentions."
> Moreover, the failure to make good the damage is if possible more culpable
> than the original bombing, because then it was certainly known what was
done
> and what the likely consequences would be.
True enough, although other wealthy nations would have the same duty from an act utilitarian perspective (from a rule utilitarian perspective, it may be the case that we should expect people to rectify their own mistakes). Did anyone prevent Sweden or Germany from cleaning up the US's mess? I'd assume that they were just as capable of doing so. Peter Singer makes the same sort of arguments all the time, albeit with individuals instead of countries.
-- Luke