<!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN"> <html><head><style type="text/css"></style><title>Re: negating non-intervention</title></head><body> <div>JC Helary wrote:</div> <div><br></div> <blockquote type="cite" cite>plus, my memory may fail me but the obuchi cabinet (the previous one) already<br> passed a 'new guideline' bill that is supposed to support actively projects<br> related to the security treaty between the us and japan. the contents of the<br> guidelines are unknown to me but i remember a special issue of a 'left'<br> monthly in november 1999 focusing on the policies of the obuchi cabinet that<br> included a harsh criticism of them (the guidelines). so i guess a research in<br> the international pages of related magazines from 1999/4 to 11 should bring<br> fruits.<br> <br> back to the main issue. the right to project means a change in the<br> constitution (the japanese people renounce the threat or use of force as a<br> means of settling international disputes. chap2 art9) although japan's self<br> defense forces -as they are locally called- have been allowed to operate<br> abroad as part of peace keaping operations thanks to a law passed in 92. the<br> means to project well means that they don't have any (?) carriers and related,<br> that also is from memory and i have nothing at hand to check it. In 1994 a<br> comitee handed a report that suggested the acquisition of long distance<br> support material to take part more efficiently to pko. i have no idea what the</blockquote> <blockquote type="cite" cite>results were. any specialist of defense matters?</blockquote> <div><br></div> <div>*****  <font color="#000000"> NBR Publications: AccessAsia Review: Vol. 2, No. 1<br> <br> The National Bureau of Asian Research</font><br> <font color="#000000"></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">STATE OF THE FIELD REPORT:<br> RESEARCH ON JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY</font><br> <font color="#000000"></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">Michael J. Green  [Michael Green is Olin Fellow for Asian Security at the Council on Foreign Relations and Acting Director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies]</font></div> <div><font color="#000000"><br> ...Introduction<br> <br> In recent years Japan has taken a series of steps to redefine its defense policies and its security relationship with the United States:</font><br> <font color="#000000"></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">In 1992 the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) produced a report, _Japan's Role in the International Society_, which highlighted a consensus in the party that Japan should expand its participation in UN peacekeeping operations and demonstrate more assertive leadership on regional security issues;<font size="-1">1</font></font></div> <div><font size="-1" color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">In 1994 Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa's special Advisory Committee on Defense Issues produced a report calling for a tripartite defense policy based on: (1) utilization of multilateral security forums; (2) enhanced indigenous defense capabilities; and (3) the U.S.-Japan security relationship;<font size="-1">2</font></font></div> <div><font size="-1" color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">In 1995 the coalition government of socialist prime minister Tomiichi Murayama issued a revision of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline that shifted the scope of Japanese defense requirements from those capabilities necessary to "resist a small-scale limited invasion" to those necessary to respond to "situations in the area around Japan that have an effect on the security of Japan;"<font size="-1">3</font></font></div> <div><font size="-1" color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">In 1996 President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced a new Joint Security Declaration that reaffirmed the continuing importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan and outlined an agenda for expanded defense cooperation, including: defense planning, research and development, missile defense, and diplomacy toward China;<font size="-1">4</font></font></div> <div><font size="-1" color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">In 1997 the U.S. and Japanese governments completed a revision of the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, paving the way for new Japanese legislation and bilateral mechanisms designed to expand Japan's logistical and military role in the event of regional contingencies;<font size="-1">5</font></font></div> <div><font size="-1" color="#000000"><br> </font><font color="#000000">Throughout this period, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) have steadily increased their policy role in Japan.  The process began with the dispatch of Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers to the Gulf in 1991 and Ground Self-Defense Forces to Cambodia for UN peacekeeping in 1992.  Institutional enhancements have continued at home with the establishment of the Japan Defense Intelligence Headquarters in 1997 and a strategic planning unit in 1998.  The JDA and JSDF have also initiated active defense diplomacy (exchanges, training, multilateral forums) with other militaries in East Asia....</font></div> <div><font color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">...The Defense Guidelines and the Japanese Constitution</font></div> <div><font color="#000000"><br> Much of the debate over Japanese security policy in the past few years has focused on how rapidly the U.S.-Japan alliance should be restructured to prepare for the next big international crisis.  Most analysts agree with the need for reinvigoration of the alliance represented by the 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration and the 1997 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, but opinion divides on whether that process should take place within Japan's current constitutional framework, or should be the vehicle for reinterpretation or even revision of the Japanese Constitution.</font><br> <font color="#000000"></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">The Japanese government has interpreted Article Nine of the Constitution to mean that Japan has the right of both individual and collective self-defense, but has chosen not to exercise the right of collective defense.  The Cabinet Legal Affairs Bureau (_Hoseikyoku_) established in 1983 that Japanese forces may come to the aid of a U.S. ship resisting an attack on Japan, but may not come to the aid of the U.S. ship if it is engaged in offensive military operations not directly related to the defense of Japan.  This line between "collective" and "individual" self-defense has obvious implications for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation and Japan's larger definition of its security role.</font><br> <font color="#000000"></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">When the Japanese government revised the National Defense Program Outline in 1995, moving the focus from defense against "small-scale limited invasion" to "situations in the area surrounding Japan that have a direct impact on the security of Japan," the barrier created by the self-imposed ban on collective defense came under intense scrutiny and debate.  After the United States and Japan agreed to review the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in 1996, conservatives in the LDP and the members of the opposition New Frontier Party pushed for the Japanese government to finally recognize the right of collective self-defense.  They had support from _Yomiuri Shimbun_, which had published a draft proposal for a new constitution that included explicit language on collective defense.<font size="-1">29</font></font></div> <div><font size="-1" color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">However, the LDP leadership was concerned about maintaining its delicate coalition with the Social Democratic Party and about broader public and regional support for the new Guidelines.  The Clinton Administration was not about to press for constitutional reinterpretation or reform either.  Consequently, the two governments announced that the Guidelines review would occur within the framework of the Japanese Constitution and the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation.  When the new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation were completed in September of 1997, the Cabinet Legal Affairs Bureau determined that almost all of the new missions and areas of cooperation outlined were consistent with a somewhat more flexible interpretation of the right of "individual" self-defense.  The only areas that remained ambiguous were the ability of Japanese minesweepers to operate with U.S. naval forces in offensive operations and the ability of Japan Air Defense Force facilities to refuel or rearm U.S. jet fighters about to strike enemy targets.  However, the Cabinet Legal Affairs Bureau acknowledged in negotiations with the Defense Agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs that even these limitations were subject to reinterpretation depending on the context of the operations.  The most crucial operational support -- in logistics; access to bases, areas, and facilities; sealane patrol; and so forth -- fell within the bounds of "individual" self-defense.</font></div> <div><font color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">Critics of this incremental approach to restructuring the alliance argue that it is insufficient in the context of the post-Cold War changes in Japanese politics and U.S.-Japan relations.  Mike Mochizuki argues that incrementalism impedes Japan's expanded contributions to the alliance, perpetuates ambiguity about the ultimate goal of Japan's defense capabilities and prevents a frank and open discussion of security issues in Japan, particularly at the parliamentary level.<font size="-1">30</font>  In short, the incremental approach preserves the asymmetries that put the alliance at risk in the first place.  Torkel Patterson maintains that "the alternative to increased latitude on collective security and collective defense is a more expensive and autonomous Japanese defense establishment that is less interdependent and interoperable with U.S. forces."  Patterson, a veteran Pentagon official of the Gulf War era of U.S.-Japan friction, argues that Japan's legitimate national security interests extend as far as the Persian Gulf (in tandem with the United States) and that the post-war constraints on U.S.-Japan security cooperation are therefore anachronistic.<font size="-1">31</font></font></div> <div><font size="-1" color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">Supporters of an incremental approach generally agree with the ultimate objectives of those advocating more drastic restructuring, but question the notion that bilateral asymmetries can or should be immediately corrected.  U.S. pressure on Japan to adopt the right of collective defense might provoke a new security debate in Japan, but it would also undermine the broad Japanese domestic political consensus that has allowed the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation review to occur, and it would increase tensions with China and the Republic of Korea.  In the end, the U.S.-Japan alliance would be left with a less stable regional environment and a re-polarization of the politics of defense in Japan.<font size="-1">32</font>  As Bruce Stokes and James J. Shinn note in a Council on Foreign Relations study of the options for the alliance, the alliance must be strengthened so that Japan is "planned in" U.S. strategy (i.e. included in U.S. contingency plans) for the Asia Pacific region, but:</font></div> <div><font color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">the risks of a new Cold War rivalry in East Asia and of being trapped in a deadly self-fulfilling prophecy increase if a tighter alliance antagonizes Beijing.  This is the most compelling reason to move with caution and moderation in strengthening the security relationship with Japan.<font size="-1">33</font></font></div> <div><font size="-1" color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">The key, as Ralph Cossa points out, is not correcting asymmetries, but "defining adequate support to the satisfaction of both nations, and in a manner not threatening to Japan's peace-loving neighbors."<font size="-1">34</font>  Defining "adequate" Japanese support as Cossa urges, and "planning Japan in" as Stokes and Shinn argue, requires implementation of the Guidelines through enabling legislation in Japan-a process that must result from broad public support rather than from divisive debate....</font></div> <div><font color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">[The full article is available at <http://www.nbr.org/publications/review/vol2no1/essay.html>.]<span ></span>   *****</font></div> <div><font color="#000000"><br></font></div> <div><font color="#000000">Yoshie</font></div> </body> </html>