<html> At 20:39 25/01/01 -0400, Dennis wrote: <blockquote type=cite cite> <dl> <dd>Because a left wing policy that called for respect for the democratic rights of subject populations was exactly the stance that should have best followed through to defense of the Kurds. If the left had not totally opposed NATO intervention but criticised it, then it could have linked the criticism to the need likewise to defend the Kurds. <dd>Chris Burford <dd>London <dd>First, the "left" did not "totally" oppose the NATO bombing. There were plenty of those left-of-center who cheered on the pilots in this "humanitarian" action. Second, the idea that one's  tactical criticism of (but not opposition to) imperial bombing would serve as collateral in another human rights nightmare is so ridiculous as to be inspired. By your logic, those who called for a halt to the violence in East Timor were not taken seriously because they were blindly opposed to the NATO bombing of Serbia. Thus, thousands of Timorese were either killed, maimed or displaced simply because portions of the left were too stubborn to see the Big Picture. Well, I must say, I never would have thought this up myself. <dd>DP</blockquote> </dl> No doubt we are unlikely to convince one another, but to take the debate forward  a little, we have to discuss the limits of how any one of us can or should hope to have a slight influence on the actual outcome of events. First I accept Dennis's observation that the left did not totally oppose the war. Maybe that was an impression from e-mail lists. But I certainly did not get the impression that many were cheering on the pilots. Dennis's main argument criticises as ridiculous the idea that a tactical criticism of the imperialist nature of the war developed could have had any weight on other struggles compared to an outright opposition. I feel Dennis makes some logical fallacies around the East Timor intervention which I will not try unpacking because what matters is not formal logic but what sort of movement is at all possible in public opinion. In East Timor there was a wide response from progressive people and from western governments that it was essential to defend the right to self-determination of the people of East Timor. NB that had certainly not been the case with imperialist governments previously which had subordinated such a right to the interests of relations with the right wing dictatorship of Indonesia. The example that others had raised in the debate however, was the Kurds. I maintain my response was logical in terms of the possibility of any shift in public opinion. Without the mass of ordinary people and jjournalistic hacks knowing the details marxist leninist policy on the right of nations to self-determination, I suggest that it was still quite possible for people to recognise the oppression of a small nation or nationality by a bigger one, whether it was in East Timor,  in Kosovo, or in the Kurdish area of Turkey (and Iraq etc). To oppose the suppression of a small people, an oppressed race, or gender, or other minority group, is one of the duties of a democrat with a small '(d') and generally speaking, contributes to the struggle for socialism. The opposing argument is that all talk like that of gallant little Belgium in the first world war, is a mere excuse to build the power of an imperialist war machine like NATO. There is some truth in this argument but in the concrete conditions that pertain today I submit that we will get more of a hearing and be able to influence events more by uniting with the sentiment of revulsion against oppression, and then criticise the imperialist nature of the response. eg 1. East Timor - it was right to defend the legitimacy of the referendum and to install an armed military force but wrong to allow the devastation of the economies of East Asia through the 1998 capitalist crisis 2. Kosovo - right to try to support the right to self determination of the Albanians of Kosovo, but wrong to do it with cluster bombs and depleted uranium in a bombing campaign throughout Serbia 3. Kurdistan - right for the European Union to put some limited pressure on the Turkish state but wrong to be so feeble, wrong for the US to coordinate the capture of Ocalan, and to use Turkey for military purposes 4. Chechnya - feebly right to make some noises of criticism but massively wrong for appeasing Putin's chauvinist war, for reasons of imperialist self interest by the West. That is a coherent story about the fundamental politics adapted to each situation. Now how to have any hopes at all of being influential depends on political context. It may be all hopeless in the USA, and it is not clear to me where Dennis Perrin is writing from. However events in the Balkans feels like in western Europe's back yard, and Turkey is not far away. There are very many Turks in Germany and in my part of London we have numerous Kurds, as well as Bosnians and Albanians. Dennis's suggestion that the stance I have suggested is fantasy, I would also refute by pointing to the position of the left of centre Italian government of D'Alema during the Kosovo war. Now for some on this list D'Alema is by definition an opportunist and a revisionist and there is no further point in discussing the matter. He certainly has made his compromises with imperialism. But during the war his party carried out some mass demonstrations for a just peace in the Balkans. At least one of NATO's actions was openly criticised by the Italian foreign secretary as I recall. Now the result of the war was not a foregone conclusion. The way NATO reacts now, one can see the war was for them a damn close run thing. As the unacceptable "collateral" damage mounted, the 19 nation coalition almost fell apart and everyone knew this was a possibility. Countries like Italy and Germany were critical to it continuing and their reservations would have had a highly significant effect. Remember we do not know how the war ended. We may not know for 10 years until internal papers and memoirs are leaked. But there may well have been a backroom deal brokered by Russia. We do not know what secret clauses were involved. But the assumption that leftists have no chance of influencing the outcome of a major political struggle is one that I would suggest we should reject on principle. It is however necessary carefully to analyse the balance of forces and the contradictions within the enemy camp. One of those important contradictions is that in order to control state power in a modern bourgeois democracy, the officials of the state have to make statements of an apparently enlightened nature. Some at times may even personally believe them. Others are vulnerable to pressure when discrepancies can be shown between their protestations and the reality of the outcome. One legacy of left wing criticism of the imperialist nature of the Kosovan war, is the setting up of the European rapid reaction force. One of the purposes of this force is to give Europe the possibility in a few cases of taking military action which is not dependent on massive US air power manned by precious US citizens It is feeble sickly child, but it is alive, and it is possible that in certain phases of the contradiction between the US and Europe it might become stronger. It might help to stabilise Northern Ireland or the Basque territory. And in the case of the conflict already mentioned, it might be allowed to bring stability to the kurdish area of Turkey, as part of a bigger deal to let Turkey get more favourable terms with the European Union. I do not suggest that any of these scenarios will inevitably happen. But I do suggest it is not ridiculous to consider that crticism of the imperialist methods used to implement a democratic policy, could under certain circumstances have detectable impact. Chris Burford London </html>