>Unlike Doug, I don't see our fractured system as necessarily
>anti-progressive-- it prevents easy national discourse on reform but it also
>prevents similar centralization to rollback past reform successes.
It's not me - I got it from James Madison <http://memory.loc.gov/const/fed/fed_10.html>.
>But the most common and durable source of factions has been the
>various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and
>those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests
>in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall
>under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing
>interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many
>lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and
>divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments
>and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests
>forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the
>spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations
>of the government.
>To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of
>such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the
>form of popular government, is then the great object to which our
>inquiries are directed.
>The two great points of difference between a democracy and a
>republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the
>latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly,
>the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over
>which the latter may be extended.
>
>The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine
>and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of
>a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
>interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice
>will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
>considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the
>public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will
>be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the
>people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the
>effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local
>prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption,
>or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the
>interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small
>or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper
>guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of
>the latter by two obvious considerations:
>
>In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the
>republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain
>number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that,
>however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number,
>in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the
>number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion
>to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in
>the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit
>characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the
>former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater
>probability of a fit choice.
>Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic
>has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is
>enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union
>over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the
>substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous
>sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of
>injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the
>Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments.
>Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater
>variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to
>outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the
>increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase
>this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles
>opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an
>unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union
>gives it the most palpable advantage.
>
>The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
>particular States, but will be unable to spread a general
>conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may
>degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy;
>but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must
>secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A
>rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal
>division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project,
>will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a
>particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is
>more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire
>State.