>-How do you think this will end up??
>
> Alexandre Fenelon
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Moscow Tribune
April 5, 2002
KREMLIN EMASCULATES DUMA
Putin preparing for elections
By Stanislav Menshikov
Vladimir Putin's mini-coup in the Duma follows the general tendency of his presidency to transform the country into a personal autocracy with a liberal face. Step one in this strategy was appointing seven non-constitutional presidential representatives who largely usurped the powers of regional governors elected according to the constitution. Step two, was to banish governors from the Federation Council (equivalent of the Russian Senate) and to effectively convert that chamber into a representation of nobodies acting on instructions from the Kremlin. Now, step number three is to deprive opposition in the lower chamber (Duma) of active participation in the legislative process.
Because Russia is a multiparty rather than a two-party system, no single political party in the Duma ever had an absolute majority. The way the system works is to apportion committee chairmanships among parties according to their share in total membership. This provides both government and opposition parties with the staff, offices, communication facilities, etc. for working on their own pieces of legislation, not simply reacting to what the government proposes. It may not be an ideal system, but it guarantees the right of democratic debate. In the end, the government majority has its way, but putting presidential and cabinet initiatives through the grinding machine of parliamentary discussion is a healthy procedure.
Boris Yeltsin hated the system because it gave the communists too loud a voice. But despite his inner feelings, he did not attempt to break it down. Vladimir Putin, on coming to power, forced a disproportional package deal that effectively punished the Fatherland-All-Russia (i.e. Primakov-Luzhkov) group for daring to compete with his own Unity party in the 1999 elections. This deal was an effective block of Unity with the Communists, in which both sides got more chairmanships than they were entitled to. It did not restrict the right of the left opposition to oppose Putin initiatives when they so chose. However, for more than two years Putin seemed satisfied and did not question the arrangement.
Suddenly, in late March the Kremlin administration gave word to its underlings in the Duma that it would like to get rid of the left-wing committees. The pro-government majority readily obliged. After a vote with no discussion, the Communists and Agrarians lost seven of their nine committees. In protest, they resigned from chairmanship of the remaining two.
The formal reason given was that the opposition was slowing down the adoption of government proposed legislation. As one Unity deputy put it with rare undemocratic candour, "they were even proposing alternative
legislation". Actually, most legislation initiated by the government was being rubber-stamped at speeds unknown in western parliamentary practice.
The real reason, however, is different. Latest public opinion polls show the government parties and their leaders loosing popularity. Most of this new trend is due to falling real incomes, particularly in the provinces. The person mostly blamed for inflation and deferred wage payments is prime-minister Mikhail Kasyanov, but the president has also lost 3-4 percent in ratings. Even more troubling are record low ratings of the presidential United Russia party, which in late March got only 21 percent approval against 34 percent by the Communists. If this trend continues, the government party might well loose the next election to the Duma coming in December 2003. Only a year and a half is left and Putin's people have precious little to turn the tide.
Their first move was to "punish" communists and their allies in the Duma. For some reason, Unity politicians believe that high left-wing ratings are correlated with committee chairmanships and the associated "administrative resources". They hope that taking over nine parliament committees from the "reds" will boost their own popularity with the electorate. The sad fact is that the "centrist" majority in the Duma is simply a bunch of second careerists with no stated ideology or constructive program except holding on to Putin's coattails. Vladislav Surkov, the man who supervises the United Russia party affairs from the Kremlin on a daily basis, has admitted that "intellectual life in the party equals zero". A party with no positive program can hardly appeal to the electorate.
The Putin operation in the Duma is clearly undemocratic and tends to emasculate parliamentary freedoms. Because it is aimed at suppressing communists it may even help bolster Putin's image with western powers. However, it could also prove to be counter-productive inside the country. By consolidating openly with right-wing leaders like Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, Putin makes opposition proposals a credible alternative to his own economic policies responsible for stagnation and falling incomes. By driving Communists into open opposition he is also opening up a Pandora box of criticism of his ties to the Yeltsin "family", his alleged responsibility for pre-Chechnya bombings in Moscow, his responsibility for surrendering Russian national security to the US, etc. It is not easy to shrug away these claims because they come from both sides of the political spectrum. Support for such criticisms are widespread in Russia. Whoever starts a straight attack on Putin's weaker points, will gain strong political points with the electorate.