>The US had a lot of influence during the Yeltsin years. Yeltsin's speeches
>on economic policy were written by Sachs. The Yeltsin-era elite practically
>lived off IMF money. In fact. the IMF basically financed the first Chechen
>War.
That's funny. I didn't think Sachs spoke much Russian--certainly not enough to write speeches.
CD: They were translated into Russian, duh. I am relying on Glinski and Reddaway's book Market Bolshevism on this, by the way. Sachs is not looked upon kindly here.
Brad: What looks like "a lot of influence" in Moscow looks like "next to no power" in Washington. Your only half-credible threat is to cut off your aid--and following through on that threat is unlikely to do anything but produce chaos, hence your threat is unlikely to be believed. And as examples like Diem and the Shah illustrate, attempts by the U.S. to trigger a change-of-government are unlikely to make things better.
CD: I was thinking more of the active interference on behalf of Yeltsin in 1996. Yeltsin was thoroughly discredited back in 1994.
Actually, I don't think the US shouls try to influence Russia at all. I think they should stay the hell out.
Brad: Nevertheless, a lot of people I talk to are surprisingly hopeful about Russia. I know I was very impressed by Andrei Ilarionov when I met him. Andrei Shleifer says that Ilarionov is really good--smart, thoughtful, patriotic, personally frugal, dedicated to making Russia's economy function rather than applying some Procrustean ideological straightjacket...
CD: I like Illarionov. He's a smart, pragmatic guy, though too liberal for my tastes. Plus, his corruption level seems to be very low. I think it's a good thing that Putin is taking advice from him and not some wretched creep like Chubais or inflexible ideologue like Gaidar -- though unfortunately the former still has a great deal of power.
Of course, a lot of people were surprisingly hopeful about Russia in 1997...
Chris Doss The Russia Journal