Chris Doss The Russia Journal ------------------
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
3. COMING OF AGE IN THE CAUCASUS
These are my notes of a lecture delivered at Brown University (Providence, Rhode Island, US) on November 30, 2001 by Sergei Aryutunov, head of the Department of the Caucasus at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. In the lecture, which was part of a series in honor of the centennial of the eminent American anthropologist Margaret Mead, Professor Aryutunov explained how current cultural and socio-economic conditions in the Northern Caucasus, especially in Daghestan, are conducive to the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. I have omitted the first section of the lecture, which was devoted to the influence of Mead's work on anthropologists in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia. -- ed.
The traditional societies of ethnic communities in the Northern Caucasus were rigidly stratified. The most elaborate social structure was that of the Circassians in the north-western Caucasus. They had 12 strata -- from princes (and a special stratum of bastards of princes!), nobles, and three ranks of knights through yeomen (free farmers) and peasants down to serfs, semi-slave serfs, and full slaves, who were mostly recent captives and were treated like animals.
Most other ethnic groups had about 4 strata. The most important dichotomy was that between freemen or "uzden" (knights and yeomen) and unfree "kur" (peasants, serfs, and slaves). The Chechens were unique in that they were all "uzden" (yeomen), although they kept non-Chechen captives as slaves.
"Kur" and "uzden" were brought up with different values. "Kur" learned to value honest decent agricultural and cattle-rearing labor. "Uzden" -- and especially knights and above -- were taught to view war, sudden raids, robbery, abduction of cattle and brides as indicators of courage and noble behavior.
The purpose of robbery was never that of adding to one's personal wealth. Cattle that had been abducted on a raid were either distributed as gifts or slaughtered for big feasts to which all neighbors were invited.
An important institution among some North Caucasian peoples, especially the Circassians, was "atalyk" (step- fatherhood). The son of a prince or noble would be brought up by a step-father, a man at least two ranks lower in the social hierarchy than his biological father, to whom he would return only at age 15. As soon as a baby boy was born in a princely household, the knights would vie or even fight with one another for the honor of being the child's step-father. The man chosen would find a wet-nurse and take the baby the next day. It was his duty to teach his step-son horse-riding, fencing, archery, and the use of a rifle. The only productive skill the boy would learn was how to take care of sheep and cattle, because it might take him several weeks to bring home livestock abducted on a raid on a distant village.
One consequence of "atalyk" was deep alienation between fathers and sons. Girls were not affected, so relations between mothers and daughters were much closer.
There is a story that illustrates the strength of the custom that a man of high rank must not be seen to concern himself with the care of his underage son. A man was standing with his friends on the flat roof of his house, discussing military affairs, when his young son, a toddler, wandered up there and came dangerously close to the edge. Without seeming to pay the least attention or pausing, he stepped as if by chance on the hem of the child's robe until the mother heard his cries and rushed to pick him up. Thereby he saved his son's life, but "inadvertently."
Besides the step-father, older male relatives such as uncles and grandfathers would also teach the growing boy how to behave. The son of a noble must never say: "I belong to such-and-such a family." Only kur "belong" to anyone. He must say: "I come from such-and-such a family."
Members of a household had to observe strict rules concerning avoidance. In particular, a daughter-in-law had to avoid her father-in-law for up to 10 years after her marriage. They must not meet or see one another, let alone speak to one another. In addition to the division of the house into two separate sections, this required two sets of doors -- one set used only by the older men, the other only by the younger women.
Tsarist rule did not change these customs much. Russian culture had much less impact on the Northern Caucasus (with the partial exception of North Ossetia) than it had on Georgia and Armenia, which effectively became part of Europe after joining the Russian Empire.
What was the impact of Soviet rule? The traditional structure was affected in different ways in different places. Thus among the Karachai kur (serfs) managed to take and hold on to power. Officials of serf origin discriminated against people of knightly origin. But a more typical situation was that in Kabarda, where uzden remained openly dominant.
In general, peasant values went out of use in the Soviet period, and were replaced by knightly values throughout the population. Even where "kur" were in power, they did not publicize their true origins, but pretended to be noble. The usual Soviet attitude that it was OK to steal from the state took an extreme form in the Northern Caucasus, where stealing from the state was elevated to the status of a positive virtue. Boys were taught: When you can steal, you must steal, it is right and manly.
What had previously been the values of only one section of each ethnic group came to be identified as ethnic or "national" values. Just as in Japan Bushido, the Way of the Samurai, was transformed by the state in the early 20th century into the national code of Yamato, so in Circassian society the Knight's Way, an exact replica of Bushido, became the Circassian Way.
Atalyk was no longer possible under the Soviet regime, but the traditional alienation between father and son remained. Fathers continued to take little part in the upbringing of their sons.
Avoidance rules are observed even today. Husband and wife do not go out to the movies together, and a woman will not speak at a public meeting out of fear that her father-in-law may be sitting in the audience.
Nevertheless modern attitudes are more commonly found among women than men. The average level of education of women is higher. Almost all teachers and physicians are women. Young men will not enter those professions, preferring a military, business, or criminal career.
Traditional structures were able to adapt to the Soviet order, but they are being deeply undermined by post-Soviet conditions. The big change is that young men have lost all respect their elders.
In Soviet times, a young man could say to himself: "I needn't worry. My father will use his connections or bribe someone to get me into university. If I feel like it I can study, but even if I don't he'll make sure I get my diploma. Then he'll find some relative who will help me get started on a career. And when he decides the time has come for me to marry, he'll find me a suitable bride."
But the old connections are now broken. Only money matters, and few fathers have enough to pay all the necessary bribes. Why should the young man respect his father or the village elders, who are no longer able to help him? So he looks for a substitute "father" who can help him.
Such a "father" may be the boss of a criminal or semi-criminal business. If there is an armed conflict in progress, a field commander may play the role. And if the young man lives in a part of the Caucasus where Islam is strong, his new "father" may well be a fundamentalist preacher with plenty of money from Saudi Arabia. Perhaps someone with links to Bin Laden and Al-Saiqa.
Islam can take many different forms. Islam has existed in Tatarstan for almost 1,000 years, but it has not impeded social development, and today Tatarstan is the most cultured and prosperous part of the Russian Federation after Moscow and St. Petersburg.
In the Caucasus there is a sharp contrast between the north-west and the north-east. Islam came to the north-west from the Crimean Khanate only in the 17th and 18th centuries, and its impact has been quite superficial. In the north-east -- Chechnya and especially Daghestan -- Islam is much more deeply rooted.
Daghestan became Moslem as early as the 7th century. Even in the worst years of Soviet rule, schools teaching Arabic literacy and the Koran managed to operate. Islam forms the core of society.
In every jamaat (village community) you will now find two mosques. The mullah of one will be an old man who adheres to traditional Sufi Islam and recognizes adat (customary law). The other mosque will have an active young mullah -- a so-called Salafi or "true Moslem," educated in Saudi Arabia or the Emirates, who recognizes only Shariat (Islamic law) and accuses his older rival of all imaginable heresies and sins. Most of the younger men, and some of the middle-aged too, support him. His ultimate goal, proclaimed openly in private conversation, is an Islamic state based on the Shariat.
So there is a high probability that the culture of Islamic fundamentalism will take root in the north-eastern Caucasus. It all depends on economic conditions. If young people can be taught practical professional skills and provided with jobs in which they can put those skills to use and earn a decent living, then the advance of Islamic fundamentalism can be halted. And there are a few signs of economic recovery in some parts of the Caucasus. But in Daghestan the economic situation keeps on deteriorating.