Vladimir Putin's yesterday's annual address to parliament legitimately concentrated on domestic affairs. These are subjects that lawmakers, businessmen and the general public are directly involved in on a daily basis. The foreign affairs part raised some concerns related to regional conflicts but was largely self-laudatory stressing improved relations with the West. However, one important subject was unduly underplayed - the recurring threat of nuclear rearmament.
Only two weeks ago, the president raised that issue while in Germany. For the first time since the gist of the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was leaked to the media, he expressed concern at changes in the US nuclear strategy, particularly about the possibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. He deplored the development of very small nuclear charges and the possibility of their use in regional conflicts. This would change the role of nuclear weapons from that of deterrents of war to use as offensive weapons.
These important statements were not given necessary publicity in the media. News of more immediate warfare squeezed them out of front pages. That is typical political myopia. For instance, in the current overcharged atmosphere in the Middle East nuclear war there cannot be excluded. Such a contingency is mentioned in the NPR. The recent confrontation between two nuclear powers - India and Pakistan - is another illustration of the same danger.
But there is a much wider, in fact global connotation to the nuclear threat. Putin did not mention it, but work on developing mini-nukes is in progress in Russia, too. Radiy Ilkayev, Director of the Nuclear Centre in Sarov (Arsamas-16) has recently confirmed this in a press interview. If work on nuclear weapons is pursued in the US, as the NPR recommends, a new chapter in the nuclear arms race will be opened. Particularly if, as a result, nuclear tests are resumed. The US has indicated that it does not wish to abide by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. If Washington resumes tests, Russia and other countries are sure to follow. That is a scary prospect, indeed.
Putin seemed to brush off these global implications. As a good sign, he mentioned the expected US-Russia new agreement on reducing strategic nuclear weapons and called the coming George W. Bush visit to Russia in May, "a historical voyage". However, that agreement, as drafted today, is at best imaginary, not real nuclear disarmament because thousands of decommissioned warheads are to be stored rather than destroyed. There is nothing "historical" about keeping warheads readily available for rearmament waiting for somebody to conclude that the right moment has arrived.
Another piece of news last week makes one's hair rise in concern. US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has asked his Science Board to look into the use of nuclear-tipped interceptors in the national missile defence system. Since last December, i.e. as soon as the US announced it was scrapping the ABM Treaty, Russian military experts were warning that this was on Pentagon's mind. Their warnings turned out to be true. Why is this important?
Nuclear-tipped interceptors are more effective in destroying attacking missiles than the more conventional hit-to-kill interceptors that the US is testing now. The latter were planned to withstand an attack of at best a few dozens missiles. Nuclear-tipped interceptors could easily increase that capacity to hundreds. This would make the US missile shield capable of neutralising the Russian deterrence potential - after it is reduced to the 1,500 limit set by the new strategic agreement. All along, Washington was assuring Moscow that its shield was not aimed at Russia, but rather at rogue states. It now looks otherwise. No rogue state in the foreseeable future will have enough missiles that would necessitate such a US capacity.
So far, Russia's military experts did not look at the US missile defence system as a threat for at least another decade. Nuclear-tipped interceptors will change that estimate. They will induce Moscow to review its stance on strategic armaments and, most probably, limit the intended warhead reductions. Plans for decommissioning the heavy land-based SS-18 (Satan) missiles would, most likely, be postponed. Plans for equipping the newer Topol-M missiles with multiple independently targeted re-entry warheads (MRVs) would be accelerated.
The conventional wisdom today is that Russia has not got enough money to finance a "symmetrical response". Therefore it has no choice but to scrap its deterrent capacity. However, much as spending on new nuclear weapons is a shameful waste of resources, let us not count on that scenario as inevitable. Purchases of equipment for strategic nuclear and space forces are today only 18 percent of Russia's total defence procurement, or 14 billion roubles. Increasing them tomorrow by a half would deduct less than 0.1 percent from annual GDP. This would hardly make a dent in resources for economic growth. If the Kremlin gives the word, expenditure will follow.
It is feasible, but extremely dangerous. To avoid being involved in a new nuclear arms race Moscow should take a much firmer stance in its talks with Washington. Leniency in this matter serves no useful purpose.