For the first time since the Gorbachev era, the West seems to be showing a clear and obvious liking for the Russian president. There are substantial grounds for this positive attitude: Gorbachev put an end to the lengthy Cold War, while Vladimir Putin's strategic turn- around after September 11 has provided an opportunity to end the historical opposition between Russia and the West, and to finally integrate Russia into the Western community. However, just like over a decade ago, the West simultaneously has hopes and hard-to-conceal fears that the situation in Russia may develop unfavorably from the Western standpoint. There are a number of fundamental issues the West is most concerned about.
First, there is criticism of Putin's foreign policy by certain groups in the community and in politics. Russia's new pro-Western agenda has not had a very positive influence on domestic political developments, and morale boosts cannot compensate for real geopolitical losses. According to the West, the discord on foreign policy between Putin and the elite, between Putin and public opinion, is threatening Russia's new political agenda and even the stability of the government. Top Western politicians share this fear, though they prefer to listen to Russian journalists and analysts speaking about it, rather than talking of it themselves.
A slightly lesser, but still serious concern for the West are the possible dynamics of development in Russian domestic politics. The threat of tycoons returning to power, and the Yeltsin-era elite being restored - something which has weakened the first two years of Putin's presidency - is a very frightening prospect for the West. According to prior experience in Russia, oligarchy promotes growth of organized crime in all forms. As a criminal superpower, Russia would pose a threat to strategic stability and security around the world.
However, the opposite political agenda - an authoritarian system, which is said to be the aim of former KGB officers - hardly seems any less dangerous for the West.
Finally, there is some uncertainty about Russian liberals and the potential of liberalism in Russia. Expressions of loyalty to liberal ideas no longer guarantee a pardon from the West for charges of dishonesty and corruption.
It is possible to ignore, agree with, or deny the West's expectations and fears about Russia. But we should understand that they are real for the Western public, and they significantly influence the West's policy toward Russia. Having generously given Russia the opportunity to prove its loyalty to its historic pro-Western agenda, the West prefers to attentively watch this process - and, if possible, correct it, restricting itself to moral support and generalized statements. In these terms, it does not take any serious risks, while the pay-off is potentially enormous. (Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)