Thursday, Aug 01, 2002
The Powell-Musharraf connection
G. Parthasarathy
THE widely read Pakistani Urdu newspaper Takbeer carried an interesting report on July 22. It reported that Maj. Mohammad Amin, a former officer of the Pakistan Army who had resigned after the 1971 debacle and was now living in London, had said: "The fact is that two years ago Gen Musharraf had started using Omar (Syed Omar Sheikh now sentenced to death for his involvement in the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl) for uniting all jihadi outfits. I met Omar's father and protested against it. The matter of great regret is that Omar's father had failed to convey my message or convince Omar to refrain from such activities." It is now an established fact that Omar was in regular touch with Brigadier Ejaz Shah of the ISI in Lahore, after we released him following the hijacking of Flight IC-814 from Kathmandu. Omar is also known to have met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. When we took up the case for his repatriation with the Pakistan Government, the ever-serious and perennially mournful looking Abdul Sattar told us that the Pakistan Government had no idea about his whereabouts. It now emerges that the Chief Executive and Army Chief of Pakistan, Gen Pervez Musharraf, was prepared to use a psychopath like Omar for promoting his jihad in Kashmir, even as his esteemed Foreign Minister was piously denying Omar's presence in Pakistan. Omar Sheikh has to be silenced and will be duly executed. He is man who knows too much. His execution will also enable the US to avoid inconvenient questions being asked about the terrorist connections of their present favourite General in Rawalpindi. The US Secretary of State, Gen Colin Powell's high regard for General Musharraf is no different from that of John Foster Dulles for Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Richard Nixon for Gen Yahya Khan and Ronald Reagan for Gen Zia ul Haq. And like his worthy military predecessors, Gen Musharraf will use his American connections to introduce his own brand of "genuine democracy" in Pakistan, debarring all politicians who have a political base, and reducing the Prime Minister to a puppet and Parliament to a rubber stamp. But one sincerely hopes that Gen Powell and his advisers will not expect us to share their assessment of the qualities of head and heart of their favourite General. Anyone with even a cursory understanding of American priorities will understand that the Bush Administration believes that a substantive role for the Army in Pakistan's national life suits their interests in the current war against the Al Qaeda and its supporters. But as far as India is concerned, it is dealing with a General who authored the Kargil conflict, proclaimed resort to low intensity conflict and jihad as legitimate instruments of foreign policy and then flatly denied he had given any commitment to the Americans about permanently ending cross-border terrorism. Gen Musharraf's predecessors — Gen Jehangir Karamat and Gen Asif Nawaz — genuinely believed that dabbling in politics affected the professionalism and morale of their men. Gen Musharraf has come to realise that apart from wielding power and acquiring wealth without responsibility, many of his army colleagues genuinely believe that they have a divine right to wield political power in Pakistan. Thus, Gen Musharraf's own strategy is going to based on seeing that his officers are well looked after, not only while in service but also after they retire. Hence, his desire to retain substantive powers, including those for appointment to high posts. He has found that Gen Colin Powell and Company will be more than willing to play ball with him in this effort. Gen Powell's silence on Gen Musharraf's farcical referendum is in striking contrast to the homilies dished out to India about `transparency' and `credibility'. But how far Gen Powell will go in supporting Gen Musharraf's external agenda, is a question of more than just academic interest to us. Among the accomplishments that Gen Musharraf is trumpeting is the rise in Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves after he joined the American war against terrorism. With Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves having exceeded $6 billion, thanks to large doses of debt rescheduling and international assistance, Gen Musharraf now believes he has more than enough foreign exchange to commence an arms buying spree. The Bush Administration has already assisted him by offering six C130 transport aircraft at $90 million — well below the market price. But this is obviously only the tip of the iceberg. General Musharraf is aiming for much more. On July 23-24, American and Pakistani military officials met in Islamabad for a preparatory meeting of their Defence Consultative Group, that is now scheduled to meet in Washington in December. The American delegation, led by Air Force Col Jeffrey Paulk, had a series of meetings, including one with the Defence Secretary, Lt. Gen Hamid Nawaz Khan. Col Paulk hoped that the revival of the Defence dialogue would "help both countries in moving forward on bilateral relations enabling things to move faster and further". While one should not normally be too concerned about the acquisition of conventional weapons by Pakistan, we cannot ignore an institutional revival of the Pak-US military sales relationship. This often involves supplies of weapons ostensibly from Pentagon stocks at throwaway prices, as was the case with the supply of M 48 A5 tanks in the 1980s and the C 130 aircraft recently. The Pak wish list also involves a requirement for 28 F16 fighters that the US had refused to supply earlier. Despite assurances to the contrary, Pakistan rewired the F 16s supplied earlier to enable them to carry nuclear weapons. There is little doubt that they would do likewise when and if they get more F16 aircraft. Given Pakistan's propensity to attempt nuclear blackmail on every conceivable occasion and the readiness of the US to press panic buttons and evacuate their citizens and diplomats whenever they do so, one wonders how Gen Colin Powell will rationalise such supplies with the professed commitment of the US to counter nuclear blackmail. It is good that New Delhi has persuaded Gen Powell that there can be no question of a dialogue with Pakistan until Gen Musharraf fulfils his promises to permanently end cross-border terrorism. Apart from ending support to his jihadis and closing down terrorist training camps, Gen Musharraf will have to disband ISI supported outfits such as the United Jihad Council and also persuade us that his colleagues in the ISI have finally decided to call it a day on efforts to `bleed' India in Kashmir and elsewhere. Only then can we really be persuaded that the General intends to match his words with deeds. But both India and the US have to make a conscious effort to ensure that their relationship does not get bogged down in the quicksand of Indo-Pakistani differences. It is primarily because of the stated policy of President Bush not to get involved in a `hyphenated' relationship with India that there has been a measure of optimism in the future of India-US relations. We need to look at a broad framework within which we can not only expand cooperation bilaterally, but also look for a wider strategic partnership in the Indian Ocean region. As tensions in the Persian Gulf grow with the Bush Administration's determination to deal with Saddam Hussein, and Al Qaeda backed terrorism spreads to South-East Asia, there is need for a more intensive dialogue between India and the US on a very wide range of issues.
(The author is former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)
Copyright © 2002, The Hindu Business Line. Republication or redissemination of the contents of this screen are expressly prohibited without the written consent of The Hindu Business Line