> Of course, Sweden's future is by no means guaranteed. Responding both to
> globalization and high tax rates, some Swedish companies have moved their
> headquarters abroad - Ericsson, for example, now has its head office in
> London. But the Swedish story should prove that nice societies sometimes
> finish first.
>
And now, of course we know that Ericsson is tanking, and that this preeminent example of Sweden following the lead of other over leveraged speculative corporations leads to the same dire consequences on the downside as for any other country.
But back to the notion I think Peter was referring to with the quote from Wall Street - it may be true that the modes and means of longterm investing in the 80's or early 90's in Sweden failed to raise sufficient interest in its workers. The pension funds at the time were mostly invested in less risky government bonds, of which the Swedes had very few outstanding. I think it was also partly due to the perception of internal economic stability of Sweden at the time. When Sweden raised its rates to 500% in the first ERM crisis in '92 to keep capital in, it signaled a greater desperation move, it also began a period of external investing to keep up, as the OECD stats indicate.
We've recently witnessed, though, how much investing practice can impact pension funds and retirement plans, to the tune of trillions. It should matter much more now whether investing in an Enron or a stable slow growth utility, or frankly in bonds vs. stocks (pension funds tend to be overweight to stocks by 60-70% even though stocks are far more volatile, because of the prevalent mantra that 'they will outperform in the long run' .) Enrons and WorldComs also pop up in portfolios because of the sheer force of marketing and collusion that Wall Street and Asset Managers engage in. My point was, it's high time to take a proactive informed independent view for future investment practices. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <../attachments/20020816/9d1cad08/attachment.htm>