``..Well, there's a chart of GNP at http://dmorgan.web.wesleyan.edu/materials/gnp.htm which puts Russia in the same league as Germany and Britain in 1913, with an impressive rate of growth. But I don't know whether the figures are reliable, or what they're composed of...'' Gordon
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There is a very interesting history of the European powers from the mid-19th C to 1914, called, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, 1848-1914, AJP Taylor, Oxford, 1954, that covers the political and diplomatic events that lead up to WWI. It's worth looking up since it outlines geo-political themes that are still configuring the world: the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Middle East, southern Africa, the Far East. The political maps are interesting since you can still see the residue of events from a hundred to a hundred and fifty years ago in current events.
I got this book to try and figure out what in the hell was going on in Balkans ten years ago and why the UK, France, Germany, Austria, and Italy were so reluctant to do anything...
In any event, in the introduction section Taylor includes some estimates of the great powers and their industrial development 1848-1914:
``In 1850 Great Britain was the only industrial power of any importance; France the only continental country where industry counted for anything. By 1870 Germany had outstripped France in coal production, though France still held her own in iron and steel---Franco-Prussian war was, from the economic pint of view, a war between equals. In Bismarck's time, between 1871 and 1890, the Germans came to overshadow France; they caught up with Great Britain in the last decade of the century, and their heavy industry surpassed hers in the twentieth. Even the small lead which the British maintained in coal is not as significant as it might seem. The British exported a large quantity of their coal [footnote:..a good deal went to France which imported one-third of her supplies..]; the Germans used their coal at home. Austria-Hungary was not negligible economically; after 1867 she kept up much on the French level. Russia remained backward until about 1890. Then she developed more rapidly than any other Power; and by 1914 she had already reached the level of France. But in economics, unlike politics, we cannot confine our figures to Europe. Until 1880 the United States counted for little. Then she had the greatest of all industrial revolutions. By 1914 she was not merely an economic Power on the European level; she was a rival continent. Her coal production equaled that of Great Britain and Germany put together; her iron and steel production surpassed that of all Europe. This was the writing on the wall; economically Europe no longer had a monopoly---she was not even the centre of the world.
The rise of Russia and the United States can be shown even more strikingly if we examine not the actual production, but the rate of development.
Table X. Manufacturing Production of the Great Powers, 1860-1913 (1913 = 100)
1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1913 --------------------------------------------------------------------
Germany 14 16 21 37 60 86 100
France 26 31 38 49 64 89 100
Great Britain 34 44 54 65 76 85 100
Russia 8 13 17 26 58 83 100
U.S.A. 8 12 21 36 55 84 100
In the critical years between 1885 and 1913 British industrial production increased at the annual rate of 2.11 per cent., German at 4.5 per cent. The American rate was 5.2 per cent., and the Russian 5.72 per cent. In 1860 Great Britain had 25 per cent of the world's industrial production; in 1913 less than 10 per cent. Germany had raised her share from 15 per cent to 17 per cent. between 1890 and 1900, but she slipped back again to 15 per cent. by 1913. And this for a simple reason. The United States had less than 20 per cent. of the world manufacturing power before 1880, more than 35 per cent. in 1913. In 1870 German production was 90 per cent. of that of the United States; in 1900 48 per cent.; in 1913 less than 40 per cent.
We must now translate these economic figures into political terms. In 1850 Prussia and Austria, the Powers of central Europe, had still some reason, though not much, to fear the domination of France. They would be supported against it by Great Britain; and this support was decisive. The Russian bogy, though still apprehended, was in reality out of date. it rested solely on manpower and could not be effective, once coal and railways came into their own. Between 1850 and 1870 economic forces worked in line with political tendencies. The Balance of Power was strengthened; and the Bismarckian system after 1871 corresponded to the reality of a number of Great Powers in Europe. After 1890 this Balance began to crumble. Germany towered above all the other continental states; and the Balance was hardly redressed when British power was thrown into the scale against her. But this situation, too, was precarious. The United States could challenge Germany, even if she dominated the continent of Europe; and at the end Russia was developing more rapidly than any other country in the world. The Germans had an opportunity, but it was not one that would last.'' (30-2p)