>That's another interesting case. It wasn't until '98 and the
>devaluation which resulted from the crisis, which the IMF had
>oppposed, that growth began. It wasn't until the default that growth
>began. So it was when the country finally put aside the IMF that it
>began actually to grow. Now, the devaluation combined with high oil
>prices did provide a stimulus to the economy. It did grow quite
>robustly for a couple of years; it has now slowed. I think that the
>magnitude of the decline, a decline of 40% in eight years, was
>enormous. The likelihood of recovery, of growth finally beginning to
>be restored, from this very low base, was, I won't say inevitable,
>but there certainly were some strong reasons given the strong
>natural resource base of the economy. But there are some real
>fundamental problems. There were just some recent articles that have
>indicated that the level of industrial concentration in Russia is
>unbelievable, that something between six and eight industrial
>conglomerates control something like 85% of the industrial base of
>the country. If that's the case, it's not the kind of competetive
>market economy that most of us think is the basis of a strong future
>for any country.