>Posibly. depends on what the aid is used for. I believe in the moral significace of the >distinction between actsa and omissions.
Or, I presume, obligatory and supererogatory. Contra the two Peters (Singer and Unger), I think such a distinction is significant, though, of course, only instrumentally so.
>As I said. But in fact the pressure on Iraq has everything to dow ith money and >power.
I think it has more to do with eliminating a threat both to the US and Iraq's neighbors.
>I should have known, you're that sort sort utilitarian. Take "moral responsibility" just >to mean "subject to moral evaluation," whatever you think that amounts to.
Not very much. I do, however, think it's important that agents feel as though they are morally responsible.
>I doubt it too. Most likely he was just taking early flight to make as sure as possible >that he had flights that left on time. But we don't know.
Well, I think we have pretty good (albeit indirect) reason for believing it.
>Well, we do that because we believe in moral responsibility ;); but the abalogy is >defective. ATtempted murder involves an attempt to have a certain effect, a killing. >Taking the early flight on Sept 11 was not a failed attempt to kill more people.
I was responding to what I took to be a general claim on your part, i.e. that we should gauge the severity of a threat based upon actual consequences in the past as opposed to "what might have happened but didn't." In probably a majority of cases that's an excellent rule of thumb, but in a non-trivial minority it's clearly ludicrous.
-- Luke
>jks
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