[LA Times] 'Sci-Fi' Weapons Going to War By William M. Arkin William M. Arkin is a military affairs analyst who writes regularly for Opinion. E-mail: warkin at igc.org.
December 8 2002
SOUTH POMFRET, Vt. -- On April 30, 2001, more than 30 square miles of the rolling Maryland countryside that make up the Aberdeen Proving Grounds were cleared of all nonessential personnel for the first full-scale test of a new weapon. Planners also took care to remove all unnecessary electronic equipment, because electronic equipment was exactly what the new weapon was designed to destroy.
At 6:13 p.m., the antenna on the exotic new device was switched on and a high-powered beam of microwaves was fired at a nearby truck -- the first field deployment of a "directed energy" weapon. It fried the truck's ignition and air-fuel mixing system, bringing the hapless vehicle to a halt.
About the same time, at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, field demonstrations were being wrapped up on another microwave weapon, this one mounted on a truck and designed to inflict intense pain on human skin. The weapon sprang from a program devoted to what military researchers call "active-denial technology."
Now, a year and a half later, an enormous effort is underway to move these speed-of-light weapons from the realm of research to combat readiness. The same is true for an array of exotic new weapons, including new generations of so-called "agent defeat" bombs. Among the latter is a guided cluster bomb that scatters 4,000 titanium rods capable of penetrating chemical and biological bunkers and storage tanks with lethal effect. Most promising is a new incendiary device that generates a firestorm so intense it cannot be quenched with water.
What lies behind this rush to bring these exotic new weapons into the American arsenal is the Bush administration's almost obsessive determination to eradicate nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in Iraq -- and potentially in other rogue states -- as part of its war on terrorism.
The new devices, along with the development of highly secret special operations units and new tactics, are intended to help the armed forces seize or neutralize the so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with greater speed and security -- as well as with less damage to surrounding areas or people, and less danger of inadvertently spreading toxic materials.
There are risks, however, because some of these new weapons could arguably be construed as violating established codes of wartime conduct. And the risks of a backlash, whether at home or abroad, are magnified by the administration's almost total refusal to talk about what it is doing and thereby build public understanding and support.
Unfortunately, one side effect of framing the war on terrorism in terms of weapons of mass destruction is that it instills in government officials a sense of moral certainty so great that they feel no need to explain or justify themselves.
And, for all the talk of withering airstrikes on thousands of Iraqi targets and of armored divisions racing toward Baghdad, what really distinguishes Washington's preparation for war with Iraq is its focus on finding and destroying Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz made this crystal clear last week when he said, "Our goal is to achieve the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, peacefully if possible, voluntarily if possible, by force if necessary."
And the administration clearly sees high-powered microwave, or HPM, weapons and other such devices as potentially useful in achieving that goal. When Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld was asked at an August press briefing how promising he considered HPM technology, he replied in his characteristically elliptical way by recalling the unexpected emergence of unmanned aerial drones in the Afghanistan war.
"You never know," he said. Drones "that were used in Afghanistan had not reached their full development. In the normal order of things, when you invest in research and development, you don't have any intention or expectations that one would use it. On the other hand, the real world intervenes from time to time."
The real world that drives current war planning is the absolute imperative of thwarting Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons.
For many years, the military and the defense industry have dreamed of directed-energy weapons -- lasers, microwaves and electromagnetic pulses that would operate in milliseconds and leapfrog over the current generations of conventional and nuclear weapons.
Microwave weapons work by producing an intense surge of energy, like a lightning bolt, that short-circuits electrical connections, interferes with computer motherboards, destroys memory chips and damages other electronic components. As antipersonnel weapons, active-denial HPMs send a narrow beam of energy that penetrates about 1/64th of an inch into the skin, where nerves that cause pain are located. By instantaneously heating the skin to above 50 degrees Centigrade (122 degrees Fahrenheit), the microwaves inflict intense pain; often, the reaction they produce is panic. "All the glossy slide presentations in the world cannot prepare you for what to expect when you step in the beam," a high-ranking officer commented last year after experiencing it. His account was contained in military documents.
As a result of the attacks of Sept. 11, these and other highly classified HPM prototypes are being evaluated for use against facilities involving weapons of mass destruction. "We are looking for a boutique of capabilities," Sue Payton, deputy undersecretary of Defense for advanced systems and concepts, told the Pentagon press corps in March, describing the agent-defeat mission. HPMs are being tested against mock targets with the hope of being able to disable them with a minimum of blast effects, civilian death or external physical damage, military sources say.
In fact, HPM weapons technology has now returned to its nuclear roots. In the mid-1980s, the Air Force's Strategic Air Command called for a new weapon able to protect storage bunkers from mobs of anti-nuclear protesters. A "repel demonstrator" device using high-powered microwaves was built and tested in 1996. The focus of the program shifted to crowd control missions for places such as Somalia and Bosnia; two vehicle-mounted prototypes were tested in New Mexico and built before Sept. 11.
While these devices can perform at close quarters, developers of long-range HPM weapons still have had to overcome huge problems in making them combat-ready. They require large power sources. They are small and lack ruggedness. And they have a tendency to inadvertently harm friendly forces.
In April 1999, the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center oversaw the first military HPM weapon successfully demonstrated against electronics on a small scale. The prototype was described at the time as "elegant, safe, well built, and user friendly." Last October, a Defense Department briefing extolled its ability to stop vehicles at hundreds of meters, and military sources hint that at least three different prototypes are available for what might be one-time use in Iraq.
Meantime, the Pentagon has not put all its eggs in the technology basket. It is training special combat units too.
Since Sept. 11, the mission of the U.S. Special Operations Command has focused on combating terrorism and countering weapons as dual priorities. The command's mission, according to Defense Department documents, is to "prevent/limit/minimize the development, possession and employment of weapons of mass destruction [and] to seize, destroy, render safe, capture or recover WMD [weapons of mass destruction]."
The use of Special Forces in this role actually has its roots in the Cold War, when the still-top-secret Delta Force was created. In fact, its first "certifying" exercise, code-named Joshua Junction, took place at a mock nuclear weapons facility on Jackass Flats at the Nevada Test Site. In that exercise, Delta Force teams were to recover a stolen U.S. nuclear weapon from a Middle East terrorist group. Over more than 20 years, what is now called the Joint Special Operations Command has honed its ability to conduct surgical missions against WMD production, storage and other facilities, using techniques and weapons designed to minimize environmental damage and the danger of dispersal.
Putting new weapons together with these highly trained teams of special operators, Pentagon planners have developed detailed scenarios for dealing with any WMD facilities encountered in Iraq.
Unmanned vehicles with special sensors keyed to detect radioactive or chemical emissions would scout the site. HPMs would then be employed. Spreading soundlessly along water pipes, air vents and antennas, they would attack electronic equipment, causing the facility to freeze up. HPMs might also be used to drive the enemy out of bunkers and other secure sites without the destruction and possible collateral damage that come with high explosives.
Cluster and smart bombs could also bring about pinpoint destruction of above-ground facilities. New incendiaries, combined with penetrating munitions and chemicals, could burn up chemical or biological agents. Under a program originally dubbed Vulcan Fire, the Navy and Lockheed Martin are furiously working to field 20 inter-metallic incendiaries. Called HTI-J-1000, these penetrator weapons combine high-temperature explosives to ignite and burn chemical agents, with disinfectant chlorine and acids to neutralize biological agents.
Many of the boutique weapons and special operations remain highly classified not only to preserve the element of surprise, but also because -- politically -- they are highly controversial.
This year's classified Nuclear Posture Review talked of a classified weapon under development that uses "radiological neutralization" of chemical/biological materials in production or storage facilities. "Radiological neutralization" suggests something awfully close to a nuclear weapon. And HPMs intended to destroy military electronics and disrupt civilian electrical power systems might also knock out electrical service to hospitals, for instance, and attack backup generators. Even people with pacemakers might be affected.
Similarly, high-tech antipersonnel devices must inflict pain while avoiding burning, eye damage or other prolonged effects that could be considered "unnecessary suffering," which is banned under existing treaties and international law.
The Bush administration justifies use of the new weapons on grounds that hitting WMD sites with conventional weapons might create large-scale disasters, because hazardous chemicals, toxins and biological agents could be dispersed over a wide area.
This line of thinking may stem in part from the fact that, during the 1991 Gulf War, when Hussein had an enormous chemical and biological arsenal, the United States took huge risks in attacking WMD sites. American intelligence had no idea which targets actually contained chemical and biological agents; only after the war did we discover how little correlation there'd been between actual and suspected WMD sites.
Today, U.S. intelligence about the location of Hussein's illicit materials is no better. The hope is that Iraq will do something to "expose" its weapons, providing the opportunity for a clear American shot. The goal -- reducing the risk of nuclear, chemical or biological disaster -- is important.
But good intentions may not be a good enough answer if units such as Delta Force are sent into action with weapons and tactics that appear to cross the threshold of what is considered lawful and acceptable. Especially if the U.S. government does not begin to make its case to the American public and the rest of the world until after the fact.
Secrecy seems to be the Bush administration's favorite operating style. In the end, however, events may prove that its momentary convenience comes at a heavy price.