>
>There are few more disastrous errors in historical thought than in
>confusing a description for an explanation. Descriptions and definitions
>are essential to identify _what needs to be explained_. But historical
>thought consists in giving such explanation.
Description isn't at issue here. A definition either comprises and/or infers an explanation -- whether that's a definition of Marxist or of power. And an explanation -- say of either of those -- comprises and/or infers a definition. The words we use constrain as well as produce what we talk about.
At the level of say, a book for review or an essay to be marked, an explanation may very well be more nuanced than a definition -- depends on your definition though. That doesn't mean an explanation does not infer a definition of what is being explained.
Now if you wanted to tell me that you avoid all definitions because they are always too simplistic, not as aware of the historical/cultural specificity of a concept and inclined to present it as static, I would probably agree. But only with the proviso that your or my explanations will always be inferring some kind of de facto definition whether we hope to avoid that or not.
Of course this could be something to do with Lukes, and therefore beyond my ken. Or some sort of Aristotelian thing, in which case I just have to say again that I have nothing whatsoever against the man or his work, we just don't belong to the same world.
Catherine