...[I]n undertaking the blockade, the allies played into American hands. A demonstration of military aggression against a Circum-Caribbean state by one or more European states had always provided an opportunity for American diplomats to wring out transit and other rights from the beleaguered state. This had happened in Colombia in 1848, which had conceded transit rights to United States citizens in Panama against the background of British encroachments in Central America; Nicaragua had done the same the following year; while Guzmán Blanco in desperation at British encroachments in the Guyana region in the mid-1880s, had sought to cultivate American support by granting monopoly concessions to American interests in the Orinoco basin.32 The British, if not the Germans, because of their novice status in the Caribbean, might have been expected to learn from this historical experience the risk of throwing Caribbean states more firmly into the orbit of Monroism, but evidently they did not. The allied coercion of Venezuela, reaching the highest pitch of intensity with the German bombardment and destruction of the Venezuelan fort of San Carlos, precipitated the signing in Washington by the Colombian negotiator of the inequitable Panama Canal zone treaty, which the Colombian Congress would later regret and vainly try to reverse. As for Castro, though the majority of Venezuelans rallied to his memorable war cry "La planta insolente del extranjero ha profanado el suelo sagrado de la Patria,"33 he knew that while he could wear the allied enemies out in a land war, they were supreme at sea, especially after they had seized or destroyed several Venezuelan gunboats without any declaration of war. Castro also knew that with the local insurgents not yet fully suppressed, and with the nearly total dependence of his government on the customs revenues of the two main ports of La Guayra and Puerto Cabello, he had to lean on the Americans for intercession with the blockading powers and for a negotiated settlement.
The story of how the American minister at Caracas, Herbert Bowen, was assigned the role of negotiator by Castro, with the consent of the government of the United States, is well known and the details of the negotiations need not be repeated. The end result was that by February 13, 1903, the first of two series of protocols were signed at Washington with the blockading powers under which a partial cash payment by Venezuela for "first line" diplomatic claims would be made, "second line" diplomatic claims would be resolved in the now time-honoured tradition of "mixed commissions" with provision for a neutral umpire if the commissioners were deadlocked, and for the vexed question of preferential treatment for the blockading nations over all other foreign claimants to be decided by the Hague Tribunal. The following year that tribunal decided in favour of the blockaders.34 As far as foreign capitalist interests were concerned -- in which American interests were now becoming vitally involved -- it was once more a triumph for the advanced industrial states since the attempt by Castro to have these claims first assessed in Venezuelan courts before reference to international tribunals was at least temporarily defeated. It is an indication of the exploitative nature of the claims business, that once negotiations for a settlement had begun nearly every western investor country put in its claim, and some of the claims were enormously inflated. To give some examples: The United States, posing as the friend of Venezuela, put in the largest claim of all, amounting in round figures to Bs 81,410,952, of which only Bs 2,269,543 were recognised by the mixed commission; Italy claimed Bs 39,844,259, of which only Bs 2,975,906 were recognised; Belgium claimed Bs 14,921,805, of which Bs 1,898,643 were recognised. Germany's claim was relatively modest -- Bs 7,376,685 -- of which 2,091,906 were recognised. English claims faired best of all: Bs 14,743,572-of which Bs 9,401,267 were recognised. Altogether foreign claims on Venezuela's hard-pressed revenues amounted in round figures to Bs 186,558,150 of which a small fraction -- Bs 35,575,154 -- were eventually recognised by the mixed commissions of 1904.35 This seeming fair play was no doubt meant to legitimize the precedence of international tribunals over Latin American national tribunals, but the gross discrepancy in the amount of the claims and what was eventually recognised also reveals the utter lack of scruple employed by the northern states as a pressure tactic against Latin American states at the time.
The Anglo/German blockade of the Venezuelan ports, we have argued, played into the hands of the Americans....[T]he United States now had the justification needed for the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The preference shown for the claims of the blockading nations also represented a de facto rejection of the Drago Doctrine 38 by the Hague Tribunal, though in 1907, when the claims of the blockaders were virtually paid out by the Castro regime, the Hague Tribunal modified its position on the use of force to collect debts.
For Venezuela, the claims payments, though drastically reduced, represented an annual remittance to the blockading powers of thirty percent of revenues from the two principal ports engaged in external trade, La Guayra and Puerto Cabello. In addition, in June, 1905, the Castro administration was required to sign a new agreement consolidating the external debt due to British bondholders and the debt due to the Diskonto Gesellschaft of Berlin, both inherited from previous administrations, amounting to Bs 132,049,925, which had to be serviced by twenty five percent of the ordinary revenues of all ports. This meant that the charges on the income of the two major ports of La Guayra and Puerto Cabello amounted to fifty five percent of their annual revenues -- "this, in a country whose port revenues amounted on the average to 90% of all fiscal collections; a country whose treasury was in a permanent state of penury and which in that epoch had no possibility of tapping other sources of fiscal income."39 That Castro paid out the debts to the blockaders within the stipulated period is testimony to his strong commitment to legal obligations and the capacity of the Venezuelan masses to endure deprivation.
It was that very commitment to legality, as well as his national fervour and outrage, that brought him into headlong conflict with American and French interests after 1904. He received information in early 1904 that the New York and Bermudez Company, before the Venezuelan Supreme Court had rendered its decision in favour of the company, had helped to finance the destructive Revolución Libertadora led by Matos. In 1905, he also received information which implicated in the same insurgency the French Cable Company, which had a monopoly over cable communications between Venezuela and Europe. He also had ample evidence that the British and Dutch colonies of Trinidad and Curaçao had once again played an important facilitating role in the costly insurgency. Castro was determined to reverse the tradition whereby Venezuela always had to pay compensation for alleged injury to foreigners and their property in Venezuela, while those foreign interests which fomented death and destruction in Venezuela received no punitive sanction. He retaliated by first suing on July 20 th , 1904, through his Attorney General, the New York and Bermudez Company for damages for the non-fulfillment of the terms of its contract and applied to the Primary Court of Claims of the Federal Court and Court of Cassation for the cancellation of the company's concession. He also applied, as was permissible under Venezuelan law, for a Receiver to take charge of the company's assets pending the outcome of the litigation. The suit was granted, and a commission was appointed by the court to assess damages to be paid by the company. It assessed damages at Bs 1,500,000 or approximately $300,000. Castro followed this by another suit in September, 1904, through the Attorney General, this one against the company for having fomented and aided the Matos rebellion. That suit finally heard in August, 1907, after much diplomatic protest and threats from Washington, resulted in the company being fined Bs 25,000,000, equivalent to $5,000,000. As O.E. Thurber, who gave in 1907 what was perhaps the most thoroughly documented account of the diplomatic impasse between the United States and Venezuela, argued, if a foreign corporation operating in the United States had been caught promoting riot and insurrection against the United States Government, the principals would probably have been hung if apprehended, the property of the offending corporation would have been confiscated, and the universal verdict would have been one of approval: "Can any one conceive that another nation would have the temerity or insolence to call us to account for our action, or for the means adopted to bring the criminals to justice?"40
But as Castro himself had recognised, in the international relations conducted by the western powers, it was strength, not principle or consistency of conduct, that mattered. When he received news of the success of the first suit, the immediate response of the same American Minister, Herbert Bowen, who had negotiated the Washington Protocols with the blockading powers, was immediately to request an American battle fleet to seize the customs houses at La Guayra and Puerto Cabello if the company's embargoed property was not returned within twenty four hours. The Venezuelan foreign minister responded by pointing out that his government was following due legal process, that the company was free to appeal to the Venezuelan courts, that Bowen was tarnishing the name of a Venezuelan nation and threatening its sovereignty, against which the Venezuelan government had to protest. The Venezuelan government on January 6, 1905, in the face of a mounting campaign of hostility by the State Department and sections of the American press, offered to sign an arbitration treaty with the United States under which all issues which "legally acquired a diplomatic character" and which the two governments could not settle by mutual consent would be settled. The United States government agreed in principle, but wanted the Venezuelan government to suspend all legal proceedings against the New York and Bermudez Company and to restore its control over its properties, pending the decision of an arbitration tribunal. However, the Venezuelan government took the view that in international law a case pending in a national court is not a diplomatic question and can only become such after the court had rendered its final decision in such a way and in such terms as to constitute an injustice.41 The United States government, like most of the other strong powers, refused to recognise this Venezuelan insistence on what was now being called the "Calvo Doctrine." Instead, it adopted the big power tactic of invoking more diplomatic claims,42 sending some warships for naval manoevres, but not proceeding to blockade any port, since Latin American countries were already becoming alienated from the United States. Moreover, in the years 1905 to 1907, the United States government was preoccupied with the Russo-Japanese war and the Morocco conflict.
Castro acted against the French Cable Company in September 1905, by raising its annual tax payment. When the company's manager refused to pay the increased tax, he had him expelled and took the company to court. The French government withdrew its minister, leaving their consul general, Olivier Taigny, in charge of French interests. Taigny protested against the Venezuelan government's action, rejecting the allegation that the company had supported the Matos rebellion. Then followed what Taigny would later call "an opera bouffe." Castro had refused to send Taigny an invitation to his 1906 New Year's party for foreign diplomats, on the ground that Taigny was a consular agent and not a diplomat. When Taigny turned up anyway at the party, he was studiously ignored by Castro. This immediately led to a furore, with the French government, asserting that it had been subjected to a diplomatic insult, called for a public apology from the Venezuelan government, and when this was not forthcoming broke off diplomatic relations. Castro, in the meantime, fully aware of the use of the cables for coded messages to insurgents, cut the French cable link from Caracas to Curaçao. Taigny, now without diplomatic status, attempted to hand-retrieve French diplomatic mail on board the French liner, the "Martinique," but was not permitted to debark by Venezuelan customs security, and was thus effectively expelled from Venezuela.43 This, of course, further embittered relations with France, which now threatened a naval blockade with secret encouragement from the United States, which, however, wished France to act unilaterally. Entangled with Germany in the Morocco crisis, the French government wisely refrained from playing the American game, and simply settled, like the Americans, for a policy of watchful waiting.
Castro's strategy for dealing with those two island bases of insurgency, Trinidad and Curaçao, was to blockade the major Venezuelan ports in times of insurgency, which only the powerful war vessels of the western powers could break, and often did. Such blockades had the effect of strangling legal trade between the islands and Venezuela, which could be circumvented only by smuggling, with the risk of contraband vessels falling victim to Venezuelan gunboats. Moreover, Castro continued Guzmán Blanco's strategy of making the Venezuela northern coastal ports direct ports of call for ships engaged in the trans-Atlantic and North America trade.44 This would cut off the lucrative middle man's profits from Trinidad and Curaçao. Simultaneously, he strengthened port defenses, strengthened his military and popular forces, especially in the outlying states, and allocated a larger share of the budget to defense. He also dealt ruthlessly with insurgents when they were caught, and could be credited as the Venezuelan leader who effectively put an end to the caudillaje, which had devastated the country over the previous half century. By 1908, every externally sponsored attempt to dislodge him from power had failed miserably. Detested by most resident diplomats except the Germans, with whom he had developed a rapproachment, Castro by mid-1908 could only evoke something akin to despair from the British minister, Sir Vincent Corbett. Commenting on the signs of another insurgency, he denounced Castro as ruthless in his response: "On the other hand, it must be remembered that the President, despite his low origin and imperfect education is a Man [his emphasis], and as such a head and shoulders above his adversaries. In spite of the universal detestation in which he is held, he may yet by sheer force of character again defeat his enemies as he has done before."45
Yet the unexpected happened: by the end of the year Castro would be out of power via a palace coup rather than an insurgency. We must now conclude with a brief overview of how it happened. In April, 1908, the United States Government, becoming increasingly frustrated by Castro's intransigence on the issue of arbitrating the New York and Bermudez issue and four others that were subsequently added, attempted a naval intimidation of Castro by sending the warship "Tacoma" to La Guayra, which, in the context of news of another insurgency in the making, with Trinidad as a likely base of operations for General Rolando, prompted Castro to make defensive preparations once more. Early in the same month it was rumoured abroad that there was an outbreak of bubonic plague in La Guayra, the chief Venezuelan port. The Trinidad authorities began prohibiting Venezuelan ships from landing goods and passengers at the Port of Spain harbour.46 This measure would certainly have resulted in Venezuelan ports having to depend on goods coming from Trinidad and Curaçao and would have delivered a serious setback to Castro's attempt to confine the Venezuelan coasting and external trade to Venezuelan ports. On April 28, Castro retaliated against Trinidad by passing a decree which quarantined La Guayra as a port of entry, citing the very bubonic plague that the Trinidad government had cited for its action. In early May the Curaçao authorities began to quarantine Venezuelan vessels coming with clean bills of health from other Venezuelan ports. Castro retaliated with a decree on May 14, virtually prohibiting foreign vessels from conducting trade with Venezuelan ports. In the same month of May an Amsterdam journal, the Hou en Trou published a letter from the Dutch Minister in Caracas, J.H. De Reuss, critical of the Castro administration. A month later, sensing an impending crisis between Castro and the British and Dutch interests, the Roosevelt administration decided to increase the pressure on Castro by breaking off diplomatic relations (June 13, 1908). In July another Dutch journal, the Handelsblad, revealed De Reuss' letter to the public, following which Castro handed De Reuss his passport on the ground that his conduct was incompatible with his diplomatic status. In the meantime mercantile interests in Curaçao appealed to the queen of the Netherlands saying that Castro's decree was ruining the trade of Curaçao and it was hinted that unless the Dutch government took urgent action, Curaçao might invite the United States to establish a protectorate over the island. The Roosevelt administration made it known diplomatically to the Dutch that it would have no objection to the Dutch mounting a naval blockade and even temporarily taking control of the Venezuelan customs houses. The stage was set for the final showdown.47 From August the Dutch began sending their iron-clads for a demonstration before the main Venezuelan ports and to prepare for the possible landing of troops.
The timing could not have been better. Castro was now suffering from severe bouts of fever and exhaustion due to a bladder infection and an intestinal ulcer. It was rumoured that he might die, unless he undertook a delicate operation abroad. Leaving his Vice President, Juan Vicente Gomez to deal with the Dutch blockade, Castro sailed for Europe on the 23 rd of November, heading for a medical institution in Germany to be operated on by one Dr. Israel. According to the British Minister in The Hague, Lord Acton, the prevailing feeling there was that "a fatal termination to the President's illness might afford a solution to the difficulty"; while the British Foreign Minister, Lord Landsdowne, minuted on December 7, "Dutch diplomacy has so far been futile. The government probably long for Castro's death at the hands of the Berlin surgeon."48
It was while Castro was being medically treated in Berlin that Juan V. Gomez, in a move carefully orchestrated by Castro's local opponents and foreign diplomats, carried out his palace coup on December 19, 1908, and invited the United States government to despatch warships to Venezuela, following which the Buchanan-Guinan accords were worked out. The New York and Bermudez property would be returned and the other American claims arbitrated.49 The Dutch failed to obtain the general commercial agreement with Venezuela they had hoped for. Once again a European aggression against Venezuela had worked to the advantage of United States interests.
But Castro did not die from the surgeon's knife and once he had sufficiently recuperated from the operation, he took ship and headed back to the Caribbean in March 1909, confident that his popular support among the masses, as distinct from the Venezuelan elite and their foreign allies, was strong enough for him to recapture the government and to deal with those who had betrayed him. Both Gomez and his foreign allies evidently believed that as well. In a move coordinated by the American government, the British and the Dutch authorities debarred him from landing at either Trinidad or Curaçao. On the 7th of April, 1909, he disembarked from the "S.S. Guadeloupe" at Fort de France, Martinique, but after taking an early morning stroll, he reported feeling unwell and his brother claimed that his stitches were reopening; he remained in his bed for the rest of the day in his underwear. In the meantime orders arrived from Paris that he was not to be permitted to remain in Martinique or be allowed to head for Venezuela. Three doctors testified that he was fit enough to be embarked despite the protests of some civilians who had seen him. He himself refused to get out of his bed. Gendarmes were summoned. At around 8:45 p.m. they took him out in a stretcher clad only in his underwear to the French liner "The Versailles" which had been delayed for nearly three hours for the purpose."50
The first Caribbean Castro to challenge Western imperialism would never again be allowed to set foot on his native land. He was transported to France, disembarking at St. Nazaire on 24 th April, 1909. Despite his immediate proclamation that he was no longer interested in regaining the Venezuelan presidency and wanted only freedom to attend to his personal affairs and to grow lettuce like Diocletian, after a period of physical recuperation he would make several vain attempts to return to his native Venezuela before dying in exile in Puerto Rico.51
[Endnotes omitted. The full text of the article is available at <http://www.sg.inter.edu/revista-ciscla/volume29/singh.pdf>.]
-- Yoshie
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