This year, 2002, was a crucial year in Russia's history. The post-Yeltsin regime attained equilibrium.
The elites are happy; the citizenry is absolutely calm and mostly content. We see it in the president's unprecedented approval rating figures.
The citizenry was almost as content in the early 1970s, when the country was inundated with petro-dollars for the first time. Ten years later, this windfall ended, and the system collapsed.
These days, the petro-dollars mostly end up at their place of origin, i.e. in the West. The process takes the form of withdrawal of capital and the form of direct investment already. Some dollars remain in Russia, however, boosting the population's consumption capacities.
The socioeconomic structure is finally balanced out. The whole nation depends on natural resources. As an exporter of raw materials, Russia is no different from other such countries. It has split into two countries: the oil, metal, and chemicals barons at the top, all the rest of the semi-impoverished population down below. And the 5% of the population servicing oligarchs in between, instead of a middle class.
Social mobility is no more. There are no new leaders appearing in business or politics. This is quite understandable. During the revolutionary decade of 1989-99, the leaders of the "initial privatization fraud" grabbed as much as they could swallow. We all see their appetites. And since they are around 40 years old, give or take a few years, it follows that they have come to stay. There are no new heights to conquer for new leaders, because the economy is not growing.
The functions of a raw materials exporter are apparent - support the status quo, protect oligarchs from the citizenry and external rivals. The oligarchs in question are those 100-150 people who own Russia, holding assets in one hand and power in the other, shifting them between hands every now and then. This function was particularly noticeable in late 2002 when the Slavneft auction was organized. Everything was made brutally clear: a direct message to foreign investors to mind their own business (and leave the Russian economy alone); a contest of political abilities; and a gift to a Russian oligarch to the tune of over a billion dollars of state funds. All this shows the stability and unchanging nature of the existing socioeconomic model. Just as Sibneft was privatized six years ago, Slavneft was privatized by Sibneft itself the other day. Once put into motion, the pattern reproduces itself again and again. There are some differences of course, minor ones. Six years ago, a company was sold at one-tenth of its real value. The other day, another was sold at about half its value. But six years ago the media and the Duma hit the roof and would not be calmed down. This time, no one cares.
This is a feature of the media's political culture in the period of mature oligarchy: no need to hide anything, since everything is clear; no opportunity to object to anything or to be surprised, since everyone knows that "this is how it has always been".
Yeltsin's system has become more mature, logical, and stable without Yeltsin. Democracy was out of the question under Yeltsin; now it is history. Hence the boredom provoked by politics. It was clear in 1999 and 2000 already, but became much more so in 2001 and 2002. It appears that no one but Duma members themselves and PR consultants are looking forward to the Duma election in 2003: the "election in slumber".